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Abstract 
 
Estimation of uncertainty is an important aspect of perception and a prerequisite for 
effective action. This thesis explores the implementation of uncertainty estimation as 
precision modulation within a predictive coding hierarchy, optimised within a 
neurbiologically-plausible message-passing scheme via the minimisation of free-energy. 
 
This thesis consists of six chapters.  The first presents a new model of a classic visual 
illusion, the Cornsweet illusion, which demonstrates that the Cornsweet illusion is a 
natural consequence of Bayes-optimal perception under the free-energy principle, and 
demonstrates that increasing contrast can be modelled by increasing signal-to-noise ratio.   
The second chapter describes dynamic causal modelling of EEG data collected from 
participants viewing the Cornsweet illusion, demonstrating that a reduction in precision, 
or superficial pyramidal cell gain, in lower visual hierarchical levels, is sufficient to explain 
contrast-dependent changes in ERPs. The third describes a model of a simple attentional 
paradigm – the Posner paradigm – recasting attention as the optimal modulation of 
precision in sensory channels. The fourth describes an MEG study of the Posner paradigm, 
using Bayesian model selection to explore the role of changes in backwards and 
modulatory connections and changes in local superficial pyramidal cell gain in producing 
the electrophysiological and behavioural correlates of the Posner paradigm. The fifth 
chapter recasts the Posner paradigm in the motor domain to investigate the level 
(intrinsic vs. extrinsic) of precision modulation by motor cues. The sixth describes a new 
model of sensory attenuation based on using precision modulation to balance the 
imperatives to act and perceive. 
 
I hope to demonstrate that precision modulation within predictive coding hierarchies, 
under the free-energy principle, is a flexible and powerful way of describing and 
explaining both behavioural and neuroimaging data 
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Introduction 
 
1. Background 
 
Living organisms are remarkable in their apparent ability to violate the second law of 
thermodynamics; that is, to resist the tendency to disorder over time (Schrödinger, 1944). 
Humans, for example, manage to keep their blood sugar, temperature, extracellular ion 
concentrations, blood pressure and many other such physiological variables within tightly 
controlled limits at all times. This is managed through elaborate systems of interoceptive 
and exteroceptive sensory receptors and reflex arcs which can monitor changes in these 
variables and act to return them to physiological limits. In essence, this involves reducing 
the entropy of the distributions of states occupied – ensuring that a small number of states 
are occupied most of the time, with the rest being very rarely occupied. Assuming that the 
organism and the system containing it are not changing over time (‘ergodic assumptions’), 
entropy is just the long-term average of surprise, and instead of minimising entropy the 
organism can maintain its homeostasis by reducing surprising sensations – a body 
temperature of 41oC, or a blood pH of 5.5, would be surprising (as well as deadly) to a 
human, for example. 
 
Although this process is remarkable in living organisms, it is by no means uniquely human. 
An earthworm or a bee also has systems that allow maintenance of extracellular sodium 
concentration, or temperature. However, humans are vastly better at doing this under a 
wider variety of circumstances than, for example, earthworms or bees. If I were to go for a 
cycle ride tomorrow, I would pack a bottle of water, knowing that my osmolarity is likely 
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to drop as the day goes on. If I stayed out too late and it started to get dark, I would adjust 
my route to arrive home more quickly, knowing that I didn’t have enough clothing with me 
to maintain my body temperature overnight. 
 
What I am doing in these circumstances is building a model of my expected physiological 
variables, which is both hierarchical – it acknowledges lower level causes, such as not 
having drunk enough water, as well as higher level ones, such as not having packed any in 
my panniers– and dynamic, in that it extrapolates future states based on the current 
trajectory. There are a number of new variables required by this model, to represent these 
higher-order causes of interoceptive data such as the time of day, my location, what’s in 
my panniers etc. – from now on, I will refer to these variables as ‘causes’; in the sense that 
they cause (potentially surprising) sensory consequences. 
 
Both interoceptive sensory receptors and exteroceptive sensory receptors provide only 
indirect information about the causes of data in the outside world. For example, true core 
temperature is a ‘cause’, which is inferred or perceived by the brain based on discharges in 
core temperature receptors, perhaps calibrated based on past experience through long-
term synaptic plasticity. Likewise, complex causes such as ‘location’ are inferred from 
complex patterns of sensory data such as photoreceptor discharges in the retina giving 
visual (e.g. landmark recognition) and semantic (e.g. signposts) information, as well as 
past memory and experience. 
 
So, given that organisms cannot directly perceive causes of surprising states, as they can 
only infer them through sensory data, they must instead reduce the surprisingness of 
these data. However, in order to use indirect information about the likely future trajectory 
of interoceptive causes, gleaned from estimates of higher-level causes, the surprise of the 
sensory data pertaining to the causes must be minimised too. For example, if I believe it to 
be 12pm, the visual data caused by twilight would be surprising, and it would also likely 
lead to surprising interoceptive states, such as a drop in body temperature as I found 
myself far from home at night. 
 
Reducing surprise thus entails building models of the causes of sensory data in the world 
which match the actual sensory data perceived as closely as possible. As explained above, 
these models will be hierarchical, incorporating the hierarchical causal structure of the 
world, and dynamic, explaining how current states and causes are linked to past and 
future states and causes. 
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A ‘good’ model of the world is one which reduces surprise – but how is this evaluated? 
Surprise itself cannot be calculated because it is mathematically intractable for all but the 
most basic of probability distributions. However, there is a quantity – the free-energy – 
which is an upper bound on surprise. Free-energy will always be greater than surprise, 
such that an organism which minimises free energy will also minimise surprise (Friston, 
2006). Crucially, Free Energy is a function of just sensory data and predictions, both of 
which are available to the agent. This thesis is based around the assumption than the brain 
uses free-energy minimisation to reduce its long-term surprise. 
 
How might these models be adjusted and refined? The answer lies in a signal-processing 
method first used to process and transmit speech: predictive coding. Predictive coding 
decomposes a signal into parts that can be ‘predicted’ based on information already held, 
and parts that cannot – the ‘prediction error’. For example, in processing speech, 
predictive coding schemes calculate the factors of the signal that are constant to a speaker, 
and thus can be ‘predicted’ across an entire segment of speech, and the actual vowels and 
consonants produced, the ‘prediction error’. The constant, speaker-specific factors need 
only be transmitted once and the entire sound segment can be reconstructed. Note that in 
this thesis, ‘prediction’ refers to the ability to reproduce current sensory data rather than 
forecast the future. 
 
Linear predictive coding has been successfully applied to explaining extraclassical 
receptive field effects (Rao & Ballard, 1998), trichromacy and colour opposition  
(Buchsbaum & Gottschalk, 1983) and retinal processing (Srinivasen et al., 1982). 
Predictive coding also arises naturally from both an assumption of hierarchical processing 
(it is inherently hierarchical) and the free-energy principle – under certain assumptions, 
prediction error is exactly equivalent to free-energy (Friston & Kiebel, 2009).  
 
This thesis examines a particular aspect of predictive coding – the inclusion of precision. 
The classical linear predictive coding schemes mentioned above are obviously too limited 
to be of much use in all but the most rarified situations. In the real world there will be 
many thousands of prediction errors arising at any one moment and many of them will 
compete with each other for explanation – for instance, they may represent competing 
estimates of the value of a cause, or competing imperatives. To reconcile these 
competitions, prediction errors must be weighted by their precision (or inverse-variance, 
or signal-to-noise), with high-precision prediction errors having a greater impact on 
processing at higher levels of the hierarchy than those with low precision. The precision 
can encode a number of stimulus properties including task-relevance, attention, basic 
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signal-to-noise ratio, semantic content, or plausibility based on external factors. Put 
simply, precision is the reliability (inverse variability) – or confidence afforded – 
prediction errors and may be a crucial aspect of confidence-sensitive predictive coding in 
the brain. 
 
This thesis explores the implementation and explanatory power of precision-weighted 
prediction error in the perception of visual illusions, directed attention and two motor 
paradigms: motor preparation and sensory attenuation. I hope to demonstrate that 
precision modulation within predictive coding hierarchies, under the free-energy 
principle, is a flexible and powerful way of describing and explaining both behavioural and 
neuroimaging data. 
 
2. Free energy, predictive coding and Bayes-optimal perception 
 
The following section provides a more mathematical description of how Bayes-optimal 
perception and action might be implemented in the brain. A more detailed derivation of 
the following equations can be found in Appendices 1-3. The outcome of this normative 
treatment is a set of differential equations (Equation 0.3) that describe neuronal activity 
and ensuing action, which we then use to demonstrate the necessary role of sensory 
attenuation and the illusory phenomena that it entails. The equations may appear a bit 
complicated but they are based on just three assumptions: 
 
 The brain minimises the free energy of sensory inputs defined by a generative 
model. 
 The generative model used by the brain is hierarchical, nonlinear and dynamic. 
 Neuronal firing rates encode the expected state of the world, under this model. 
 
The first assumption is the free energy principle, which leads to active inference in the 
embodied context of action. This provides a principled (Bayes optimal) explanation for 
action and perception, in which both minimise a free energy bound on the (negative) 
Bayesian log evidence for a generative model of the sensorium. This means that 
minimising free energy maximises Bayesian model evidence. The second assumption – 
about the nature of the models entailed by neuronal circuits – is motivated easily by 
noting that the world is both dynamic and nonlinear and that hierarchical causal structure 
emerges inevitably from a separation of temporal scales (Ginzburg & Landau, 1950; 
Haken, 1983), and the observation that the functional anatomy of the brain is hierarchical. 
The final assumption is the Laplace assumption that, in terms of neural codes, leads to the 
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Laplace code that is arguably the simplest and most flexible of all neural codes (Friston, 
2009). 
 
Given these assumptions, one can simulate a whole variety of neuronal processes by 
specifying the particular equations that constitute a generative model. The resulting 
perception and action are specified completely by the above assumptions and can be 
implemented in a biologically plausible way as described below. In brief, these simulations 
use differential equations that minimise the free energy of sensory input using a 
generalised gradient descent (Friston, Stephan, Li, & Daunizeau, 2010). 
 
       (0.1) 
 
These coupled differential equations describe perception and action respectively and just 
say that neuronal activity encoding conditional expectations ( , , , )    =  and action 
a  change to reduce free energy, where free energy ( , )F s   is a function of sensory inputs 
( , , , )s s s s   and conditional expectations encoded by neuronal activity. The first 
differential equation has the same form as Bayesian (e.g., Kalman-Bucy) filters used in 
time series analysis. The first term is a prediction based upon a differential matrix 
operator  that returns the generalised motion of the expectation. The second 
(correction) term is usually expressed as a mixture of prediction errors that ensures the 
changes in conditional expectations are Bayes-optimal predictions about hidden states of 
the world.  
 
The second differential equation says that action also minimises free energy. The 
differential equations above are coupled because sensory input depends upon action, 
which depends upon perception through the conditional expectations. This circular 
dependency leads to a sampling of sensory input that is both predicted and predictable, 
thereby minimising free energy and prediction errors. 
 
To perform neuronal simulations under this scheme, it is only necessary to integrate or 
solve Equation 0.1 to simulate the neuronal dynamics that encode conditional 
expectations and the ensuing action.  
 
 
 
D
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2.1 Hierarchical Dynamic Models 
 
Conditional expectations depend upon the brain’s generative model of the world, which 
we assume has the following (flexible and general) hierarchical form: 
 
(1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1
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

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


 
 
 
 


 
 
) ( )
, )))
i
v
   (0.2) 
 
This equation is just a way of specifying a generative model in terms of a probability 
density over the sensory and hidden states, where the hidden states have been divided 
into hidden states and causes 
( ) ( )
( , )
i i
x v . Here, ( ) ( )( , )i ig f  are nonlinear functions of 
hidden states that generate sensory inputs at the first level. Random fluctuations 
( ) ( )
( , )
i i
x v
   in the hidden causes and motion of states enter each level of the hierarchy. 
Gaussian assumptions about these random fluctuations make the model probabilistic – 
they play the role of sensory noise at the first level and induce uncertainty at higher levels. 
The amplitudes of these random fluctuations are quantified by their precisions 
( ) ( )
( , )
i i
x v
 
 
that may depend upon the hidden states or causes through log-precisions 
( ) ( )
( , )
i i
x v
  . 
Hidden causes link hierarchical levels, whereas hidden states link dynamics over time. 
Hidden states and causes are abstract quantities (like the motion of an object in the field of 
view) that the brain uses to explain or predict sensations. 
 
2.2 Perception and predictive coding 
 
Given the form of the generative model (Equation 0.2) we can now write down the 
differential equations (Equation 0.1) describing neuronal dynamics in terms of (precision-
weighted) prediction errors on the hidden causes and states. These errors represent the 
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difference between conditional expectations and predicted values, under the generative 
model (using  A×B := A
T B , omitting higher-order terms and where subscripts denote 
derivatives): 
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Equation 0.3 can be derived fairly easily by computing the free energy for the hierarchical 
model in Equation 0.2 and inserting its gradients into Equation 0.1. This produces a 
relatively simple update scheme, in which conditional expectations are driven by a 
mixture of prediction errors, where prediction errors are defined by the equations of the 
generative model. 
 
The top two lines of equation 0.3 describe how the initial value of the expectations ( )iD  
is updated to minimise free energy. Precision-weighted prediction errors ( ) ( ),i i
v x
   
influence the update in proportion to the connection strengths 
( )( ) ( )
( )1
2( ) ( )
( , )
ii i
i
i i
g f

 
 
  
  
. These precision-weighted prediction errors are calculated in 
the third and fourth lines. The difference between the current expectations ( ) ( 1),i i
x v
  D  
and the values as predicted by the generative model ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( , ), ( , )i i i i i i
x v x v
f g     are 
weighted by the precision ( )i , which is itself a function of causes and states (seventh and 
eighth lines). With this particular form for the precisions, the term ( ) ( )( )i i
v x
tr    is 
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constant for causes and states that affect the log-precisions linearly and zero if they have 
no effect. 
 
It is difficult to overstate the generality of Equation 0.3: its solutions grandfather nearly 
every known statistical estimation scheme, under parametric assumptions about additive 
or multiplicative noise (Friston, 2008). These range from ordinary least squares to 
advanced variational deconvolution schemes. The scheme is called generalised Bayesian 
filtering or predictive coding (Friston et al., 2010): see also (Rao & Ballard, 1999). In 
neural network terms, Equation 0.3 says that error-units receive predictions from the 
same level and the level above. Conversely, conditional expectations (encoded by the 
activity of state units) are driven by prediction errors from the same level and the level 
below.  These constitute bottom-up and lateral messages that drive conditional 
expectations towards a better prediction to reduce the prediction error in the level below.  
This is the essence of recurrent message passing between hierarchical levels to optimise 
free energy or suppress prediction error: see (Friston & Kiebel, 2009) and Appendix 1 for 
a more detailed discussion. In neurobiological implementations of this scheme, the 
sources of bottom-up prediction errors are thought to be superficial pyramidal cells that 
send forward connections to higher cortical areas. Conversely, predictions are conveyed 
from deep pyramidal cells, by backward connections, to target (polysynaptically) the 
superficial pyramidal cells encoding prediction error (Mumford, 1992; Friston & Kiebel, 
2009). 
 
In the present context, the key thing about this predictive coding scheme is that the 
precisions at each level in the hierarchy depend on the expected hidden causes and states 
in the level above. It is this dependency we have proposed mediates attention or selection 
in hierarchical inference (Feldman & Friston, 2010; Friston, et al., 2012). Equation 0.3 tells 
us that the state-dependent precisions modulate the responses of the error-units to their 
presynaptic inputs. This modulation depends on the conditional expectations about the 
states and suggests something intuitive – attention is mediated by activity-dependent 
modulation of the synaptic gain of principal cells that convey sensory information 
(prediction error) from one cortical level to the next. This translates into a top-down 
control of synaptic gain in principal (superficial pyramidal) cells elaborating prediction 
errors and fits comfortably with the modulatory effects of top-down connections in 
cortical hierarchies that have been associated with attention and action selection.  
 
The numerics of the integration scheme used to simulate inference (Equation 0.3) are 
provided in Appendix 4. 
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Figure 0.1: Predictive coding in the brain. Schematic detailing the neuronal architecture that might 
implement the generalised predictive coding described in Equation 0.3.  This shows the speculative 
cells of origin of forward driving connections that convey prediction error from a lower area to a 
higher area and the backward connections that construct predictions (Mumford et al 1992; Friston 
2008).  These predictions try to explain away prediction error in lower levels.  In this scheme, the 
sources of forward and backward connections are superficial and deep pyramidal cells – 
represented by red and black triangles – respectively. State-units are in black and error-units in 
red. Here, neuronal populations are deployed hierarchically within three cortical areas (or macro-
columns).  Blue arrows represent backwards modulatory connections, the mechanism whereby 
activity in higher levels can provide contextual or attentional modulation of the gain in lower levels. 
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2.3 Action 
 
In active inference, conditional expectations elicit behaviour by sending top-down 
predictions down the hierarchy that are unpacked into proprioceptive predictions at the 
level of the cranial nerve nuclei and spinal-cord. These engage classical reflex arcs to 
suppress proprioceptive prediction errors and produce the predicted motor trajectory 
 
?̇? = −
𝜕
𝜕𝑎
𝐹 = −
𝜕?̃?
𝜕𝑎
. 𝜉𝑣
(1)
        (0.4) 
 
The reduction of action to classical reflexes follows because the only way that action can 
minimise free energy is to change sensory (proprioceptive) prediction errors by changing 
sensory signals; cf., the equilibrium point formulation of motor control (Feldman & Levin, 
1995). In short, active inference can be regarded as equipping a generalised predictive 
coding scheme with classical reflex arcs: see (Friston et al., 2010; Friston, Daunizeau, & 
Kiebel, 2009) for details. The actual movements produced clearly depend upon top-down 
predictions that can have a rich and complex structure. 
 
2.4 Neurobiological implementation of predictive coding 
 
Figure 0.1 details the neuronal architecture that might implement the generalised 
predictive coding described in Equation 0.3.  This shows the speculative cells of origin of 
forward, driving connections that convey prediction error from a lower area to a higher 
area and the backward connections that construct predictions (Mumford et al 1992; 
Friston 2008).  Forwards prediction errors are encoded by superficial pyramidal cells (red 
triangles) while backwards predictions are conveyed by deep pyramidal cells (black 
triangles). Backwards modulatory connections, which adjust the precision of superficial 
pyramidal cells, are also signalled by deep pyramidal cells. Expectations about causes and 
states are signalled by interneurons. This architecture was refined and expanded based on 
anatomical and electrophysiological data by (Bastos et al., 2012), to yield a scheme which 
can be used to model neuroimaging data (chapters 2 and 4). 
 
3. Outline of the Thesis 
 
The first two chapters investigate the relationship between precision, sensory signal-to-
noise ratio and superficial pyramidal cell gain. The paradigm used is a very simple visual 
illusion – the Cornsweet effect (O’Brien 1959; Craik 1966; Cornsweet 1970). 
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In chapter 1, I review the nature of illusions using the free-energy formulation of Bayesian 
perception described above.  Following the work of previous authors (Purves et al., 1999; 
Lotto & Purves, 2001) I reiterate the notion that illusory percepts are, in fact, Bayes-
optimal and represent the most likely explanation for ambiguous sensory input. By using 
plausible prior beliefs about the spatial gradients of illuminance and reflectance in visual 
scenes, I show that the Cornsweet effect emerges as a natural consequence of Bayes-
optimal perception.  Furthermore, the appearance of secondary illusory percepts (Mach 
bands) is simulated as a function of stimulus contrast.  The contrast-dependent emergence 
of the Cornsweet effect and subsequent appearance of Mach bands were simulated using a 
simple but plausible generative model of the general form described above.  Because this 
generative model was inverted using the neurobiologically plausible scheme described in 
Equation 0.3, we could use the inversion as a simulation of neuronal processing and 
implicit inference. Finally, the qualitative and quantitative predictions of this Bayes-
optimal simulation are verified psychophysically, using stimuli presented briefly to normal 
subjects at different contrast levels, in the context of a fixed alternative forced choice 
paradigm. 
 
In chapter 2, we use the conclusions of chapter 1 – that increasing contrast can be 
modelled by increasing sensory precision – to test the hypothesis that increasing visual 
contrast increased the precision encoded in early visual areas by the gain or excitability of 
superficial pyramidal cells.  This hypothesis was investigated using 
electroencephalography and dynamic causal modelling (DCM) (Garrido et al., 2007a; 
Bastos et al., 2012); a biologically constrained modelling of the cortical processes 
underlying EEG activity.  We presented Cornsweet stimuli of varying contrast to 
participants while recording from high-density EEG. Source localisation identified the 
electromagnetic sources of visually evoked responses and DCM was used to characterise 
the coupling among these sources. Bayesian model selection was used to select the most 
likely connectivity pattern and contrast-dependent changes in connectivity. As predicted, 
the model with the highest evidence entailed increased superficial pyramidal cell gain in 
higher-contrast trials. This increase in gain was most pronounced in early visual areas and 
lessened as the visual hierarchy was ascended. These results demonstrate that increased 
signal-to-noise ratio in sensory signals produce (or are represented by) increased 
superficial pyramidal cell gain, and that synaptic parameters encoding statistical 
properties like sensory precision can be quantified using EEG and dynamic causal 
modelling.   
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Chapters 1 and 2 looked at static encoding of precision; Chapters 3 and 4 change track to 
examine attention and look at the dynamic, online modulation of precision. 
 
In chapter 3, I expand upon the suggestion (Friston, 2009) that attention can be 
understood as inferring the level of uncertainty or precision during inference using a 
hierarchical predictive coding scheme.  This chapter tries to substantiate this claim using 
neuronal simulations of directed spatial attention and biased competition.  Using the 
Bayesian formulations of perception and predictive coding described above, we 
demonstrate that if the precision depends dynamically on the values of the states, one can 
explain many aspects of attention.  This is illustrated in the context of the Posner paradigm 
(Posner, 1980), using the simulations to generate both psychophysical and 
electrophysiological responses.  These simulated responses are consistent with 
psychophysical (Posner et al., 1978) and physiological (Mangun & Hillyard, 1991) data on 
directed attention. Furthermore, if we present both attended and non-attended stimuli 
simultaneously, biased competition (Desimone & Duncan, 1995) for neuronal 
representation emerges as a principled and straightforward property of Bayes-optimal 
perception. 
 
In chapter 4, I examine the assertions of the model described in chapter 3 – that the 
behavioural and electrophysiological phenomenology of the Posner paradigm can be 
explained in terms of a cue-dependent setting of precision or gain on the sensory channels 
reporting anticipated target locations, which is updated selectively by invalid targets. 
Taking advantage of the biologically plausible theory described above, where precision is 
encoded by the gain of superficial pyramidal cells reporting prediction error, I use 
dynamic causal modelling to assess the evidence in magnetoencephalographic responses 
for cue-dependent and top-down updating of superficial pyramidal cell gain. Bayesian 
model comparison suggested that it is almost certain that differences in superficial 
pyramidal cells gain – and its top-down modulation – contribute to observed responses; 
and we could be more than 80% certain that anticipatory effects on postsynaptic gain are 
limited to visual (extrastriate) sources. These empirical results speak to the role of 
attention in optimising perceptual inference and its formulation in terms of predictive 
coding. 
 
In chapters 5 and 6 I turn my attention to the motor domain, to examine if the principles of 
precision modulation within predictive coding hierarchies expounded in the first four 
chapters can help to explain motor preparation and sensory attenuation. In chapter 5, I 
pursue the idea that action planning (motor preparation) is an attentional phenomenon 
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directed towards kinaesthetic signals. This rests on a view of motor control as active 
inference, where predictions of proprioceptive signals are fulfilled by peripheral motor 
reflexes, as described above. If valid, active inference suggests that attention should not be 
limited to the optimal biasing of perceptual signals in the exteroceptive (e.g. visual) 
domain but should also bias proprioceptive signals during movement. Here, this idea is 
investigated using the Posner paradigm recast in a motor setting. Specifically, reaction 
time changes when movements were preceded by valid relative to invalid cues were 
examined. Furthermore, the hierarchical level at which putative attentional effects were 
expressed is addressed by independently cueing the nature of the movement and the hand 
used to execute it. A significant interaction between the validity of movement and effector 
cues on reaction times was found. This suggests that attentional bias might be mediated at 
a low level in the motor hierarchy, in an intrinsic frame of reference. This finding is 
consistent with attentional enabling of top-down predictions of proprioceptive input and 
may rely upon the same synaptic mechanisms that mediate directed spatial attention in 
the visual system. 
 
Chapter 6 applies active inference to a phenomenon where previous theoretical 
explanations were incomplete – sensory attenuation (Weiskrantz et al., 1971 ). Minisming 
prediction error can be achieved by changing our predictions to explain sensory input 
through perception, or by actively change sensory input to fulfil our predictions via action. 
However, this creates a conflict between action and perception, in that self-generated 
movements require predictions to override the sensory evidence that one is not actually 
moving. However, ignoring sensory evidence means that externally generated sensations 
will not be perceived. Conversely, attending to (proprioceptive and somatosensory) 
sensations enables the detection of externally generated events but precludes generation 
of actions. This conflict can be resolved by attenuating the precision of sensory evidence 
during movement or, equivalently, attending away from the consequences of self-made 
acts. We propose that this Bayes optimal withdrawal of precise sensory evidence during 
movement is the cause of psychophysical sensory attenuation. Furthermore, it explains 
the force-matching illusion (Shergill et al., 2003) and reproduces empirical results almost 
exactly (Shergill et al., 2005). Finally, if attenuation is removed, the force-matching illusion 
disappears and false (delusional) inferences about agency emerge. This is important, given 
the negative correlation between sensory attenuation and delusional beliefs in normal 
subjects (Teufel et al., 2010) – and the reduction in the magnitude of the illusion in 
schizophrenia (Shergill et al., 2005). Active inference therefore links the neuromodulatory 
optimisation of precision to sensory attenuation and illusory phenomena during the 
attribution of agency in normal subjects. It also provides a functional account of deficits in 
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syndromes characterised by false inference and impaired movement – like schizophrenia 
and Parkinsonism – syndromes that implicate abnormal modulatory neurotransmission. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Free Energy and Illusions: The 
Cornsweet effect 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Illusions are often regarded as ‘failures’ of perception; however, Bayesian considerations 
often provide a principled explanation for apparent failures of inference in terms of prior 
beliefs.  This chapter is about the nature of illusions and their relationship to Bayes-
optimal perception.  The main point made in this chapter is that illusory percepts are 
optimal in the sense of explaining sensations in terms of their most likely cause. In brief, 
illusions occur when the experimenter generates stimuli in an implausible or unlikely way.  
From the subject’s perspective, these stimuli are ambiguous and could be explained by 
different underlying causes.  This ambiguity is resolved in a Bayesian setting, by choosing 
the most likely explanation, given prior beliefs about the hidden causes of the percept. 
This key point has been made by many authors (e.g., Purves et al. 1999).  Here, I develop it 
under biologically realistic simulations of Bayes-optimal perception and try to make some 
quantitative predictions about how subjects should make perceptual decisions.  I then try 
to establish the scheme’s validity by showing that these predictions are largely verified by 
experimental data from normal subjects viewing the same stimuli.   
 
The example chosen here is the Cornsweet illusion, which has a long history, dating back 
to the days of Helmholtz (Mach, 1865; O’Brien 1959; Craik 1966; Cornsweet 1970).  This is 
particularly relevant given this formulation of the Bayesian brain is based upon the idea 
that the brain is a Helmholtz or inference machine (Helmholtz, 1867; Barlow, 1974; Dayan 
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et al., 1995: Friston 2005).  In other words, the brain is trying to infer the hidden causes 
and states of the world generating sensory information, using predictions based upon a 
generative model that includes prior beliefs.  I hoped to show that the Cornsweet effect 
can be explained in a parsimonious way by some simple prior beliefs about the way that 
visual information is generated at different spatial and temporal scales.   
 
1.1 The Cornsweet effect and the nature of illusions 
 
Figure 1.1 provides an illustration of the Cornsweet illusion.  The illusion is the false 
percept that the peripheral regions of a stimulus have a different brightness, despite the 
fact they are physically isoluminant.  This illusion is induced by a biphasic luminance 
“edge” in the centre of the field of view (shown in the right hand column of Figure 1.1).  
The four rows of Figure 1.1 show the Cornsweet effect increasing in magnitude as the 
contrast of the stimulus is increased.  Interestingly, at high levels of contrast, secondary 
illusions - Mach bands (Mach, 1865; Lotto et al. 1999) – appear at the para-central points 
of inflection of the true luminance profile.  It is this contrast-dependent emergence of the 
Cornsweet effect and subsequent Mach bands that is simulated here, under the 
assumption that perception is Bayes-optimal.   
 
The Bayesian aspect of perception becomes crucial when considering the nature of 
illusions.  Bayesian theories of perception describe how sensory data (that have a 
particular likelihood) are combined with prior beliefs (a prior distribution) to create a 
percept (a posterior distribution).  One can regard illusory percepts as those that are 
induced by ambiguous stimuli, which can be caused in different ways – in other words, the 
probability of the data given different causes or explanations is the same. When faced with 
these stimuli, the prior distribution can be used to create a unimodal posterior and an 
unambiguous percept.  If the percept or inference about the hidden causes of sensory 
information (the posterior distribution) is different from the true causes used to generate 
stimuli, the inference is said to be illusory or false.  However, with illusory stimuli the 
mapping of hidden causes to their sensory consequences is ill-posed (degenerate or many 
to one), such that a stimulus can have more than one cause.  Thus, from the point of view 
of the observer, there can be no ‘false’ inference unless the true causes are known. The 
perceptual inference can be optimal in a Bayesian sense, but is still illusory. However, not 
all possible causes of sensory input will be equally likely, so there will be an optimal 
inference in relation to prior beliefs about their causes. Prior beliefs can be learnt or 
innate: priors that are learnt depend upon experience while innate priors can be 
associated with architectural features of the visual brain, such as the complex  
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Figure 1.1: The Cornsweet Illusion and Mach Bands. The Cornsweet illusion is the false perception 
that the peripheral regions of a Cornsweet stimulus have different reflectance values.  The 
magnitude of the effect increases as the contrast of the stimulus increases.  At higher levels of 
contrast, the secondary illusion – Mach bands – appear.  The Mach bands are situated at the point of 
inflection of the luminance gradient.   
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arrangement of blobs, interblobs and stripes in V1, that may reflect priors on the statistical 
structure of visual information selected by evolutionary pressure. 
 
Prior beliefs are essential when resolving ambiguity or the ill-posed nature of perceptual 
inverse problems. There will always be an optimal posterior estimate of what caused a 
sensation that rests upon prior beliefs.  The example in Figure 1.2 illustrates this: the 
central panel shows an ambiguous stimulus (luminance profile) that is formally similar to 
the sort of stimulus that induces the Cornsweet illusion.  However, this stimulus can be 
caused in an infinite number of ways.  Two plausible causes are shown here by assuming 
the stimulus is the product of (non-negative) illuminance and reflectance profiles.  The 
lower two panels show the ‘true’ causes generating stimuli for the Cornsweet illusion.  
Here, the stimulus has a reflectance profile that reproduces the Cornsweet stimulus and is 
illuminated with a uniform illuminant.  An alternative explanation for exactly the same 
stimulus is provided in the upper two panels, in which two isoreflectant surfaces are 
viewed under a smooth gradient of ambient illumination.  In this example, both the 
illuminant and reflectance are made non-negative by applying an exponential transform 
before multiplying them to generate the stimulus.   
 
The key point made by Figure 1.2 is that there are many possible gradients of illuminance 
and reflectance that can produce the same pattern of sensory input (luminance). These 
different explanations for a particular stimulus can only be distinguished by priors on the 
spatial and temporal characteristics of the reflectance and illuminance.  In this example, 
the ambiguity about what caused the stimulus can be resolved if the observer believes, a 
priori, that the visual world is composed of isoreflectant surfaces, as opposed to surfaces 
that (implausibly) get brighter or darker nearer their edges or occlusions (as in the lower 
panels).  Under this prior assumption, an observer who infers the presence of spatially 
extensive isoreflectant surfaces, and explains the edge at the centre with an illuminance 
gradient, would be inferring its most likely cause.  The Cornsweet ‘illusion’ is thus only an 
illusion because the experimenter has chosen an unlikely combination of illuminance and 
reflectance profiles. In what follows, plausible priors on the spatial composition and 
generation of visual input are used to simulate the Cornsweet effect and the emergence of 
Mach bands. 
 
The Bayesian approach to visual perception has been explored in previous work (Yuille, 
Geiger & Bulthoff, 1991; Knill & Pouget, 2004).  In addition, several other visual illusions 
have been explained using Bayesian principles, including motion illusions (Weiss et al., 
2002), the sound-induced flash illusion (Shams, Ma & Beierholm, 2005) and the Chubb 
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Figure 1.2: Contributions to luminance. Luminance values reaching the retina are modelled as a 
multiplication of illuminance from light sources and reflectance from the surfaces in the 
environment.  The factorisation of luminance is thus an ill-posed problem.  One toy example of this 
degeneracy is shown here; the same stimulus can be produced by (at least) two possible 
combinations of illuminance and reflectance.  Prior beliefs about the likelihood of these causes can 
be used to pick the most likely percept.   
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illusion (Lotto & Purves, 2001).  Additionally, Purves et al. (1999) demonstrated the 
Bayesian nature of the Cornsweet illusion: when presented in a context implying an 
illuminance gradient and reflectance step, the Cornsweet illusion is elicited more easily. 
 
In terms of the neuronal systems mediating the Cornsweet illusion; some authors have 
implicated subcortical structures: for example, Anderson, Dakin & Rees (2009) found that 
BOLD signal in the lateral geniculate nuclei (LGN) best correlated with perception of the 
Cornsweet illusion, although correlations were also seen in visual cortex. Furthermore, the 
illusion could be abolished if the stimulus was not presented binocularly, suggesting an 
origin before V1.  Mach bands similarly have been attributed to retinal mechanisms (e.g. 
Ratliff 1965); however, Lotto et al. (1999) have suggested a high-level contextual 
explanation for their appearance. Irrespective of the cortical or subcortical systems 
involved, it is assumed that the same Bayesian principles operate and, crucially, rest on a 
hierarchical generative model that necessarily implicates distributed neuronal processing 
at the subcortical and cortical levels. 
 
1.2 Overview 
 
This chapter comprises three sections.  The first describes a simple generative model of 
visual input that entails prior beliefs about how visual stimuli are generated and can be 
used to infer their causes. This model is used in the second section to simulate the 
perception of the Cornsweet illusion and contrast-dependent emergence of Mach bands.  
In the third section, the predictions of the simulations are tested using a psychophysics 
study of normal subjects.   
 
2. A generative model for the Cornsweet effect 
 
These simulations are based upon the free-energy formulation of Bayes-optimal 
perception described in the introduction and elsewhere in the literature (Friston et al, 
2006; Friston, 2009; Feldman & Friston 2010). Free-energy is a function of sensory 
samples and a probabilistic representation of what caused those samples. This 
representation can be cast in terms of the most likely or expected states of the world, 
under a generative model of how they conspire to produce sensory inputs. In brief, once 
the agent’s generative model is known, one can use the free-energy principle to predict its 
behaviour and perception. In the present context, the focus will be on perception and the 
role of prior beliefs that are an inherent part of the generative model.  In what follows, I 
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describe the model and then use it to simulate perceptual inference and 
electrophysiological responses. 
 
2.1 The generative model 
 
The generative model used here is straightforward: sensory input (luminance) is the 
product of reflectance and illuminance, where illuminance varies smoothly over space but 
can fluctuate with a high frequency over time.  Conversely, the reflectance profile of the 
visual world is caused by isoreflectant fields or surfaces that fluctuate smoothly in time.  
Crucially, the spatial scales over which these fluctuations occur have a scale-free nature, of 
the sort found in natural images (Field, 1987; Burton & Moorhead, 1987; Tolhurst et al., 
1992; Ruderman & Bialek 1994; Ruderman, 1997).   To ensure positivity of the illuminant 
and reflectance an exponential transform to the two factors is applied before multiplying 
them (as in Figure 1.2).  Equivalently, the underlying causes (reflectance and illuminance) 
can be envisaged as being composed additively in log-space. This model is shown 
schematically in Figure 1.3, in terms of hidden causes and states.  Mathematically, this 
model can be expressed as:    
(1.1) 
Here, s are sensory signals generated from hidden states x
 
and causes v plus some random 
fluctuations ω. Luminance is modelled as the product (or sum of the exponents) of 
illuminance and reflectance.  R   and L  are collections of spatial basis functions; inverting 
the model to find v means determining what weights to give to each of these basis 
functions to best explain the image.   
 
The basis functions for reflectance are a set of Haar wavelets (simple step functions) 
thinned at the edges of the visual field because of the increasing size of classical receptive 
fields in the periphery.  For simplicity (and ease of reporting the results), these 
simulations are restricted to a one-dimensional visual field.  Because Haar wavelets afford 
local linear approximations to continuous reflectance profiles, the resulting reflectance 
has to be a mixture of isoreflectant surfaces at different spatial scales.  To impose the  
32 
 
 
Figure 1.3: The generative model. The generative model employed in this chapter models 
illuminance as a discrete cosine function and reflectance as a Harr wavelet function with peripheral 
high-frequency wavelets removed.  In addition, illumination is allowed to change quickly over time, 
whereas reflectance varies more slowly. This is achieved by making the coefficients on the 
reflectance basis functions hidden states, which accumulate hidden causes to generate changes in 
reflectance. Inversion of the model provides conditional estimates of the hidden causes and states 
responsible for sensory input as a function of time.  See main text for an explanation of the variables 
in this figure. 
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scale-free aspect, I decrease the variance or, equivalently, increase the precision of the 
reflectance wavelet coefficients or hidden states in proportion to the order or spatial scale 
of their wavelet. This is implemented by placing a prior on the wavelet coefficients with 
the form 3( ) (0, )N k
k
p x e

 , where k is the order of the wavelet. Neuronally, these basis 
functions could stand in for a filling-in process such as that described by Grossberg & 
Hong (2006).   
 
Conversely, the illuminant is modelled as a mixture of smoothly varying cosine functions 
with a low spatial frequency. This is easily motivated by the fact that most sources of 
illumination are point sources, which results in smooth illuminance profiles. These were 
modelled here with the first three components of a discrete cosine transform (see Figure 
1.4 for a graphical representation of the basis functions and how they are used to generate 
a stimulus).  
 
By construction, this generative model of visual signals separates the spatial scales or 
frequencies of the illuminance and reflectance such that all the high frequency 
components are in the reflectance profile, while the low frequency components are in 
illuminance profile.  Temporal persistence of reflectance is assured because the 
reflectance coefficients 16 1( )x t   are hidden states that accumulate hidden causes 
16 1
( )
R
v t
 . This persistence reflects the prior belief that surfaces move in a continuous 
fashion. For simplicity, the hidden causes controlling illuminance 3 1( )
L
v t
  are mapped 
directly to the stimulus (although this is not an important feature of the model).  This can 
be thought of as accommodating rapid changes in illuminance of the sort that might be 
produced by a flickering candle.  
 
Equation 1.1 defines the generative model in terms of the joint probability over sensory 
information and the hidden variables producing fluctuations in reflectance and 
illuminance. The fluctuations in the hidden causes are assumed to be Gaussian with a 
precision (inverse variants) of one, while the fluctuations in the motion of the hidden 
states are assumed to have a log precision of twelve.  Finally, sensory fluctuations or noise 
are given a log-precision of six.  In the next section, manipulating the log-precision of the 
sensory noise is used as a proxy for changing the contrast of the stimulus.   
 
Figure 1.4 shows a snapshot of the sort of visual signals this generative model produces.  
Here, the outer product of the discrete transforms above is used to generate a two-
dimensional stimulus.  This is not designed to be a veridical model of the real visual world.  
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Figure 1.4: 2-D example. The top panels show 2-D examples of luminance (left) and reflectance 
(right), created form the generative model.  The resulting stimulus is the product of the two 
(bottom panel).   
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However, it is sufficient to explain the Cornsweet illusion and related effects by 
incorporating simple and plausible priors on the spatial scales over which illuminance and 
reflectance change.  In the next section, this generative model is used to simulate 
perceptual and physiological responses to a stimulus, under the free-energy principle.  
This reduces to a Bayesian deconvolution of sensory input that tries to discover the most 
likely hidden causes and states generating that input.   
 
To simulate these responses, Equation 0.1 (discussed in the introduction), is integrated or 
solved using the functions ( , )g x v  and ( , )f x v  specified by a generative model in 
Equation 1.1. These functions map hidden variables to sensory input and encode prior 
beliefs about the dynamics of hidden states. In short, by plugging the equations of the 
generative model in Figure 1.3 into the predictive coding scheme of Figure 0.1 in the 
introduction, Bayes-optimal inference about the causes of sensations can be simulated. 
Crucially, the posterior or conditional beliefs about these causes can then be reconstructed 
and associated with percepts.  In particular, the posterior belief about any mixture of 
hidden variables can be assessed.  This process is used to quantify the Cornsweet and 
Mach band percepts, in terms of reflectance differences among different parts of the visual 
field.  Note that the predictive coding scheme in Figure 0.1 weights the prediction errors 
by precision matrices, which encode the expected amplitude of random fluctuations. 
 
2.2 Simulated responses 
 
The simulated responses in Figure 1.5 were obtained by presenting the Cornsweet 
stimulus under uniform illumination.  Here, the stimulus was presented transiently by 
modulating the illumination with a Gaussian envelope over time (see image inset).  The 
resulting predictions are shown in panel A as solid lines, while the red dotted lines 
correspond to the prediction error.  These predictions are based upon the inferred hidden 
states and causes shown on the right and lower left respectively.  The lines correspond to 
the posterior expectations and the grey regions correspond to 90% Bayesian confidence 
intervals.  In terms of the underlying causes, the blue curve in panel B is an estimate of the 
(log) amplitude of uniform illumination.  This should have a roughly quadratic form (given 
the Gaussian envelope), peaking at around bin 30, which indeed it does.  The remaining 
causes that deviate from zero (panel C) are the perturbations to the hidden states 
explaining or predicting changes in reflectance.  These drive increases or decreases in the 
conditional expectations of the hidden states shown on the right.  The green line is the 
coefficient of the second-order basis function splitting the visual field into an area of 
brightness on the left and darkness on the right.  It can be seen that at the point of  
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Figure 1.5: Predictions of the model. Panel C shows the estimates of the hidden states (coefficients 
of the reflectance basis functions) over time.  The hidden state controlling the amplitude of the 
lowest-frequency basis function, which corresponds to the Cornsweet percept, contributes 
substantially to the overall perception of the stimulus (green line).  The estimates for the hidden 
causes are shown in panel B.  The grey areas are 90% confidence intervals.  Panel A shows 
predictions (solid lines) of sensory input based on the estimated hidden causes and states and the 
resulting prediction error (bottom lines).  The insert on the upper left shows the time-dependent 
luminance profile used in this simulation. Please see main text for further details. 
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Figure 1.6: The model’s ‘perceptions’. The upper panels show the predicted illuminance (left) and 
reflectance profiles (right), reconstructed from the coefficients of the basis functions estimated 
from the model inversion shown in the previous figure. An inferred reflectance profile 
demonstrating the Cornsweet illusion is apparent, but at this level of contrast, Mach bands have not 
yet appeared. Please see main text further details. 
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maximum illumination, there is an extremely high degree of confidence that this hidden 
state is bigger than zero.  This is the Cornsweet percept. 
 
The corresponding percepts in sensory space are shown in Figure 1.6 as a function of 
peristimulus time.  The upper panels show the implicit reflectance and illuminance 
profiles encoded by the conditional expectations of hidden variables respectively.  After an 
exponential transform (and multiplication) these produce the sensory predictions shown 
on the lower left.   By taking a weighted mixture of the perceived reflectance in different 
regions of the visual field (shown by the white circles) one can estimate the conditional 
certainty about both the Cornsweet effect (differences in perceived reflectance on 
different sides) and the appearance of Mach bands (differences in perceived reflectance on 
the same side).  The weights used to evaluate these mixtures are denoted as cornW  and 
mac
W  for the Cornsweet and Mach band effects respectively. The conditional expectation of 
these mixtures or effects ( )x
mac mac
W     and their confidence intervals are shown on 
the lower right.  At this level of visual contrast or precision (a log-precision of six), the 
Cornsweet effect is clearly evident with a high degree of certainty, while the confidence 
interval for the Mach band effect always contains zero.  In other words, at this contrast 
(sensory precision) there is a Cornsweet effect but no Mach band effect.  In the next 
section, the simulation above is repeated and the conditional expectations (and 
confidences) about illusory effects at the point of maximum illumination for different 
levels of contrast are recorded. 
 
3. Contrast- or precision-dependent illusory percepts 
 
Using the generative model and inversion scheme described above, the simulations are 
repeated over different levels of sensory precision.  This can be regarded as a 
manipulation of contrast in the following sense: If it is assumed that the brain uses divisive 
normalisation (Weber, 1846; Fechner, 1860; Craik, 1938; Geisler & Albrecht 1992; 
Carandini & Heeger, 1994), the key change in sensory information, following an increase 
in contrast, is an increase in signal to noise; in other words, its precision increases.  
Therefore, a manipulation of the log-precision of sensory noiseis used to emulate changes 
in visual contrast.  It should be noted that sensory noise was not actually added to the 
stimuli.  The key quantity here is the level of precision assumed by the agent which, in 
these simulations, was changed explicitly.  In more realistic simulations, the log-precision 
would be itself optimised with respect to free-energy (see Chapter 3 and Feldman & 
Friston 2010 for an example of this in the modelling of attention). 
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Figure 1.7: The effect of contrast. In the results presented here the precision of the sensory data was 
used to model stimulus contrast.  As precision increases, the strength of both the Cornsweet and 
Mach effects increases until, at very high levels of precision (contrast) the true luminance profile is 
perceived and the illusory percepts fade.  Crucially, the Mach bands appear at higher levels of 
contrast than the Cornsweet illusion. The inserts in the lower panels show the inferred reflectance 
is at different levels of contrast (indicated by the blue dots in the lower graph). The prediction 
errors associated with the processing of stimuli and these three levels are shown in the next figure. 
Please see main text for further details. 
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Figure 1.7 shows the results of perceptual inference under the Bayesian scheme described 
above.  The only thing that was changed was the log-precision of the sensory input, from 
minus two (low) through to intermediate levels and ending with a very high log precision 
of sixteen.  The two graphs show the conditional expectation and 90% confidence 
intervals for the Cornsweet effect (upper panel) and Mach bands (lower panel) 
respectively, at the point of maximum illumination.  It can be seen in both instances that 
under low levels of contrast (sensory precision) both effects are very small and inferred 
with a large degree of uncertainty.  However, as contrast increases, conditional 
uncertainty reduces and, at a critical level, produces a confident inference that the effect is 
greater than zero (or some small threshold).  Crucially, the point at which this happens for 
the Cornsweet effect is at a lower level of contrast than for the Mach bands.  In other 
words, the Cornsweet illusion occurs first and then the Mach bands appear as contrast 
continues to rise.  The explanation for this is straightforward; the Mach band illusion rests 
upon higher spatial frequencies in the generative model, which have a higher prior 
precision (encoding prior beliefs about the statistical – scale free – structure of natural 
visual scenes).  This means that there needs to be precise sensory evidence to change 
them from their prior expectation of zero.  In short, at high levels of contrast or sensory 
precision, more and more fine detail in the posterior percept is recruited to provide the 
optimum explanation for the stimulus.  Interestingly, as the contrast or sensory precision 
reaches very high levels, the veridical reflectance and illuminant profiles are inferred and, 
quantitatively, both the Cornsweet and Mach band effects disappear.  The three images 
show exemplar percepts, at low, intermediate and high levels of contrast respectively.  The 
key difference in the spatial banding that underlies the Cornsweet and Mach band effects 
is evident in the difference between the intermediate and high levels of contrast.   
 
The key prediction of these simulations is that subjects categorize their percepts 
differently at different levels of contrast, following a brief exposure to a Cornsweet 
stimulus. At low levels of contrast, the stimulus would be categorised as uniformly flat.  At 
intermediate levels of contrast, the stimulus would be categorised as a Cornsweet percept, 
with isoluminant and uniform differences in the right and left hand parts of the visual 
field; while at higher levels of contrast one would expect the Mach bands to dominate and 
the stimuli would be categorized as possessing para-central bands.  In principle, at very 
high levels of contrast, the subject should perceive the veridical stimulus. However, 
whether this level of contrast can be attained empirically is an open question.   
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Figure 1.8: Contrast and prediction error. As stimulus contrast increases, prediction error is 
redistributed from sensory input to hidden variables.  At high levels of precision, sensory 
information induces prediction errors at higher levels, which in turn explain away prediction error 
at the sensory level.  The higher-level prediction errors at high precision reflect increasing 
confidence that the reflectance is different from the prior expectation of zero.  Please see main text 
for further details. 
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3.1 Simulating Neural Responses 
 
Figure 1.8 shows the prediction errors at low, intermediate and high levels of contrast.   
These are shown at the sensory level (upper row) and at the higher levels of the hidden 
causes and states (lower row).  The key thing to note here is that as contrast increases and 
the spatial detail of the posterior predictions increases, the sensory prediction error falls.  
This is at the expense of inducing prediction errors at the higher level, which increase in 
proportion to the precision of sensory information.  These higher prediction errors are 
simply the difference between the posterior and prior expectations and reflect an 
increasing departure from a prior expectation of zero as contrast (the log precision of 
sensory noise) increases.  Although these results are interesting in themselves, they can 
also be regarded as a simulation of event related potentials.  The reason that we can 
associate prediction error with observed electromagnetic brain responses is that it is 
usually assumed that prediction errors are encoded by the activity of superficial pyramidal 
cells (see Figure 0.1).  It is these cells that are thought to contribute primarily to local field 
potentials and non-invasive EEG signals.   
 
In the high-contrast condition, the prediction errors at the lower level are suppressed by 
the prediction of the presence of a Cornsweet stimulus.  This sort of phenomenon has been 
demonstrated using fMRI (Alink et al., 2010, den Ouden et al., 2010); predictable stimuli 
cause less activation in stimulus-specific areas than unpredictable stimuli.  However, the 
process simulated here is likely to produce more complicated neurophysiological 
correlates because of the confounding effect of precision; increased predictability 
(through increasing conditional confidence about the stimulus) will also increase 
estimates of precision.  Since we believe that the prediction errors reported by superficial 
pyramidal cells are precision-weighted, decreasing prediction error in lower sensory 
areas may be masked by the increasing precision of those errors.  We will return to this 
and related issues chapter 2. Here, we focus on psychophysical correlates. 
 
 
4. A psychophysical test of theoretical predictions 
 
In this section, I report a psychophysics study of normal subjects exposed to the same 
stimuli used in the simulations above.  Instead of using normal procedures for assessing 
illusions (which usually involve matching intensity differences), I use a forced-choice 
paradigm.  This is because I wanted to present stimuli briefly: Firstly, because brief 
presentation avoids the confounding effects of saccadic eye movements, and secondly, a 
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forced-choice paradigm places constraints on the subject’s choices that map directly to the 
model predictions.  In what follows, I describe the paradigm and interpret the results 
quantitatively, in relation to the predictions of the simulations above. 
 
4.1 Subjects and experimental paradigm 
 
27 healthy subjects were studied in accordance with guidelines established by the local 
ethical committee and after obtaining informed consent. 8 participants (4 female) 
completed the Mach band paradigm; 19 (12 female) completed the Cornsweet paradigm.   
 
Experiment 1 (Cornsweet paradigm): The Cornsweet illusion was assessed using a 2-
interval forced choice procedure.  Subjects were presented with a (set contrast) 
Cornsweet stimulus and real luminance step for 200ms (a Gaussian temporal envelope 
was not used), separated by an interval of 200ms. One stimulus appeared to the left of 
fixation and one to the right; this was randomised across trials, as was the order of the 
stimuli.  Subjects were asked to report the side on which the stimulus with the greatest 
contrast had appeared (Figure 1.9). 
 
Six blocks were completed, using Cornsweet stimuli with Weber contrasts of 0.0073 to 
0.0734.  A Quest procedure (Watson & Pelli 1983) was used to select each step stimulus 
for comparison.  The mean of the psychometric function was taken as the point of 
subjective equality between the Cornsweet stimulus and a real luminance.  There were 
200 presentations per block. 
 
Experiment 2 (Mach band paradigm): The same method could not be used to identify the 
strength of the Mach bands percept, as there is no non-illusory stimulus that can be used 
for matching. Consequently, a two-alternative forced choice paradigm was used: A single 
Cornsweet stimulus was displayed for 200ms to the left or right of fixation and 
participants were asked to report if the stimulus contained Mach bands or not.  Each 
participant completed six runs of 200 presentations at ten Weber contrast levels from 
0.0204-0.2038.  The probability of reporting a Mach band was assessed as the relative 
frequency of reporting its presence over trials, within subject (Figure 1.9). 
 
In both experiments, stimuli were displayed on an LCD monitor under ambient room 
lighting.  Subjects were seated 60cm away from the monitor, such that stimuli subtended 
an angle of 14.21o vertically and 6.10o horizontally, at 2.96o -7.06o eccentricity.  The 
luminance ramp of the Cornsweet stimulus profile occupied 2.42 degrees.  Only the lowest  
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Figure 1.9: Time courses of trials. Experiment 1: Before the start of each trial, participants fixated a 
central cross.  One Cornsweet and one real luminance step-stimulus appeared for 200ms each, with 
a 200ms interval between them.  The order of the stimuli, their orientation and the side on which 
each appeared were randomized (although they were constrained to appear on opposite sides 
within each trial).  Participants then had 1750ms to report the side on which the stimulus with the 
greatest contrast had appeared (using the arrow keys of the keyboard). Experiment 2: Each trial 
stared with fixation. A Cornsweet stimulus then appeared for 200ms with a random orientation to 
the left or right of fixation.  Participants had 1750ms to report, with the ‘Y’ and ‘N’ keys, if they 
perceived Mach bands. 
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Figure 1.10: Experimental results. This figure shows the results of the empirical psychophysical 
study for the Cornsweet illusion (left panel) and the Mach band illusion (Right panel). Both report 
the average effect over subjects and the standard errors (bars). The Cornsweet illusion is measured 
in terms of the subjective contrast level (quantified in terms of subjective equivalence using 
psychometric functions). The Mach band illusion is quantified in terms of probability that the 
illusion is reported to the present. Both results are shown as functions of empirical (Weber) 
stimulus contrast levels. The same range has been used for both graphs so that the dependency on 
contrast levels can be compared. The key thing to note here is that the Cornsweet illusion peaks 
before the Mach band illusion (vertical line). 
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levels of contrast the monitor was able to produce were employed; thus, luminance values 
were linearised post hoc. 
 
4.2 Results and discussion 
 
The results of the psychophysics experiments are shown in Figure 1.10, as a function of 
empirical (Weber) contrast levels. These results are expressed as the mean over all 
subjects and associated standard errors. The reported Cornsweet effect (as indexed by the 
point of subjective equality) peaked, on average over subjects, at a contrast of about 0.025. 
At higher levels of contrast, as in the simulations, the effect falls before plateauing at the 
highest contrast used in Experiment 1. Conversely, the probability of reporting a Mach 
band increased monotonically as a function of the empirical contrast, reaching about 75% 
at a Weber contrast of about 0.15. 
 
Qualitatively, these empirical results compare well with the theoretical predictions shown 
in Figure 1.9: that is, the subjective or inferred Cornsweet effect emerged before the Mach 
bands, as contrast increases. The characteristic ‘inverted U’ dependency of the Cornsweet 
effect on contrast levels is also seen. The empirical profile is somewhat compromised by 
the small range of contrasts employed, however, this range was sufficient to disclose an 
unambiguous peak. Clearly, it would be nice to relate these empirical results quantitatively 
to the simulations shown in Figure 1.8. This presents an interesting challenge because the 
psychophysical data consist of reported levels of an effect and the probability of an effect 
for the Cornsweet and Mach Band illusions respectively. However, because these 
simulations provide a conditional or posterior probability over the effects reported, both 
sorts of reports can be simulated to see how well they explain the psychophysical data. 
This quantitative analysis is now considered in more detail. 
 
4.3 A formal behavioural analysis 
 
The simulations provide conditional expectations (and precisions) of both the Cornsweet 
and Mach band effects over a number of simulated (Weber) contrast levels, as modelled 
with the precision of sensory noise. This means that one can compute a psychometric 
function of contrast c  that returns the behavioural predictions of both illusions 
respectively; namely, the level of the illusion and the probability of inferring a Mach band. 
To predict the reported level of the Cornsweet illusion the conditional expectation 
( )
corn
c  can simply be scaled by some (unknown) coefficient 1 . To predict the 
probability of reporting the presence of Mach bands, one can integrate the conditional  
47 
 
 
Figure 1.11: Predicted and experimental results. Theoretical predictions of the empirical results 
reported in the previous figure: These predictions are based upon a response model that maps from 
the conditional expectations and precisions in the simulations to the behavioural responses of 
subjects. This mapping rests on some unknown parameters or coefficients : 1, 5
i
i   that 
control the relationship between the simulated ( )c  and empirical contrast levels c  used for 
stimuli and the relationship between the probabilities of reporting a Mach band ( ( ))
mac
p c  and 
the conditional probability that it exceeds some threshold ( )macp c  at contrast level c . These 
relationships form the basis of a response model, whose equations are provided in the left panel 
(for simplicity, the expressions for conditional variance of the Mach band contrast have been 
omitted). Given empirical responses for the mean Cornsweet effect ( )M c  and probability of 
reporting a Mach band ( )P c , the coefficients i  can be estimated under the assumption of 
additive prediction errors  . The predicted responses following this estimation are shown in the 
graphs on the right-hand side. The upper panels show the empirical data superimposed upon 
conditional predictions from the model. The blue lines are the predicted psychometric functions, 
( )
corn
c  and ( ( ))
mac
p c . The red dots correspond to the predictions at levels of contrast used in 
the simulations (as shown in Figure 1.8), while the black dots correspond to the empirical 
responses: ( )M c  and ( )P c . The lower left panel show the relationship between the empirical 
and simulated contrast levels (as a semi-log plot of the empirical contrast against the log-precision 
of sensory noise). The lower right panel shows the relationship between the probability of 
reporting a Mach band is present and the underlying conditional probability that it is above 
threshold. 
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probability distribution over the Mach band effect above some (unknown) threshold 
2
 . 
However, to do this, the relationship between the simulated and empirical contrasts must 
be known:  
 
As noted above, the log-precision of sensory noise   is used to model log-contrast in 
accord with Weber's law. This means a linear relationship can be assumed between the 
empirical log-contrast and simulated log-precision. This induces two further unknown 
coefficients – the slope and intercept (
3
  and 
4
 ) that parameterise the relationship 
between the simulated and empirical contrasts. Finally, the conditional probability of a 
suprathreshold Mach band effect must be related to the probability of reporting its 
presence. Here, a simple, monotonic sigmoid relationship is assumed, under the constraint 
that when the conditional probability was 50:50, the report probability was also 50:50. 
The precise form of this mapping is provided in Figure 1.11 (left panel) and has a single 
(unknown) slope coefficient 5 . These relationships provide a mapping between the 
results of the simulations and the observed responses averaged over subjects (under the 
assumptions of additive prediction errors). This is known as a response model and is 
detailed schematically in Figure 1.11.  The predictions are based on the simulated 
responses in Figure 1.8, assuming a smooth psychometric function of contrast that was 
modelled as a linear mixture of cosine functions: ( ) cos( )
k
X k   for 1, , 6k  . The 
coefficients of this discrete cosine set were estimated with ordinary least squares, using 
the responses of the model ( ( ), ( ))
corn mac
     over different precision levels, at the time 
of maximum luminance. 
 
Given the form of the relationships between the simulated and empirical contrasts and 
between the report probability and conditional probabilities for Mach bands, one can use 
the psychophysical data to estimate the unknown coefficients of these relationships: 
: 1, ,5
i
i  . The results of this computationally informed response modelling are 
shown in the right panel of Figure 1.11. The upper panels show the same data as in Figure 
1.10 placed over the theoretical psychometric functions based on the simulations of the 
previous section. These predictions are based on the mapping from simulated to empirical 
contrast levels (lower left) and the relationship between the probability of reporting a 
Mach band and the conditional confidence that it is present (lower right). 
 
By construction, the relationship between the simulated and empirical contrasts is linear 
when plotted on a log-log scale. The slope of this plot suggests that the higher contrasts 
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used in the simulations are, practically, not realisable in an empirical setting. This is 
because as the simulated contrast increases the corresponding empirical contrast 
increases much more quickly. The implication of this is that the contrasts employed in the 
psychophysics study correspond to the first few levels of the simulated contrasts. This 
means that it may be difficult to demonstrate the theoretically predicted attenuation of the 
Cornsweet illusion at very high levels of contrast. 
 
The relationship between the report and conditional probabilities suggests that subjects 
have a tendency to 'all or nothing' reporting; in the sense that a conditional confidence 
that the probability of reporting a Mach band is slightly greater than the conditional 
confidence it is above threshold. Conversely, subjects appear to report the absence of 
Mach bands with a probability that is slightly greater than the conditional probability it is 
below threshold. The resulting psychometric predictions (in the upper panels) show a 
remarkable agreement between the predicted and observed probabilities of reporting a 
Mach band. The correspondence between the predicted and empirical results for the 
Cornsweet illusion are less convincing but show that both asymptote to a peak level much 
more quickly than the probability of reporting a Mach band. 
 
In summary, this analysis suggests that there is a reasonable quantitative agreement 
between the theoretical predictions and empirical results. Furthermore, in practical terms, 
it appears that the normal range of Weber contrasts that can be usefully employed 
corresponds to a relatively low level of sensory precision in the simulations. This means 
that it may be difficult to demonstrate the ‘inverted U' behaviour for the Cornsweet 
illusion seen in Figure 1.8. This is because it may be difficult to present stimuli at the ultra 
high levels of contrast required on a standard LCD screen. Note that the empirical 
probability of reporting a Mach band does not decrease as a function of contrast level. This 
is to be anticipated from the theoretical predictions: increasing the contrast level increases 
the conditional precision about the inferred level of the Mach band effect, which means 
that the probability that is above threshold can still increase even if the conditional 
expectation decreases (as in Figure 1.8). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the nature of illusions, in the context of Bayes-optimal 
perception.  I reiterate the notion that illusory percepts are optimal in that they may 
represent the most likely explanation for ambiguous sensory input.  This has been 
illustrated using the Cornsweet illusion.  By using simple and plausible prior expectations 
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about the spatial deployment of illuminance and reflectance, the emergence of the 
Cornsweet effect as a natural consequence of Bayes-optimal perception has been 
demonstrated .  Furthermore, a contrast-dependent emergence of the Cornsweet effect 
could be simulated and subsequent appearance of Mach bands that was verified 
psychophysically using a forced choice paradigm.   
 
The work described in this chapter is published as: 
Brown H,  Friston KJ. (2012). Free-energy and illusions: the cornsweet effect. Front. 
Psychol.  3:43. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Dynamic causal modelling of 
precision and synaptic gain in visual 
perception – an EEG study 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Predictive coding has proved helpful in explaining many visual phenomena, including 
extraclassical receptive field effects in V1 (Rao & Ballard, 1999), repetition suppression 
(Summerfield et al., 2008) and modulation of early cortical responses by attention (Rauss, 
Schwartz, & Pourtois, 2011).  Friston & Kiebel (2009) suggested a neurobiologically 
plausible scheme by which predictive coding could be executed in the cortex; key to these 
proposals is the idea that superficial pyramidal cells pass prediction error forward to 
higher cortical areas.   
 
Classical predictive coding schemes are linear; however, these schemes cannot 
accommodate state dependent changes in the precision (inverse variability) of sensory 
signals. An important generalisation of predictive coding was introduced by (Feldman & 
Friston, 2010), discussed in Chapter 3,  to accommodate the fact that the precision of 
sensory signals is highly context sensitive and depends upon the (hidden) states of the 
world, generating sensory inputs. In generalised predictive coding, precision scales the 
prediction error such that precise prediction errors have more influence at higher levels in 
representational cortical hierarchies; effectively, precision represents the signal-to-noise 
ratio or salience of prediction error associated with bottom-up signals.  This sort of scaling 
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is vitally important for sensory perception; for example, in multimodal integration (Ernst 
& Banks, 2002) and in reconciling information derived from sensory signals and prior 
knowledge (Rahnev, Lau, & de Lange, 2011).  Precision also influences the perception of 
visual contrast – increasing the relevance and the probability of a visual contrast signal 
have dissociable effects on energy sensitivity (Wyart et al., 2012), and attention allows the 
adoption of more stringent (conservative) detection criteria during contrast detection 
(Rahnev et al., 2011), suggesting that contrast detection is dependent on the estimated 
precision of sensory information. The introduction of precision also explains away the 
apparent contradiction between biased competition, which boosts expected signals 
(prediction errors) and predictive coding, which attenuates them (Feldman & Friston, 
2010).  This has recently been demonstrated experimentally; (Kok et al., 2011) have 
shown, in an fMRI paradigm, that attention reverses the attenuation of BOLD signal seen in 
response to predictable stimuli. In generalised predictive coding, superficial pyramidal 
cells have been proposed to report precision-weighted prediction error, rather than pure 
prediction error (Friston & Kiebel, 2009).  This sort of scheme is formally similar to those 
based upon adaptive resonance theory (Grossberg & Versace, 2008). See also (Spratling, 
2008). Crucially, it provides a plausible mechanism for attentional modulation. 
 
In chapter 1, I describe investigations into the role of precision in the context of visual 
illusions – in particular the Cornsweet illusion (Brown and Friston, 2012). This illusion is 
perhaps the simplest of visual illusions, where a visual ‘edge’ between two isoluminant 
regions creates the impression that the one region is brighter than the other. I will focus 
on this illusion because it provides clear psychophysical evidence that contrast affects the 
encoding of precision in predictive coding – in a way that motivates the 
electrophysiological hypotheses tested in this chapter. The Cornsweet illusion was 
simulated by assuming observers make predictions about their visual input using a 
generative model in which reflectance and illuminance interact to produce sensory 
signals. Crucially, the generative model included prior beliefs that luminance varied with 
low spatial frequency whereas reflectance varied with high spatial frequency.  Inversion of 
this generative model under a generalised predictive coding framework replicated the 
illusory perception of the Cornsweet illusion stimulus. In short, it was sufficient to explain 
the Cornsweet illusion purely in terms of plausible prior beliefs about the spatial 
frequency structure of illuminance profiles and reflecting surfaces. 
 
This is not the first explanation of the Cornsweet illusion to be based on Helmholtz’s 
(Helmholtz, 1924) idea that the visual system must remove the effect of the illuminant to 
perceive.  (Purves, Shimpi, & Lotto, 1999; Purves et al., 2004) have suggested a Bayesian 
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explanation for the Cornsweet illusion and demonstrated that contextual cues indicating 
two differently reflectant surfaces subject to an illuminance gradient increase the 
magnitude of the Cornsweet illusion.  Mechanistically, this may be achieved by filling-in 
(Grossberg & Hong, 2006) - see also Reynolds & Heeger (2009) for a contemporary 
discussion in the context of the normalisation model. 
 
In these simulations, the emergence of the Cornsweet illusion depends critically on the 
luminance contrast of the stimuli. To simulate the effects of changing contrast, the 
precision of the sensory inputs (the first hierarchical layer of the generative model), was 
manipulated; high precision corresponded to higher contrast and vice versa.  This 
manipulation was based on Weber’s law (Weber, 1846) and evidence that the brain uses 
divisive normalisation (Brady & Field, 2000; Carandini & Heeger, 1994), meaning that 
higher contrast stimuli have a higher signal-to-noise ratio and therefore higher precision. 
Associating stimulus contrast with precision enabled the generalised predictive coding 
scheme to accurately reproduce the effects of contrast on human observers; namely, the 
magnitude of the Cornsweet illusion increased to a plateau (Figure 1.10), and Mach bands 
appeared at higher contrast.  These results suggest that increasing stimulus contrast 
increases the precision of sensory signals encoded by early visual areas.   
 
In the context of the generalised predictive coding scheme outlined in the introduction, 
precision is encoded by the gain of superficial pyramidal cells.  Gain in early visual areas is 
known to be important for contrast perception.  Cells in visual area V1 are sensitive to 
contrast and, on a timescale that precludes neuronal adaptation, the firing rate of such 
cells generally increases linearly in response to increasing visual contrast, except at very 
high contrast levels (Albrecht, Farrar, & Hamilton, 1984; Ohzawa, Sclar, & Freeman, 1982).  
Although this pattern is consistent with a gain-based explanation of visual contrast coding, 
this is by no means the only explanation.  In this study, I used EEG and dynamic causal 
modelling to investigate role of synaptic gain in contrast perception in early and higher 
cortical areas. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
18 healthy right-handed subjects participated in the study (9 male; age 20-56). Ethical 
approval was obtained from the UCL Research Ethics Committee (no. 2715/002).  Written 
informed consent was obtained from all subjects.   
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2.2 Experimental paradigm  
 
Cornsweet illusion stimuli (Figure 2.1) were created by applying a bandpass filter to 
1024x512 arrays of white noise to produce a random blob pattern with a fundamental 
frequency of 67 blobs/image (1 cycle/degree).  This pattern was thresholded and 
convolved with a 2-D Laplacian-of-Gaussian filter to give a Cornsweet illusion stimulus.  
Stimuli were scaled to have 10%, 25% or 90% of the maximum contrast supported by the 
monitor.  The stimuli occupied both lower quadrants of the screen, subtending 
approximately 32o of visual angle.  The central 2o of visual angle were left blank.  Stimuli 
were presented against a grey background on a gamma-corrected monitor.  Average 
luminance was 48cd/m2. 
 
 Participants sat on a comfortable chair and rested their head on a chin rest.  The stimuli 
were displayed on an LCD monitor 60cm from the subjects.  During the task, subjects 
fixated on a central cross.  One of the three Cornsweet illusion stimuli was presented on 
the bottom half of the screen for 400ms.  Inter-trial interval was jittered between 600ms 
and 800ms.  Three sessions of 1200 stimuli were presented, over about one hour’s 
scanning time.  During the task, the fixation cross changed to a circle and back again 
between stimuli, randomly with a probability of 0.01, to provide targets for an incidental 
task, used to maintain attentional set. Participants counted these events and reported the 
total to the experimenter after each session. 
 
2.3 Data collection and processing 
 
EEG data were recorded using a Biosemi system with 128 scalp electrodes at a sampling 
rate of 512 Hz.  An average reference was used.  Vertical and horizontal eye movements 
were monitored with electro-oculogram electrodes.  Electrode positions were recorded 
with a Polhemus digitiser.  Data were analysed using SPM8. 
 
Data were down-sampled to 200Hz and bandpass-filtered between 0.5Hz and 45Hz to 
suppress very low frequencies (Luck 2005).  Baseline-corrected epochs were extracted 
from the time series starting at 100ms before stimulus onset and ending at 400ms after 
stimulus onset.  Blink and eye-movement artefacts were detected by simple thresholding 
of electro-oculogram channels; artefactual trials were removed from the analysis.  9.7% of 
trials were excluded (range across subjects 0.3%-32%).  Three types of event related 
averages were taken – an average for each subject and contrast level, an average over 
contrast levels for each subject and an average for each contrast level over all subjects. 
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Figure 2.1: Cornsweet illusion stimuli used for this study.  These stimuli were created by applying a 
bandpass filter to white noise to create a random blob pattern with a fundamental frequency of 67 
blobs/image (1 cycle/degree).  This pattern was thresholded and convolved with a 2-D Laplacian-
of-Gaussian filter to produce a Cornsweet illusion stimulus.  Stimuli were scaled to have 90% (top), 
25% (middle) or 10% (bottom) of the maximum contrast supported by the monitor.  The stimuli 
subtended approximately 32o of visual angle.  The central 2o of visual angle were left blank.  Stimuli 
were presented against a grey background on a gamma-corrected monitor. 
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2.4 Source Localisation  
 
Using the event related potentials averaged over contrasts for each subject, source 
localisation was performed using multiple sparse priors and group constraints (Litvak & 
Friston, 2008). This localisation optimises prior covariance constraints on sources over 
subjects and provides maximum a posteriori estimates of activity at each source from a 
cortical mesh from 60ms post stimulus onset to 400ms post stimulus onset for each 
subject. These estimates were averaged over peristimulus time and projected to a three-
dimensional source space, where they were smoothed to create an image of source activity 
for each subject. Individual subject images were averaged.  This procedure was used to 
identify the location of four bilateral sources in each hemisphere (Figure 2.2). The sources 
were identified as the four bilateral peaks with the largest posterior estimates of evoked 
power (sum of squared source activity over peristimulus time – Litvak and Friston 2008). 
 
2.5 DCM 
 
Dynamic causal modelling as implemented in SPM8 was used to examine the changes in 
pyramidal cell gain due to changes in visual contrast (Kiebel et al., 2008).  Dynamic causal 
modelling employs biophysically constrained models and a Bayesian inversion scheme to 
infer hidden variables relating to connectivity and synaptic efficacy by modelling EEG data 
as the response of a dynamic input-state-output system to experimental perturbations.  
The model comprises both a neuronal mass model that allows for directed coupling among 
hidden neuronal states and the electromagnetic forward model (used for source 
localisation above) that maps from hidden neuronal states to observed channel data. 
 
The neuronal model employed in DCM consists of a number of discrete cortical sources, 
each comprising four cell populations – superficial and deep pyramidal cells, spiny stellate 
cells and inhibitory interneurons (figure 2.3).  The activity of these populations is coupled 
by a series of differential equations, which are based on the intrinsic connectivity among 
cortical layers (Bastos et al., 2011).  A series of parameters, (γ1-γ10) specifies the strength 
of intrinsic connectivity between populations; four of the intrinsic connections are 
optimised to fit the data, the others are fixed.  One or more may be optimised in a 
condition-specific way.   
 
Extrinsic connections link different sources.  Extrinsic forward connections are excitatory, 
originate from superficial pyramidal cells and terminate on spiny stellate neurons.   
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Figure 2.3: The structure of the 
neuronal mass model used to 
simulate activity in each cortical 
layer.  The model consists of four cell 
populations: superficial (4) and deep 
pyramidal cells (1), spiny stellate 
cells (2) and inhibitory interneurons 
(3). The transmembrane potential of 
each cell is modelled by a set of 
differential equations which simulate 
the average voltage and current 
across a group of neurons (Jansen & 
Ritt, 1995). The voltage in each cell is 
transformed into a firing rate by the 
function S(p). Each cell can receive 
connections from other cells within 
the same cortical area, whose 
strength is modulated by γ 
parameters, or from specific cells in 
other cortical areas whose 
connection strengths are encoded in 
the matrices AF and AB. 
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Figure 2.2: Source localisation. Sources located by source reconstruction using multiple sparse 
priors and group constraints.  The figures show absolute source activity averaged across subjects; 
the maxima were used as source locations for DCM.  Four locations emerged bilaterally: an area in 
the inferior occipital gyrus most closely corresponding to visual area V4, the inferior parietal 
cortex, Brodmann area 19 and the orbitofrontal cortex. 
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Extrinsic backward connections are inhibitory, originate from deep pyramidal cells and 
terminate on superficial pyramidal cells.   
 
Under generalised predictive coding, superficial pyramidal cells are thought to signal 
precision-weighted prediction error (Friston & Kiebel, 2009).  The precision is 
represented in the model by pyramidal cell self-connectivity, γ7 (figure 2.3).  As such, this 
parameter was altered to represent changes in precision on prediction errors. Anatomical 
evidence clearly shows that the superficial pyramidal cells are the origins of the majority 
of forward connections, which ascend the visual cortical hierarchy, and that these 
connections drive activity at the levels above (Bastos et al., 2012).  As such, these cells are 
thought to signal prediction error, which must be passed to higher hierarchical levels 
within the predictive coding scheme.  The prediction tested in this experiment is about the 
modulation of the precision, or gain, of the prediction error, and this superficial pyramidal 
cell self-connection is mathematically equivalent to a gain. One alternative hypothesis was 
that it was the precision of the predictions, signalled by deep pyramidal cells, that 
mediated contrast-dependent responses; as such, the level of the deep pyramidal cell gain 
was also fitted to contrast-specific responses and the model evidence of these two models 
was tested. 
To generate predicted signals in sensor space, the superficial pyramidal cell activity and a 
small contribution from deep pyramidal cell activity (which is thought to represent most 
of the EEG signal) are multiplied by a lead field matrix which maps sources to sensors to 
produce simulated data (output equation, figure 2.3).  This lead field matrix constitutes 
the conventional electromagnetic forward model. 
 
The dynamic causal model is inverted using variational Bayesian procedures to obtain the 
posterior density of the free parameters given the data.  As well as the four intrinsic 
connection strength parameters, the free parameters included the strength of all extrinsic 
connections.  The posterior distributions were obtained using a standard Variational 
Laplace scheme as described in Friston et al., (2007). 
 
To determine the connectivity of the areas identified by the source localisation, Bayesian 
model selection was first performed using the free energy, which is an approximation to 
log model evidence.  Six plausible models were specified (Figure 2.4), representing both 
parallel and serial hierarchies, with and without inter-hemisphere connections.  Each of 
the six models was fitted separately to the average response over all subjects for each 
contrast level. A fixed-effects model comparison was then performed.  This stage of the 
analysis was conducted solely to find the most plausible model within which to test our 
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hypotheses about within-area parameter changes; we had no specific anatomical 
hypotheses. 
 
The winning model was used for all subsequent analyses.  Within this model, three sub-
models of contrast-dependent effects were evaluated using subject-specific averages: a 
model with no contrast-dependent effects, a model with contrast-dependent changes in 
the self-connectivity of superficial pyramidal cells (γ7) and a model allowing contrast-
dependent changes in the self-connectivity of deep pyramidal cells (γ10).   A fixed effects 
Bayesian model comparison was then used to compare the final three models (contrast 
dependent effects upon the superficial, deep or no cells) by pooling their log evidences 
over subjects. This analysis tested our specific hypothesis: can the change in brain 
responses seen when visual contrast is altered be modelled only by changes in the gain of 
superficial pyramidal cells within each area? 
 
2.6 Statistical Analysis  
 
Statistical analysis of the parameter estimates from the winning model was performed in 
SPSS 20.0.  The winning model had contrast-dependent changes in the γ7 parameter (self 
inhibition of superficial pyramidal cells or negative gain). The maximum a posteriori 
estimates of the changes in these parameters were quantified using a classical summary 
statistic approach. Eight parameters changed in a contrast-specific way in each subject-
specific model – one for each of four areas in both hemispheres.  These parameters were 
entered into a two-way ANOVA with factors cortical source (with four levels) and 
hemisphere (with two levels). In addition, a one-way ANOVA with planned contrast 
testing for a (linear) change in gain with hierarchical level was performed, weighting the 
groups (from the bottom of the hierarchy to the top) as 4,3,2,1.  Equal variance was 
assumed. 
 
3. Results 
 
Source localisation revealed four bilateral sources of activity (Figure 2.2): visual area 4 
(V4), the inferior parietal cortex (IPC), Brodmann area 19 (A19) and the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC). These cortical areas have been implicated previously in the processing of 
visual form and the global (spatial) attributes of visual stimuli (Peterson et al., 1999; 
Podzebenko et al., 2005; Shikata et al., 2003). The locations of these sources were used in 
subsequent dynamic causal modelling of observed responses in sensor space. Note that 
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Figure 2.4: Model selection. Initial model selection was carried out to identify the extrinsic 
connectivity pattern on the sources identified.   Only plausible models were tested; these models 
had the inferior orbital gyrus at the bottom of the hierarchy and the superior orbital gyrus at the 
top (Felleman & Van Essen, 1991).  These models are distinguished by the deployment of forward 
and backward extrinsic connections, as determined by their level in the hierarchy. Here, this level 
corresponds to vertical position. 
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the anatomical designations are just mnemonic. Although the source reconstruction used a 
canonical template – and the sources can be associated with a Talairach and Tournoux 
location – the spatial precision of EEG source reconstruction means that anatomical 
localisation is very approximate. 
 
Six dynamic causal models (Kiebel et al., 2008) employing a canonical microcircuit model 
of neural activity (Bastos et al., 2011) were fitted to the event related potentials averaged 
over all subjects for each level of contrast (Figure 2.4). Fixed effects Bayesian model 
comparison was used to compare the evidence for each model, pooled over subjects. The 
model with the greatest evidence was a simple hierarchy with diagonal interhemispheric 
connections (Figure 2.4, Figure 2.5).  This model was then used to assess contrast-
dependent changes in coupling for each subject. 
 
This model was fitted to individual subject data with three possible models of contrast-
dependent effects; one which allowed no changes in connectivity, a model with contrast- 
dependent changes in the self-connectivity of superficial pyramidal cells and a model 
allowing contrast-dependent changes in the self-connectivity of deep pyramidal cells.  
Fixed-effects Bayesian model comparison showed the model with contrast-dependent 
changes in the self-connectivity (gain) of the superficial pyramidal cells had the most 
evidence, with a log Bayes factor of 900 – compared to equivalent model with changes in 
the deep pyramidal cells. Both of these models had an overwhelming amount of evidence 
in relation to the null model, with no contrast dependent changes in gain (with Bayes 
factors of over 30,000).  The model with contrast dependent changes in superficial 
pyramidal cell gain provided an excellent fit to the data (Figure 2.6). 
 
Contrast-dependent changes in coupling under the winning model were assessed in a post 
hoc fashion, using classical inference.  Two-way ANOVA (with factors cortical source and 
hemisphere) showed no effect of side (F1,136 = 1.850; p = 0.073), so parameters pertaining 
to left and right sources were analysed together subsequently.  One-way ANOVA with 
planned testing for a (linear) change in gain with hierarchical level showed a significant 
trend for contrast-dependent increases in lower sources and smaller, or no, contrast-
dependent increases in higher sources of the hierarchy (t140 = -2.472; p = 0.015) (Figure 
2.7).  The contrast-dependent changes in gain shown in Figure 2.6 produce a progressive 
attenuation of contrast-dependent effects at higher levels in the hierarchy. This can be 
seen easily in Figure 2.8, where solid lines represent the highest-contrast condition and 
dotted lines the lowest-contrast condition. The difference in responses to the different 
levels of contrast clearly decreases as the hierarchy is ascended. 
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Figure 2.5: Results of fixed-effects Bayesian Model Selection.  Upper panel: out of the different 
extrinsic connectivity models, Model 5, a serial hierarchy with interhemispheric connections, had 
the most evidence.  This model was used for subsequent analyses.   
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Figure 2.6: Model fits. The fits of the three models of contrast-dependent effects to event related 
potentials in sensor-space for an illustrative subject; these responses are summarised with the first 
two principal components or modes.  The modes are used for data reduction – the data is projected 
onto the principal eigenvectors of the prior covariance of the data.  In this chapter, eight modes are 
used in total.  The dashed lines show the data modes and the solid lines the model predictions.  In 
the best-fitting model (centre) these are almost superimposed, whereas in the less well-fitting 
models, substantial differences are evident. 
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4. Discussion 
 
The results of this study suggest that the visual contrast of a stimulus increases the gain of 
superficial pyramidal cells in lower visual areas, relative to higher levels.  This is entirely 
consistent with generalised predictive coding, where visual contrast determines the 
precision of sensory signals and the representation of that precision in terms of the gain or 
sensitivity of superficial pyramidal cells. 
 
Generalised predictive coding suggests that forward connections in the brain (known to 
originate from superficial pyramidal cells (Felleman & van Essen, 1991; Maunsell & van 
Essen, 1983) convey precision-weighted prediction error.  Theoretical work described 
above (Brown & Friston, in submission) has shown that increasing visual contrast 
corresponds to increasing the precision of sensory channels in accordance with Weber’s 
law. In this study, I have shown that the changes in the EEG signal across levels of visual 
contrast can be modelled by changes in gain in superficial pyramidal cells.  This gain is 
thought to represent the precision of the prediction error, which determines the signal-to-
noise ratio associated with sensory input. 
 
A technical issue – that deserves a brief comment – is that the cell populations, whose 
intrinsic gain best models visual contrast effects, are the same populations generating the 
observed EEG signal (in the model). One might ask whether this biases the model 
comparison, given that visually evoked responses generally increase with contrast (Polat 
and Norcia 1996). Although this is a possibility – in the sense that any inference in DCM 
pertains only to the models considered – the intrinsic connections between superficial and 
deep cells means that changes in the gain of deep cells could also easily explain the 
contrast dependent responses – through their influence on superficial cells. Furthermore, 
models with contrast dependent changes in extrinsic connections (targeting both 
superficial and deep populations) had substantially lower evidence than the models 
reported above (results not shown). In short, an increase in the gain of superficial 
pyramidal cells appears to be the best explanation for contrast dependent effects, within 
the set of alternative models that could be plausibly conceived of. 
 
It should be noted that a contrast dependent increase in evoked responses could be 
modelled in many ways. In this sense, the use of DCM can be regarded as testing specific 
hypotheses about a limited number of competing explanations. I focused on the gain or 
intrinsic sensitivity of superficial and deep pyramidal cells because explanations in terms 
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Figure 2.7: Contrast-dependent changes in the gain of superficial pyramidal cells. These are the 
average parameters, over subjects, controlling the contrast dependent changes in negative self-
inhibition (gain) under the winning model of the previous figures. Note the progressive decrease in 
contrast-dependent effects at higher levels of the hierarchy. This is predicted theoretically, because 
the precision of prediction errors at the lowest (sensory) level has been manipulated through 
experimental manipulations of visual contrast.  
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Figure 2.8: Prediction error in the cortical hierarchy. This figure shows the activity reconstructed at 
each of the sources used for DCM analysis (based on a DCM of the grand average event related 
potentials over subjects). These responses can be taken to be a rough proxy for prediction error, 
since superficial pyramidal cells contribute most of the EEG signal.  The difference in signal 
between high-contrast and low-contrast clearly reduces as the hierarchy is ascended, reflecting the 
decreasing differences in the precision of prediction error. 
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of post-synaptic gain follow directly from predictive coding formulations of perceptual 
synthesis. This does not mean that other hypotheses could not be explored based upon 
alternative theoretical formulations. In brief, as with all dynamic causal modelling studies, 
the conclusions have to be qualified in relation to the hypotheses all models addressed.   
 
On a general note, the conclusions of this chapter highlight the utility of dynamic causal 
modelling – in using experimental data to ask specific questions. Figure 2.6 shows that the 
effects of changing the gain of superficial and deep pyramidal cells are, qualitatively, very 
similar. This means that adjudicating between implicit explanations for contrast 
dependent effects is a very difficult problem. Note that this problem cannot be finessed 
experimentally – for example, there is no (non-invasive) experimental manipulation of 
contrast that selectively engages deep or superficial pyramidal cells. The solution offered 
by DCM is to place constraints on the way that data are explained and use Bayesian 
modelling to quantify the evidence for different hypotheses. Note that although the 
expression of the different hypotheses in figure 2.5 looks very similar, the evidence for 
contrast dependent changes in the gain of superficial cells is enormous (with a Bayes 
factor of over 900). This evidence could not be intuited by simply looking at the data: it is 
disclosed by careful and informed Bayesian modelling of those data. In short, dynamic 
causal modelling of this sort exploits prior knowledge to solve otherwise very difficult 
inference problems. However, this solution rests upon the specification of specific and well 
posed questions.  In other words, the efficiency with which this sort of modelling 
adjudicates between different hypotheses depends on an efficient and careful 
experimental design. 
 
The cells of early visual areas corresponding to human V1 have been studied extensively 
with electrophysiologically in cat and macaque.  Although this study did not model V1 as a 
distinct source, the lack of spatial resolution with EEG means that the results from IOG can 
be regarded as representative of early visual responses.  The supragranular superficial 
pyramidal cells in this dynamic causal model are located in the same cortical layers as 
complex cells in cat area 17, which predominate in layers 2 and 3 (Gilbert & Wiesel, 1979). 
Moreover, in Rao and Ballard’s predictive coding model of visual cortex, prediction error 
units display complex cell-like behaviour in the presence and absence of feedback (Rao & 
Ballard, 1999). Subsequent examination of the contrast-dependent responses of such cells 
shows that, in the absence of adaptation, their firing rate generally increases linearly in 
response to increasing visual contrast, except at very high contrast levels (Albrecht et al., 
1984; Ohzawa et al., 1982).  The short stimulus duration and dim screen used in this study 
suggests adaptation of retinal or early cortical responses can be discounted and therefore 
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contrast-dependent responses at the cellular level should increase monotonically with 
contrast, which seems to be the case in figure 2.7. Dynamic causal modelling of the 
underlying synaptic mechanisms suggests that this increase is the result of increasing gain 
in superficial pyramidal cells. 
 
What might be the mechanism behind these gain increases?  In perceptual processing, 
acetylcholine signalling seems to be an important mechanism for contrast gain-control.  
Increasing endogenous acetylcholine reduces contrast-dependent gain (DeBruyn, 
Gajewski, & Bonds, 1986), while nicotine has a suppressive effect on gain in cortical layers 
2,3 and 5 but an facilitatory effect in layer 4c, where stellate cell bodies are located 
(Disney, Aoki, & Hawken, 2007).  Short-term depression, particularly at the 
thalamocortical synapse to spiny stellate cells, has also been proposed to play a role 
(Carandini, Heeger, & Senn, 2002; Chung, Li, & Nelson, 2002); this would fit with the 
neuronal encoding of precision by neuromodulatory mechanisms.   
 
The mechanisms discussed in relation to encoding precision also seem to have an 
important role in contrast sensitivity.  For example, nicotine increases contrast sensitivity 
(Disney et al., 2007), especially at low spatial frequencies (Smith & Baker-Short, 1993), 
while scopolamine, a muscarinic antagonist, universally increases contrast sensitivity 
(Smith & Baker-Short, 1993), an effect that can be attenuated by increasing the luminance 
(precision) of the stimulus (Evans, 1975). 
 
Aberrant encoding of precision and uncertainty has been proposed to play a role in a 
number of neuropsychiatric disorders.  In patients with schizophrenia, the mismatch 
negativity, an evoked potential that is greater in response to deviant or unexpected 
auditory tones, is decreased in magnitude (Jahshan et al., 2011; Jordanov et al., 2011; 
Leitman et al., 2010). This may represent a failure to detect statistical regularities and 
assign higher precision to sensory information, leading to a reduced difference between 
responses to standard and deviant stimuli (Garrido et al., 2008; Garrido et al., 2009; 
Strelnikov, 2007). In other words, schizophrenic subjects may never be surprised because 
they fail to make precise predictions. This explanation for the mismatch negativity speaks 
to an optimisation of precision or gain associated with sensory prediction errors due to 
rapid sensory learning and calls upon exactly the same synaptic mechanisms that have 
been proposed to at mediate attentional gain (Feldman and Friston 2010). In short, 
sensory surprise depends upon appropriately precise prediction errors and adaptive 
precision or gain control.   
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(Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 2009) have proposed a hierarchical Bayesian explanation for 
schizophrenia that rests on the aberrant weighting of top-down and bottom-up 
information that could lead to both hallucinations and delusions.  In predictive coding, this 
weighting is determined by the precision of prediction errors at different levels in 
hierarchical generative models.  Patients with schizophrenia show a pan-frequency 
increase in contrast sensitivity threshold (Skottun & Skoyles, 2007; Slaghuis, 1998), which 
could reflect inadequate increase of synaptic gain at superficial pyramidal cells in 
response to high-contrast stimuli.  These ideas are important, because this study suggests 
it is possible to measure the neuronal encoding of precision noninvasively using EEG, in a 
very simple paradigm which would be easy to perform with patients. 
 
In conclusion, I provide evidence that the contrast-dependency of early visual cortical 
responses is mediated by the gain of superficial pyramidal cells.  In computational terms, 
this gain may encode the precision of prediction errors signalled by these cells. These 
results suggest that DCM may be useful as an assay of the synaptic (neuromodulatory) 
mechanisms that underlie perceptual inference.  
 
 
The work described in this chapter is published as: 
Brown H, Friston KJ. (2012). Dynamic causal modelling of precision and synaptic gain in 
visual perception - an EEG study. Neuroimage. 63:223-31. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Attention, uncertainty and free-
energy 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Attention is a ubiquitous and important construct in cognitive neuroscience.  Many 
accounts of attention fall back on Jamesian formulations, famously articulated as “the 
taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several 
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought” (James 1890).  More recent and 
formal accounts appeal to information theory and computational principles (Duncan and 
Humphreys, 1989; Deco & Rolls 2005; Jaramillo & Pearlmutter 2007; Spratling 2008; 
Reynolds & Heeger 2009; Bruce & Tsotsos 2009; Spratling 2010), with an increasing 
emphasis on Bayesian formulations (Rao 2005; Itti and Baldi, 2010; Chikkerur et al., 
2010). These attempts to understand attention are pursued in computational terms. This 
means terms like uncertainty, surprise and precision will be used in a rather formal way. 
Without exception, these terms refer to properties of probability distributions. Probability 
distributions are central to modern treatments of perception that cast perception as 
inference. Inference requires us to represent probability distributions (or densities) over 
possible causes or explanations for our sensations. These distributions have several 
important attributes: For example, a broad distribution encodes a high degree of 
uncertainty about a particular cause. This uncertainty is, mathematically, the average 
(expected) surprise over all possibilities. A key measure of uncertainty is the width or 
variance of the distribution, or its inverse, precision. In what follows, I hope to show that 
attention is more concerned with optimizing the uncertainty or precision of probabilistic 
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representations, rather than what is being represented. By describing perception in formal 
terms, one can see almost intuitively where attention fits into the larger picture and how it 
might be mediated neurobiologically.  This is important because a formal framework 
allows one to link classical psychological constructs to current physiological perspectives 
on attention (e.g., communication through coherence; Fries 2005). I hope to show that the 
perspectives afforded by cognitive psychology, neurophysiology and formal (theoretical) 
treatments are all remarkably consistent. 
 
In this chapter I suggest that perception is the inference about causes of sensory inputs 
and attention is the inference about the uncertainty (precision) of those causes (Friston 
2009). This places attention in the larger context of perceptual inference under 
uncertainty (Rao 2005; Spratling 2008; Whiteley & Sahani 2008; Chikkerur et al., 2010).  
In this work,I  try to show that attention emerges naturally in a Bayes-optimal scheme 
used previously to address predictive coding (Friston & Kiebel 2009), perceptual 
categorisation (Kiebel et al., 2009), learning (Friston 2008) and action (Friston 2010a). In 
other words, I try to explain some simple attentional phenomena using an established 
framework that has explanatory power in domains beyond attention. Specifically, I show 
how attention can be construed as inferring the precision of sensory signals and their 
causes.  The idea is illustrated using computational simulations of neuronal processing 
that try to establish face-validity in terms of psychophysical and electrophysiological 
responses.  This is done in the context of the Posner paradigm (Posner 1980); a classical 
paradigm for studying directed spatial attention in vision, using cued targets.  This 
paradigm also makes it possible to address, in a heuristic way, biased competition 
(Desimone 1996) by presenting validly and invalidly cued targets simultaneously.  The 
hope was to connect psychophysical studies of attention with theories based upon 
detailed electrophysiological studies in monkeys.  
 
 
The basic idea pursued in this chapter is that attention entails estimating uncertainty 
during hierarchical inference about the causes of sensory input.  This idea is developed in 
the context of perception based on Bayesian principles, under the free-energy principle 
(Friston 2009), as described in the introduction.  Formally, this scheme can be regarded as 
a generalisation of predictive coding (Rao and Ballard 1998) and involves recurrent 
message passing among hierarchical levels of cortical systems to optimise a probabilistic 
representation of the world (Mumford 1992; Friston 2009).  In these generalised schemes, 
precision is encoded by the synaptic gain (post-synaptic responsiveness) of units 
reporting prediction errors (Friston 2008). There are many metaphors for attention that 
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relate closely to the idea described in this chapter.  Perhaps the simplest is that of 
statistical inference, which treats perception as hypothesis testing (Gregory 1980): 
Indeed, most modern theories of perception draw on Helmholtz’s ideas about the brain as 
an inference machine (e.g. Gregory 1968; Ballard et al 1983; Dayan et al 1995).  These 
theories regard the brain as inferring how sensory data are generated using generative 
models (cf, hypotheses) in exactly the same way that we analyse scientific data.  The 
simplest example of this is the Student’s t-statistic, where a difference in group means is 
divided by its standard error to test for group differences.  Under the null hypothesis, the 
observed difference is the prediction error and the standard error is an estimate of its 
precision (inverse variance).  This means that one can regard the t-statistic as a precision-
weighted prediction error.  Crucially, both the prediction error and its precision have to be 
estimated, given empirical (sensory) data.  The idea here is that attention rests on 
estimating precision and is therefore an integral part of perception.  Things get more 
interesting if we consider that the precision of sensory signals depend on states of the 
world.  This means that optimising precision entails optimising inferred states of the 
world that affect the precision or uncertainty about our sensations.  It is this 
generalisation of generative models which is exploited in this chapter.  In brief, most 
generative models (including those used to simulate perception) ignore state-dependent 
noise or error variance; assuming that it is constant for any (sensory) data channel.  In 
what follows, this assumption is relaxed to consider generative models in which the states 
of the world (for example the presence of attentional cues) can change the precision of 
sensory data.  A simple example of this would be the direction (state) in which we pointed 
a searchlight.  This determines which part of the sensorium contains precise information; 
namely visual information reflected by surfaces that are illuminated.  Any coupling 
between the state of the world (content) and the precision of sensory samples (context) 
should be an inherent part of veridical generative models of sensory input.  Under this 
perspective, searchlight (spotlight) metaphors for attention become a natural way to think 
about its functional role (Shulman et al., 1979; Crick 1984; Cave and Bichot, 1999; 
Eckstein et al 2002).  Mechanistically, this role is to weight or bias selected sensory 
channels (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Maunsell, & Treue 2006; Reynolds & Heeger 2009; 
Stokes et al., 2009).  In statistical terms, this is formally identical to weighted least squares 
that underlies all optimal (maximum a posteriori) estimates of model parameters.  Put 
simply, this involves weighting data in proportion to their estimated precision. 
 
In predictive coding schemes, sensory data are replaced by prediction error, because this 
is the only sensory information that has yet to be explained. Here, the weighting is 
implemented by synaptic gain.  We therefore return to the central role of precision-
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weighted prediction errors in optimal inference.   Neurobiologically, this is easy to relate 
to theories of attentional gain, where the postsynaptic responsiveness of sensory 
(prediction error) units is modulated by attentional mechanisms (Desimone 1996; 
Maunsell, & Treue 2006).   This chapter will focus on two neurobiological candidates for 
modulating synaptic gain that have specifically linked to attention: synchronous gain 
(Chawla et al 1999a) mediated by fast oscillatory or synchronised activity (Womelsdorf & 
Fries 2006; Fries et al 2008) and classical neuromodulatory (e.g., cholinergic) 
neurotransmission (Schroeder et al 2001; Hirayama et al 2004): 
 
Electrophysiologically, desynchronisation with increased gamma activity (between 30 and 
100 Hz) is seen during attentional tasks in invasive (Steinmetz et al., 2000; Fries et al., 
2008; Bichot et al., 2005), and non-invasive EEG and MEG studies (Gruber et al., 1999; 
Sokolov et al., 1999; Pavlova, Birbaumer and Sokolov, 2006; Vidal et al., 2006). Gamma 
oscillations induced with subliminal flicker may improve attention-based performance 
(Bauer et al., 2009). Furthermore, increased gamma is associated with faster reaction 
times (Womelsdorf et al., 2006; Fründ et al., 2007).  Gamma oscillations can control gain 
by affording synchronised neuronal discharges a greater influence on the firing rate of 
downstream neurons (Chawla et al 1999a; Salinas and Sejnowski, 2001; Zeitler, Fries and 
Gielen, 2008).  Gamma activity has also been proposed as a solution to the ‘binding 
problem’, which I discuss below in relation to attention (Treisman and Schmidt, 1982). 
 
In terms of neurotransmitters, gamma oscillations are profoundly affected by 
acetylcholine, which is released into sensory cortices from nuclei in the basal forebrain.  It 
acts through both fast ion channel (nicotinic) receptors and slow metabotropic 
(muscarinic) receptors (Wonnacott, 1997; Zilles et al., 2004; Hasselmo et al., 2006).  
Disruption of the cholinergic system by drugs or lesions can interfere with attentional 
processes, including the Posner paradigm (Voytko et al., 1994; Witte et al., 1997; Dalley at 
al., 2001; Herrero et al 2008; Vossel et al., 2008).  Acetylcholine appears to increase 
synaptic gain directly by, for example, reducing spike-frequency adaptation (McCormick 
and Prince, 1985; ibid 1986).  It may also facilitate the induction of gamma oscillations by 
reducing adaptation in pyramidal cells (Buhl et al. 1998; Borgers et al. 2005), decreasing 
activity of inhibitory interneurons (Buia and Tiesinga 2006) or directly inactivating 
specific interneurons (Xiang et al. 1998).  However, the time-course of acetylcholine 
release can be quite protracted (Parikh et al., 2007). This suggests rapid (ten to a hundred 
milliseconds) attentional mechanisms may rest on an interaction of cholinergic 
mechanisms with fast activity-dependent modulation of synaptic gain. It is this activity 
(state) dependent optimisation  I pursue in this chapter. 
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In summary, it may be the case that attention is the process of optimising synaptic gain to 
represent the precision of sensory information (prediction error) during hierarchical 
inference.   Furthermore, if we allow for state-dependent changes in precision, the 
neurobiology of attention must involve activity-dependent changes in synaptic gain; 
assuming that neuronal activity represents the states of the world and synaptic gain 
represents precision.  Given this sort of architecture we can, in principle, simulate 
attentional processing with established (Bayes-optimal) inversion or recognition schemes, 
using models with state-dependent noise.  What follows is an attempt to do this. 
 
This chapter comprises five sections.  The first comprises brief review of attention in 
psychological and neurobiological terms.  This section focuses on directed spatial 
attention and, in particular, the Posner (cueing) paradigm that emphasises the importance 
of valid cues in establishing attentional set during target detection (Posner 1980). To 
complement this psychophysical perspective, biased competition models that are based on 
careful electrophysiological studies of evoked visual responses using intracranial 
recordings are considered (Desimone 1996).  Biased competition is probably the most 
established and influential theory that accounts for unit responses in attentional 
paradigms framed at the level of receptive fields.  I also review the concepts of attentional 
resources and other constructs associated with early and late attentional selection and the 
feature-integration theory of attention.  In the second section, the free-energy principle 
and form of the generative models described in the introduction are briefly recapitulated.  
The emphasis here is on generalising previous models to include state-dependent noise 
and what this means for their neurobiological optimisation or inversion. The resulting 
inversion scheme corresponds to recognizing the causes of sensory data (that include both 
states of the world and their precision).  Precision is encoded by the synaptic gain of 
sensory or prediction error units, which pass messages to units representing conditional 
expectations about the world. In this scheme, optimisation of synaptic gain may 
correspond to attention. In the third section, simulations of the Posner paradigm are 
presented using the recognition scheme of the previous section.  This allows 
demonstration some basic characteristics of attention-based inference; including 
attentional bias, attentional capture and the cue-validity effect.  A direct interpretation of 
the probabilistic representations encoded by simulated neuronal activity is supplemented 
with simulated psychophysical and electrophysiological data.  These simulated responses 
make some clear predictions about speed-accuracy trade-offs and event-related 
electrophysiological responses, which I compare against the literature.  In the final section, 
the same simulations are used but both valid and invalidly cued targets are presented 
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together.  This is a rough metaphor for paradigms used to study biased competition and 
allows us to see if biased competition emerges from the free-energy formulation.  This is 
examined by looking at competition between cues via the effect of an attended cue on the 
responses evoked by an unattended cue.  This chapter concludes with a brief discussion 
and indications of how the scheme in this chapter could be applied to empirical 
psychophysical and electroencephalographic observations.  
 
2. Attention, biased competition and the Posner paradigm 
 
In this section, I review some of the key paradigms and theories that have dominated 
attention research over the past decades.  The focus will be the Posner paradigm, which is 
simulated in later sections, and biased competition, which is one of the most prevalent 
electrophysiologically grounded theories of attention.   
 
Early cognitive models of attention, although inherently limited by lack of knowledge 
about the underlying neural processes, elucidated the important difference between early 
and late selection.  Broadbent (1958), working in the auditory domain, suggested that 
attention operated by selecting stimuli at an early stage of processing, when only basic 
physical attributes had been encoded.  The selected stimulus was then processed by an 
‘identification system’, which could handle only one stimulus at a time; to explain why 
semantic information about unattended stimuli is unavailable to recall (Broadbent, 
1952a,b).  However, there are stimuli which violate this principle: Moray (1959) 
demonstrated that a subject’s name, which is salient only after semantic processing, could 
shift attention to a previously unattended auditory stream.  The competing theory, that all 
stimuli are processed semantically before selection for consciousness recall, was posited 
by Deutsch and Deutsch (1963), whereas Treisman (1964) suggested that unattended 
stimuli are attenuated so that attention can be diverted to them, if they become 
behaviourally salient. Lavie (1995) attempted to reconcile these models by demonstrating 
that perceptual load plays an important role in attentional selection: Intuitively, early 
selection occurs with higher attentional load and late selection with lower load. This 
differential selection rests on the notion of limited capacity.  Many of these ideas can be 
understood in the framework of biased competition theory, which tries to explain some of 
the phenomena described above using neurobiological mechanisms: 
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2.1 Biased competition 
 
Biased competition (Desimone and Duncan, 1995) is a model of attention based on 
electrophysiological studies and earlier behavioural models. Its main contribution was to 
make the notion of limited capacity or resources more concrete, by suggesting small lower 
level receptive fields (RFs) compete to drive larger RFs at higher hierarchical levels. 
Biased competition says that attention is an emergent property of competition between 
stimuli for attentional resources, which is influenced by the properties of the stimuli and 
task requirements.  Its premise is that, in a crowded visual field, objects must compete for 
neural representation at some point along the visual processing stream.  This can be 
deduced from the large size of classical receptive fields in higher visual areas, such as 
monkey area TE, which can cover up to 25o of visual angle (Gross et al., 1972; Desimone 
and Gross, 1979).  Clearly, many objects can fall into such a visual field but the neuron can 
only represent (report) one thing with its firing.  If an object is represented by these 
higher-order visual neurons, they are unavailable to represent other objects.  Thus the 
object has consumed some finite ‘attentional resource’.  
 
This premise leads to a key prediction: if two stimuli are presented within a cell’s 
receptive field, the response to both will be smaller than the sum of the response to the 
stimuli presented separately (Reynolds et al. 1999).  Single-cell electrophysiological 
studies have confirmed that stimuli interact in this mutually suppressive manner in areas 
V2 and V4 (Reynolds et al. 1999),  IT (Rolls and Tovee, 1995) and MT (Recanzone et al., 
1997), but not V1, where receptive fields are so small it is difficult to present competing 
stimuli (Moran and Desimone, 1985).  The average responses of visual cortical areas in 
fMRI studies in humans mirror the results from electrophysiological studies in animals 
(Kastner et al. 1998; Beck and Kastner, 2005).  An important result is that the maximum 
spatial separation between stimuli, which induces suppressive interactions, increases at 
higher levels of visual processing, which is consistent with increasing receptive field size 
(Kastner et al., 2001).   
 
Large receptive fields thus cause stimuli to compete.  The probability with which stimuli 
are represented by cells is thought to be influenced by a number of top-down and bottom-
up biases.  Bottom-up biases result from the properties of the stimuli itself, such as visual 
or emotional salience and novelty.  Abrupt-onset stimuli, which have high temporal 
contrast, and thus salience, can attract attention even if they are task-irrelevant (Yantis 
and Jonides, 1984).  In the visual search paradigm, used to address feature-integration and 
binding (Treisman & Gelade 1980; Treisman & Schmidt 1982; Treisman 1998), subjects 
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are required to find a unique object in a display cluttered with distracters.  If the unique 
object is particularly salient, for example if it is brighter than the distracters or has a 
unique colour, the search time remains constant regardless of the number of distracters.  
This phenomenon is called ‘pop-out’.  Salience does not have to be a function of simple 
visual attributes: distractor faces exhibiting negative emotions slow search times more 
than neutral faces (Pessoa, Kastner and Ungerleider 2002).  Novelty preference, the well-
documented tendency for neurons to respond more strongly to a new stimulus than to a 
familiar one, can also be considered as a bottom-up bias (Desimone, 1996).   
 
Top-down biases reflect the cognitive requirements of the task rather than the stimuli.  
Top-down biases have been most studied via spatially-directed attention experiments.  
Electrophysiologically, if attention is directed towards one of two competing stimuli in a 
receptive field, the mutually suppressive effect disappears and the response of the cell 
emulates the response to attended stimulus alone (Moran and Desimone, 1985; Chelazzi et 
al. 1993; Treue and Maunsell, 1996; Desimone, 1998).  Even in the absence of visual 
stimulation, baseline increases in firing rate of 30-40% may be seen, if attention is 
directed to a location within a cell’s receptive field (Luck et al., 1997).  Indeed, in fMRI 
studies, responses are increased in visual areas after attentional cuing but before stimulus 
onset (Chawla et al 1999b; Kastner et al. 1999; O’Connor et al. 2002; Stokes et al., 2009).  
In addition, cells respond more strongly to attended than unattended stimuli (Luck et al., 
1997).  Thus, top-down bias has both additive (baseline shift) and multiplicative 
(attentional gain) components that may depend on each other (Chawla et al 1999b). In 
summary, biased competition is a mechanistic framework, which provides a plausible 
neurobiological account of attention. Later, we will see how biased competition emerges 
naturally in predictive coding formations of Bayes-optimal perception. 
 
2.2 The Posner paradigm 
 
In later sections optimal perception under the Posner task, a covert attention task, will be 
simulated.  Attending to an object usually involves looking at it; that is placing its image at 
the fovea (the central area of the retina with highest acuity).  However, attention can be 
directed independently of eye movement (Posner et al., 1978).  Under the Posner 
paradigm, subjects are required to foveate a central spot and respond as quickly as 
possible to the appearance of a peripheral target.  The target is cued with either a central 
arrow indicating the side it will appear on, or a peripheral box around the target’s 
eventual location.  The cue is correct (valid) most (usually 80%) of the time.  Posner found 
that reaction times to validly cued targets were significantly shorter than to invalidly cued 
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targets, which appeared on the opposite side. This demonstrated that attention could be 
moved to salient locations in the absence of gaze shift. The cuing seen in the Posner 
paradigm seems to be separable from the phenomenon of ‘alerting’, in which a non-
directional signal indicates the imminent onset of a target (Fernandez-Duque and Posner, 
1997; Posner, 2008). Subjects are quicker to respond to a target if the cue indicates the 
location of the target than when it only indicates the timing (Davidson and Marrocco, 
2000). In addition, a pharmacological double-dissociation exists such that inhibitors of the 
cholinergic system selectively reduce the benefits of spatial cues, while noradrenergic 
inhibitors selectively reduce the benefits of alerting cues (Marrocco et al., 1994). 
Furthermore, dopamine and noradrenalin antagonists can reduce the reaction time cost of 
invalidly cued targets, while preserving the validly effect (Clark et al., 1989).  However, 
this effect may be due to the role of noradrenalin in task switching (Sara, 1998; Yu and 
Dayan, 2005).   
 
The two types of cues used in the Posner paradigm – central and peripheral – show the 
same facilitation effect.  However, they may operate by different mechanisms.  Peripheral 
stimuli are labelled as ‘exogenous’, because the change in attention is triggered by an 
external event.  It is well established that abrupt-onset peripheral stimuli can attract 
attention via bottom-up mechanisms (Yantis and Jonides, 1984), even when task-
irrelevant (Theeuwes, 1991).  Central stimuli are ‘endogenous’ because they do not in 
themselves indicate target location; attention must be directed to the correct location 
according to information conveyed by the cue.  The most common central cues are 
inherently directional: an arrow pointing to where the target will appear, or an asterisk 
just to one side of fixation.  Although cues such as this may automatically ‘push’ attention, 
even when the subject has been told the cue is invalid (Hommel at al., 2001).  
 
Exogenous and endogenous cuing fit well with biased competition theory: exogenous 
cuing can be thought of as a bottom-up bias, based on the prior expectation that salient 
events recur in the same part of the visual field.  On the other hand the effect of 
endogenous cues must be mediated by top-down bias. However, these top-down effects do 
not necessarily call on semantic or explicit processing: For example, Decaix et al. (2002) 
examined performance on the Posner paradigm when subjects were not informed about 
the cue-target relationship but subjects still learnt cue-target relationships within 90 
trials, and performance was independent of whether the learnt relationship was accessible 
to verbal report.  Bartolomeo et al. (2007) compared performance of informed and non-
informed subjects and found no effect of explicit knowledge on reaction time. Finally, 
Risko and Stolz (2010) demonstrated that knowledge of the proportion of valid trials did 
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not affect reaction time. In short, the basic phenomena disclosed in the Posner paradigm 
may not depend on high level cognitive processing. This suggests that a low level 
simulation of perceptual processing should be able to account for cue validity effects. This 
is what I attempt to show and demonstrate that cue-validity effects are Bayes-optimal. In 
the next section, I review the principles that lie behind Bayes-optimal perception and 
apply these principles to the Posner paradigm in the subsequent section.   
 
3. Mathematical foundations 
 
The hierarchical message passing scheme below was introduced in the introduction as a 
highly general scheme which allows inversion of hierarchical dynamic models within a 
predictive coding scheme: 
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Here, the amplitude of random fluctuations are assumed to be parameterised in terms of 
log-precisions, where   
 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
(exp( ))
( )
i u i u i u
i u i u i u
R diag
I diag


  
  
       3.2 
 
The vector function ( , ) ( , ): ( , , ) : ,i u i ux v u v x     returns state-dependent log-precisions 
and ( , )i uR  is the inverse smoothness matrix ( , )i uV .  In what follows the amplitude 
(variance) of random fluctuations will be quantified in terms of log-precisions, such that 
the associated variance is ( , )exp( )i u . With this particular form for the precisions, the 
terms ( , )i u
w
  and ( , ) ( , )( )i u i u
w w
tr    are constant for states ,w v x  that affect the log-
precisions linearly and zero if they have no effect. 
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In the present context, the key thing about this scheme is that the precisions 
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
: ( , , )
i u i i i u
v x     depend on the expected hidden causes and states. It is this 
dependency that I propose mediates attentional processing. Equation 3.1 tells us that the 
state-dependent precisions modulate the responses of the error-units to their presynaptic 
inputs. This modulation depends on the conditional expectations about the states and 
suggests something intuitive; attention is mediated by activity-dependent modulation of 
the synaptic gain of principal cells that convey sensory information (prediction error) 
from one cortical level to the next. These are generally thought to be the superficial 
pyramidal cells responsible for generating EEG signals. More specifically, precision sets 
the synaptic gain of error-units to their top-down and lateral inputs. In hierarchical 
models, the gain modulation of error-unit activity ( , )i u  depends on ( ) ( ) ( , )( , , )i i i uv x   and 
therefore depends on the conditional expectations of ( )ix  in the current level and ( )iv  in 
the level above.  This translates into a top-down control of synaptic gain in principal 
(superficial pyramidal) cells elaborating prediction errors and fits comfortably with the 
modulatory effects of top-down connections in cortical hierarchies that have been 
associated with attention. Note that the precisions or synaptic gain ( , )i u  also depends on 
the slowly varying parameters    responsible for learning. It is these parameters I 
associate with the slower dynamics of classical neuromodulation (e.g., cholinergic 
neurotransmission; Friston 2008). 
 
4. Simulating the Posner paradigm 
 
In this section, the hierarchical dynamic models described in the introduction are used as 
a generative model of stimuli used in the Posner paradigm.  Inversion of this model, using 
generalised predictive coding (Equation 16) will be used to simulate neuronal responses. 
This allows us to explore some of the inferential and empirical aspects of perception the 
Posner paradigm was designed to study.  I first describe the particular model and stimuli 
used.  I then present simulated responses to valid and invalid targets to highlight their 
differences, in terms of implicit speed-accuracy trade-offs and their electrophysiological 
correlates. 
 
4.1 The Posner model 
 
I deliberately tried to keep the generative model as simple as possible so that its basic 
behaviour can be seen clearly.  To this end, the model used has two levels, the first 
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representing visual input and the second representing the causes of that input.  The model 
has the following form, which is unpacked below:  
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This minimal model has all the ingredients needed to demonstrate some complicated but 
intuitive phenomena.  It helps to bear in mind that this is a generative model of how 
sensory data are caused that is used by the (synthetic) brain; sensory data were actually 
generated by simply presenting visual cues in various positions. Because this is a model 
the prior assumptions about the causes of visual input are that they are just random 
fluctuations about a mean of zero; i.e., (1) (2, )vv z . Perception (model inversion) uses this 
model to explain sensory input in terms of conditional expectations about what caused 
that input. 
 
The model is first described in terms of the way that it explains sensory data; in other 
words, how it maps from causes to consequences.  I then reprise the description in terms 
of its inversion; namely, mapping from consequences (sensory data) to causes (percepts).  
As a generative model, Equation 3.3 describes how hidden causes generate sensory input.  
There are three causes, which are just random fluctuations with a mean of zero and a 
precision of one. Two causes generate targets in the right and left visual fields 
(1)
,L R
v  
respectively and a third (1)
C
v  that generates a cue. This cue establishes the probabilistic 
context in which the first two causes are expressed.  This context is determined by hidden 
states 
(1)
,L R
x , which modulate the log-precision (inverse amplitude) of random fluctuations 
that are added to the hidden causes to create sensory data. Here, 
(1)
,L R
x  are mean centred 
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versions and     is a constant that controls the potency of hidden states. Unless stated 
otherwise, 2  .  Crucially, the hidden causes induce sensory signals directly but also 
drive increases or decreases in the hidden states (second equality in Equation 20). The 
two hidden states represent a high precision on the left and a low precision on the right 
and vice versa.  In other words, they induce a redistribution of precision to the left and 
right in a complementary way.  The first cause (1)
L
v  generates a stimulus Ls  in the left 
hemi-field and drives its corresponding hidden state (1)
L
x  to increase precision on the left; 
similarly for the right cause.  This means that hidden causes not only cause sensory signals 
but also augment their precision.  In other words, they cause precise visual information 
with spatial specificity.   
 
Note how the log-precision (1, ) (1)( , )v x   of sensory noise (1, ) (1, )~ (0, (exp( )))Nv vz diag   
depends on the hidden states.  The motivation for this dependency is simple: high levels of 
signal are generally associated with lower levels of noise (i.e., high signal to noise). More 
formally, this represents a prior expectation that sensory input conforms to Weber’s law 
(Formankiewicz & Mollon, 2009): For stimulus intensities with a fixed precision (of 
sensory noise), under Weber’s law (after log-transform) the log-precision scales with the 
magnitude of the signal. See Appendix 5. 
 
The ensuing increase in local precision can be regarded as analogous to exogenous cuing 
in the Posner paradigm, in the sense that it co-localises in space and time with its sensory 
expression. Endogenous effects on precision that do not co-localise correspond to the 
probabilistic context established by (1)
C
v  that enables endogenous cuing. This hidden cause 
drives hidden states to increase precision on the right. One can think of Cs  as the 
corresponding endogenous cue in the centre of the field of view. Note that the hidden 
states decay slowly.  This represents a formal prior that once a cause has been expressed 
in any part of the visual field, subsequent causes will be expressed in the same vicinity 
with a high sensory precision.  The time constants for the accumulation of hidden causes 
by hidden states (four and two) and their decay (thirty two) are somewhat arbitrary, 
because any units of time can be assigned to the dynamics. The important thing is that the 
decay is slower than the accumulation (by factors of eight and sixteen here). 
 
This model uses two hidden states that are placed in (redundant) opposition to each 
other. The reason for this is so this model can accommodate situations where hidden 
states encode a high precision in their circumscribed part of the visual field: This involves 
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generating data in multiple sensory channels, with a hidden state for each channel or 
location. These simulations are demonstrated in the section on biased competition below. 
Note that the ‘competition’ between these units is a formal prior of the model and can be 
thought to represent the selection of the single most behaviourally salient stimulus in 
order to act upon it. One can easily add further hierarchical levels to make the sensory 
dynamics more realistic (i.e., the causes at the sensory level could excite hidden states in a 
lower level to produce spatiotemporally structured or moving stimuli; cf, Nobre et al., 
2007).  However, the basic behaviour I want to illustrate here does not change.  Finally, 
note that there is no hand-crafted gain modulation of sensory signals in the generative 
model. Attentional boosting of sensory signals is an emergent property of model inversion, 
which is now considered: 
 
From the perspective of model inversion (mapping from sensory signals to causes) the 
predictive coding scheme of the previous section implies the following sort of behaviour.  
When a cue Cs  is presented, it induces high-precision prediction errors, which excite the 
representation of the hidden cause (1)
C
v  at the higher level.  This then drives up the hidden 
states biasing precision to the valid (right) hemi-field, which remain activated after the 
cue disappears.  If a subsequent (valid) target is presented, it will induce high-precision 
prediction errors and a consequent representation of its associated cause at the second 
level (1)
R
v , with a reasonably high degree of conditional confidence. Conversely, if an invalid 
target is presented, it faces two challenges.  First, the prediction errors it elicits have low 
precision and will therefore exert less drive on its associated cause (1)
L
v .  Furthermore, this 
cause has to activate its associated hidden or contextual state (1)
L
x  from much lower 
(negative) levels.  This means that the invalid target may never actually be perceived or, if 
it is inferred, then it will take considerably longer before the prediction error increases its 
own potency (by changing the hidden causes and states).  In short, invalid targets will be 
perceived later and with a lower degree of conditional certainty (cf, Vibell et al., 2007).   
 
Figure 3.1 shows an example of these dynamics.  In this simulation, both cue and target 
stimuli were generated with Gaussian functions presented one quarter and two-thirds of 
the way during the trial (each trial comprised sixty four 10 ms time bins; i.e., 640 ms). 
When generating stimuli all random fluctuations were suppressed, using a log-precision of 
eight.  The cue was a simple bump function with duration (standard deviation) of about 45 
milliseconds. The target was a (biphasic) time derivative of a Gaussian bump function with 
duration of about 90 milliseconds.  The cue and target stimuli are shown as broken grey  
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Figure 3.1: Simulation of the Posner task. Here, a validly cued target is simulated.  Upper left panel: 
The time-dependent expression of the cue and target stimuli are shown in red Cs  and green Ls  
respectively.  Lower left panel: The ensuing conditional expectations of the underlying hidden 
causes 
(1) (1) (1)
, ,
R C L
v v v   are shown below.  The grey areas correspond to 90% conditional confidence 
tubes.  Upper right panel: This confidence reflects the estimated precision of the sensory data, 
which is encoded by the expectations of the hidden states.  The green line corresponds to a 
precision or attentional bias to the right 
(1)
R
x  and the blue line to the left 
(1)
L
x .  They grey lines are 
the true precisions.  Lower right panel: This insert indicates the sort of stimuli that would be 
generated by these hidden causes. 
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lines in Figure 3.1.  These are nearly underneath the respective predictions in red Cs  and 
green Ls  respectively.  The dotted red lines show the prediction error and reflect the small 
amount of noise used in the simulations (a log-precision of eight; see Equation 3.3).  The 
ensuing conditional expectations of the underlying causal states (1) (1) (1), ,
R C L
v v v   are shown 
below (lower left).  The grey areas around the expectations correspond to 90% 
conditional confidence regions (referred to as tubes).  Note that the conditional tube for 
the cued target (green line (1)
R
v ) is relatively tight because the precision of the prediction 
errors associated with this location is high.  Conversely, the tube for the nontarget (1)
L
v  is 
somewhat wider but correctly centred on an expectation of zero.  The precisions are 
determined by the hidden states shown on the upper right.  The green line corresponds to 
a precision or attentional bias to the right (1)
R
x  and the blue line to the left (1)
L
x .   It can be 
seen that by the time the target arrives, the log-precision is about four (see Equation 3.3).  
This is substantially greater than the prior precision on the hidden causes (set this to a 
log-precision of zero). Therefore, the representation of the hidden cause (target) is driven 
primarily by sensory input.  The insert on the lower level provides a schematic indicating 
the sort of stimuli that would be generated by these hidden causes.  Now, compare these 
results with the equivalent responses to an identical stimulus but presented in the other 
hemi-field: 
 
Figure 3.2 uses the same format as Figure 3.1 to show the responses to an invalid target 
(blue lines) presented on the right.  It can be seen here that the predictions on this sensory 
channel are substantially less than the true value (compare the blue and dotted grey lines) 
with a consequent and marked expression of prediction error (dotted red line).  As 
anticipated, the conditional confidence regions for the conditional expectation of this 
invalid target (lower left panel) are now much larger; with the 90% confidence tube 
always containing the value zero.  The reason for this is that this invalid cue has failed to 
reverse the attentional context and is still operating under low levels of precision.  This is 
reflected by the hidden states.  In comparison with the previous figure, the attentional bias 
(difference between the right and left hidden states) has been subverted by the invalid cue 
but has not been reversed (the dotted grey lines show the true values of these hidden or 
contextual states).   
 
The result of this asymmetry between valid and invalid cueing means that responses to 
valid targets are of higher amplitude and have much tighter confidence tubes, in relation 
to invalid targets.  This is shown on the lower right panel of Figure 3.2, where one can  
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Figure 3.2: Simulation of an invalid cue. This figure uses the same format as Figure 3.1 but shows 
responses to an invalid target (blue line) presented on the right.  The predictions of this sensory 
channel are substantially less than the true value (compare the blue and dotted grey lines) with a 
consequent expression of prediction error (dotted red line).  The conditional confidence regions for 
the conditional expectation of this invalid target (lower left panel) are now much larger than in the 
previous figure. This is shown in the lower right panel, where one can compare the conditional 
estimates of the valid (green; see Figure 3.1) and the invalid (blue) hidden cause, with their 
respective conditional confidences (grey).  Note that these responses were elicited using exactly the 
same stimulus amplitude. 
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compare the conditional estimates of the valid (green) and the invalid (blue) cause.  Note 
that these profoundly different responses were elicited using exactly the same stimulus 
amplitude, after the cue had disappeared.  This means that the difference is attributable 
only to the context (hidden states) that is instantiated by the endogenous cue.  This is the 
basic phenomenon that I wanted to demonstrate, namely attentional bias in the ability of 
stimuli to capture attentional resources, where these resources correspond to the 
precision of sensory samples encoded by inferred hidden states or context.  The reason 
that precision behaves like a resource is that the generative model contains prior beliefs 
that log-precision is redistributed over sensory channels in a context-sensitive fashion but 
is conserved over all channels. 
 
4.2 The psychophysics of the Posner paradigm 
 
The difference in the confidence tubes between valid and invalidly cued targets (Figure 
3.2; lower right) can be usefully interpreted in relation to behaviour.  At each point in 
peristimulus time, the conditional density implicit in the conditional mean and precision 
can be used to compute the conditional probability that the target intensity is present.  
This provides the posterior probability (1)( 0 | , ) : ,
i
p v s m i R L   of the presence of a 
target as a function of peristimulus time shown in Figure 3.3 (left panel).  These results 
can be interpreted in terms of a speed-accuracy trade-off.  For example, one can identify 
the amount of peristimulus time required to accumulate sufficient evidence for a fixed 
level of accuracy, as determined by the posterior conditional confidence. Note how the 
conditional probability of the target being present shrinks toward chance (50%) levels, 
under invalid cueing. In this example, 80% conditional confidence for valid targets (solid 
line) is attained at about 20 milliseconds before the same accuracy for invalid targets 
(broken line).  This translates into a reaction time advantage for valid targets of about 20 
milliseconds. 
 
Figure 3.3 (right panel) shows the time taken to reach 80% conditional confidence after 
the onset of invalid, neutral and valid cues (simulated with .8  ). Neutral cues are 
modelled by reducing .2   and removing any spatial bias afforded by the hidden states 
(by only using valid targets). This produces a temporal facilitation (temporal alerting 
effect) but without spatial specificity.  The reaction time advantage with valid cues and the 
cost with invalid cues can be seen clearly.  The reaction time to neutrally cued stimuli lies 
between these values.  Note the asymmetry between the reaction time benefit of a valid  
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Figure 3.3: Speed-accuracy tradeoffs and replication of psychophysical results. Left panel: The 
posterior probability of a target being present as a function of peristimulus time, which can be 
interpreted in terms of a speed-accuracy trade-off.  A reaction time can be derived from this data, as 
the post-stimulus time taken to achieve a fixed level of accuracy, as determined by the posterior 
conditional confidence.  In this example, 80% conditional confidence is attained at about 340 
milliseconds for valid targets (solid line).  However, for invalid targets (broken line) the same 
accuracy is only attained after about 360 milliseconds.  This translates into a reaction time 
advantage for valid targets of about 20 milliseconds.  Right panel: This shows the reaction times for 
invalid, neural and valid cues (to within a constant), where neutral cues caused a small reduction in 
precision but with no spatial bias. The reaction times here are shown to within an additive 
constant, to better reflect empirical data (see Figure 3.4). 
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cue and the cost of an invalid cue; this asymmetry is evident in behavioural data and is an 
emergent property of the nonlinearities inherent in this Bayes-optimal scheme. 
 
Recall that the time-course of the Posner effect depends on the slowly-decaying hidden 
states encoding precision (with a time constant of thirty two in Equation 3.3).  This  
reflects a formal prior that changes in precision show a temporal persistence at any 
location in visual space. This sort of prior means that attentional biasing will persist but 
decay monotonically following a cue.  This effect manifests in reaction times as a slow 
decay of benefits and costs with valid and invalid cures respectively.  Figure 3.4 (left 
panel) shows the difference in reaction times following the three types of cue for various 
asynchronies between cue and stimulus onset (the ‘foreperiod’).  The small benefit seen 
for neutral cues is due to a temporal alerting effect and reflects an increase in precision 
with no spatial bias (i.e., a small increase in precision at both locations). Note that cue-
dependent effects emerge over 200 ms, during which time conditional expectations 
accumulate evidence (see Figure 3.1; upper right panel). The ensuing profiles of reaction 
times are pleasing similar to empirical observations. The right panel of Figure 3.4 shows 
the corresponding behavioural results reported in Posner et al. (1978). Note again that the 
asymmetry in costs and benefits, over different foreperiods, is an emergent property of the 
scheme used in the simulations. 
 
The speed-accuracy trade-off is a useful psychophysical function, which can also be 
interpreted in terms of relative accuracies at a fixed reaction time.  In this example, at 360 
ms after the cue (about 50 ms after the onset of the target), the posterior confidence about 
the presence of valid targets is about 98%, whereas it is only about 70% for invalid targets 
(Figure 3.2).  The relative position and divergence of the speed-accuracy curves may 
provide a useful and quantitative link to empirical psychophysical data.   
 
4.3 The electrophysiology of the Posner paradigm 
 
In what follows, I attempt to explain the well characterised electrophysiological correlates 
of the Posner paradigm using simulated event-related activity evoked by target stimuli. 
Spatial cueing effects are expressed in the modulation of event-related potentials (ERPs) 
to valid and invalid cues (Eimer et al., 1993; Mangun and Hillyard, 1991; Perchet et al., 
2001). Generally, one sees an increase in P1 and N1 and a decrease in posterior P3 
components in validly cued trials with respect to invalid ones. In other words, there is 
usually a validity-related enhancement of early components and an invalidity-related 
enhancement of late components.  The P1 component is the earliest component showing  
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Figure 3.4: Timecourse of the cuing effect. Left panel: Simulated reaction times showing the time 
course of the Posner effect over different delays (foreperiod) between the onset of the cue and the 
target increases. Right panel: Empirical reaction time data, redrawn from Posner et al (1978). In 
both the simulated and empirical data, reaction time benefit and cost increase swiftly to a 
maximum and then decay slowly.  This reflects the quick rise and slow decay of the inferred hidden 
states seen in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 (upper right panels).  There is a slight reaction time benefit for 
neutral cues due to a temporal alerting effect.  This was modelled by allowing neutral cues to 
induce a small rise in both the inferred hidden states.  The simulated reaction times data were 
taken as time at which there was 80% confidence that the target was present. The simulated 
reaction times are shown to within an arbitrary constant (to accommodated unmodelled motor 
responses).  The asymmetric difference between the cost for an invalid cue and the benefit for a 
valid cue was an emergent property of the simulations. 
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Figure 3.5:  Simulation of electrophysiological responses. This figure shows simulated EEG data from 
our simulations (upper panels) and empirical EEG data (lower panel) from Mangun and Hillyard 
(1991).  The EEG traces were created from the prediction errors on the hidden causes (left) and 
states (right).  The empirical data were recorded via EEG from the occipital cortex contralateral to 
the target (i.e., the cortex processing the target).  The simulated data exhibits two important 
features of empirical studies: Early in peristimulus time, stimulus-driven responses are greater for 
valid cues (upper left panel) relative to invalid cues. This is often attributed to a validity 
enhancement of early (e.g., N1) components.  Conversely, later in peristimulus time, invalid 
responses are greater in amplitude. This can be related to novelty (and salience) responses usually 
associated with late waveform components (e.g., P3). In the simulations, this invalidity effect is 
explained simply by greater prediction errors on inferred hidden states encoding precision (upper 
right panel; second bracket in lower panel). It is these prediction errors that report a surprising or 
novel context, following the failure to predict invalidly cued stimuli in an optimal fashion. 
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attentional modulation and is considered to reflect attentional gain or the cost of attending 
to the wrong location (Coull, 1998; Luck et al., 1990; Mangun and Hillyard, 1991). It is well 
known that the amplitude of the later P3 component is inversely related to the probability 
of stimulus (Donchin and Coles, 1998). The anterior P3a is generally evoked by stimuli 
that deviate from expectations. Indeed, novel stimuli generate a higher-amplitude P3a 
component than deviant but repeated stimuli (Friedman et al., 2001). The P3b is a late 
positive component with a parietal (posterior) distribution seen in oddball paradigms and 
is thought to represent a context-updating operation (Donchin and Coles, 1998; Polich, 
2007). Increased P3 amplitudes during invalid trials, relative to valid trials, suggest that 
invalidly cued targets produce a novelty-like effect (P3a) and change the representation of 
probabilistic contingencies (P3b) or context (Gómez et al., 2008; Vossel et al., 2006). 
These hypotheses sit very comfortably with the formal scheme in this chapter; in that 
sensory signals (prediction errors) evoked by valid targets will enjoy a selective gain, 
leading to enhanced early (P1 and N1) responses.  Conversely, initial responses to invalid 
targets are suppressed until they revise the probabilistic context encoded by inferred 
hidden states. The prediction errors on the hidden states reflect (and drive) this revision 
and may contribute the later (P3) ERP components. The prediction errors on the hidden 
causes and states representing the content and context respectively are shown in Figure 
3.5. 
 
Figure 3.5 shows synthetic ERPs based on the simulations in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.  Here, I 
have made the simplifying assumption that electrophysiological signals represent the 
activity of superficial pyramidal cells (which are presumed to encode prediction error; 
Friston 2008).  This means we can focus on the prediction error as a proxy for 
electrophysiological responses.  The results in the top panels of Figure 3.5 show the 
prediction errors on the sensory signals ( (1, )v  - left panel) and hidden states ( (1, )x  - right 
panel). The prediction errors for valid trials are shown as dotted lines and invalid trials as 
solid lines.  These simulations show an early suppression of prediction error for an 
invalidly cued target, as its low precision fails to drive its representation to its veridical 
level.  This violation of predictions causes prediction errors on the hidden states encoding 
context that are expressed later in peristimulus time and drive the hidden states to revise 
their conditional expectations (shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2). This double dissociation 
between validity effects in early and late peristimulus time is exactly the same as that 
observed by Mangun and Hillyard (1991). The empirical results of their ERP study are 
shown in the lower panel of Figure 3.5 and are very similar to the simulations.  
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4.4 Summary 
 
In summary, this section has applied the Bayes-optimal scheme established in the 
previous section to a minimal model of the Posner paradigm. This model provides a 
mechanistic if somewhat simplified explanation for some of the key psychophysical and 
electrophysiological aspects of the Posner effect, namely, validity effects on reaction times 
and the time course of these effects as stimulus onset asynchrony increases. Furthermore, 
the model exhibits an asymmetry in costs and benefits for invalid and valid trials 
respectively. Electrophysiologically, it suggests early attentional P1 enhancement can be 
attributed to a boosting or biasing of sensory signals (prediction errors) evoked by a 
target, while later P3 invalidity (cf, novelty) effects are mediated by prediction errors 
about the context in which targets appear. 
 
5. Simulating biased competition 
 
In this final section, I revisit the simulations above but from the point of view of biased 
competition.  Although the Posner paradigm considers a much greater spatial and 
temporal scale than the paradigms normally employed in a monkey electrophysiology, 
similar phenomena can be emulated by presenting both cued and non-cued targets 
simultaneously using the Posner model.  I hoped to see a competitive interaction between 
stimuli that favoured the cued target.  Furthermore, I hoped to see responses to the 
unattended (invalid) target changed in the presence of an attended target.  This is one of 
the hallmarks of biased competition and is usually attributed to lateral interactions among 
competing representations for stimuli, within a cell’s receptive field (see Section 2).  
Although this model is too simple to distinguish between stimuli presented inside and 
outside the classical receptive field (because the spatial support of sensory channels is not 
modelled in this chapter), we can assume that targets fall within the extraclassical 
receptive of field of units representing hidden causes. This is because the response to one 
target depends on the presence of the other, as we will see next. This competition is 
explicitly laid out in the model, by forcing cue stimuli to decrease the value of one hidden 
state as much as they increase the value of the other. The process here is best described as 
‘competition’; a selection process could be trivially implemented by adding a further 
hierarchical level exhibiting winner-takes-all behaviour. 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the results of presenting both stimuli simultaneously.  Again the cue is in 
red, the valid target in green and the invalid (unattended) target in blue.  It is immediately 
obvious that biased competition between the targets is profound, such that the response  
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Figure 3.6: Simulation of biased competition. This figure uses the same format as Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
but reports the results when both targets are presented simultaneously. The ensuing conditional 
responses can be compared with the responses in Figure 3.2, when the invalidly cued target was 
presented alone: When the valid target is also presented, it prevents the invalid target from 
reversing the precision bias established by the cue; i.e., it fails to capture attention resources. The 
lower left panel shows the conditional expectation and confidence regions for the invalid target, 
with and without the valid target, to show how the responses evoked are suppressed; i.e., biased 
competition. 
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to the unattended target is about half of the response to the attended target.  Furthermore, 
the conditional confidence about the unattended target is substantially less than that for 
the attended target (light and dark confidence tubes in the lower left panel).  The lower 
right panel of Figure 3.6 compares the conditional expectations and confidence intervals 
associated with the unattended (invalid) target presented with and without the attended 
(valid) target.  The latter response is exactly the same as the data presented in the lower 
left of Figure 3.2 simulating invalid cue responses.  One can see that when the same 
stimulus is presented in conjunction with an attended target, its conditional expectation is 
attenuated by about 20% and the conditional confidence tubes are much wider (light with 
an attended distractor and dark without).  In other words, the attended target has 
competed for attentional resources to subvert conditional confidence about the 
unattended target.  This is despite the fact that both unattended targets were identical; 
they were just presented in a different context.   
 
This context is encoded by the expected hidden states and explains the biased competition 
for resources:  In contrast with the hidden states inferred with the invalid target alone 
(see the equivalent panel in Figure 3.2) the partial reversal of contextual representations 
has been precluded by the presence of the valid target. This means that the invalid cue can 
no longer capture precision and consequently is never able to fully express itself, through 
precise prediction errors, on the conditional representation of its cause.  It is this effect, 
and only this effect, that is needed to explain biased competition.  Note that it is not 
necessary to model lateral interactions or explicit competition among representations; 
competition emerges naturally in a Bayes-optimal fashion through the nonlinear effects of 
precision encoded by the units representing context, where the influence of these units is 
mediated by top down or lateral projections. 
 
The results in Figure 3.6 are strikingly similar to data obtained from electrophysiological 
studies. Figure 3.7 (upper panel) shows the conditional expectations about valid (solid 
line) and invalid (dashed line) targets from Figure 3.6. The lower panel shows 
peristimulus histograms reported in Luck al. (1997) following simultaneous presentation 
of two (effective and ineffective) stimuli averaged over V4 neurons that showed a 
significant attention effect. The solid line reports trials in which attention was directed to 
the effective stimulus (cf, responses to a valid target) and the dashed line when attention 
was directed to the ineffective stimulus (cf, responses to an invalid target). The 
quantitative agreement between these simulated and empirical responses is evident and 
speaks quantitatively to biased competition among stimuli.  
 
97 
 
 
Figure 3.7: This figure demonstrates how generalised predictive coding reproduces some 
quantitative aspects of biased competition. The simulation (upper panel) reproduces the 
conditional expectations in the previous figure about valid (solid line) and invalid (dashed line) 
targets, when presented simultaneously. These two responses resemble those reported in Luck et 
al. (1997): Lower panel: Peristimulus histograms (over 20 ms bins) redrawn from Luck at al 
(1997), following simultaneous presentation of two (effective and ineffective) stimuli averaged 
over 29 V4 neurons that showed a significant attention effect. The solid line reports trials in which 
attention was directed to the effective stimulus (cf, responses to a valid target) and the dashed line 
when attention was directed to the ineffective stimulus (cf, responses to an invalid target). Note 
that the empirical data are non-negative spike counts, whereas the simulated activity represent 
firing rate deviations around baseline levels. 
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5.1 Summary 
 
Biased competition emerges naturally in Bayes-optimal schemes as a simple consequence 
of the fact that only one context can exist at a time.  This unique aspect of context is 
encoded in the way that the representation of hidden states (context) modulates or 
distributes precision over sensory channels.  Optimising this representation leads to 
competition among stimuli to make the inferred context more consistent with their 
existence.  This highlights the simplicity and usefulness of appealing to formal (Bayes-
optimal) schemes, when trying to understand perception. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
This treatment of attention is one of many accounts that emphasise the role of 
probabilistic inference in sensory processing; including sensorimotor integration (Körding 
and Wolpert, 2004; Wolpert et al., 1995), sensory integration (Jacobs, 1999; Knill & 
Saunders 2003; and Ernst and Banks, 2002; Saunders, 2003; Alais and Burr, 2004), 
salience and value estimation (Whiteley and Sahani, 2008; Trommershauser et al., 2003b; 
Seydell et al., 2008) and perception (Langer and Bulthoff, 2001; Adams et al., 2004).  
There have been some notable Bayesian accounts of attention using formal models (Rao 
2005; Spratling 2008, Spratling 2010). Others have tried to define statistical measures of 
saliency, i.e. that which draws our attention (Duncan and Humphreys, 1989; Bruce & 
Tsotsos 2009; Itti and Baldi, 2010).  These developments are now discussed in the light of 
the more general free-energy formulation used in this chapter. 
 
The free-energy formulation is a generalisation of information theoretic treatments that 
subsumes Bayesian schemes by assuming the brain is trying to optimise the evidence for 
its model of the world. This optimisation involves changing the model to better account for 
sensory samples or by selectively sampling sensations that can be accounted for by the 
model (cf, perception and action). Attention can be viewed as a selective sampling of 
sensory data that have high precision (signal to noise) in relation to the model’s 
predictions. Crucially, the model is also trying to predict precision. It is this (state-
dependent) prediction I associate with attention. In short, perception, attention and action 
are trying to suppress free-energy, which is an upper bound on (Shannon) surprise (or the 
negative log-evidence for the brain’s model of the world). Under some simplifying 
assumptions, free-energy is just the amount of prediction error, which means free-energy 
minimisation can be cast as predictive coding. So how does this relate to other formal 
treatments? 
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6.1 Attention and surprise 
 
Rao (2005) has introduced a compelling model of visual attention using Bayesian belief 
propagation. However, although consistent with Bayesian (free-energy) principles, belief 
propagation schemes rest on (discrete) representations of hidden causes and states, 
which are not compatible with the dimensionality of states in the real world (Friston 
2009).  Using a more descriptive approach, Itti and Baldi (2006; 2009) proposed that 
many factors, which influence visual salience, can be integrated with prior expectations by 
calculating Bayesian surprise.  This is (heuristically) related to another measure of 
saliency, proposed by Bruce and Tsotsos (2009), who suggest that visual searches are 
attracted to areas of the visual field which maximize the information sampled.  Crucially, 
reducing free-energy or (Shannon) surprise increases Bayesian surprise and increases the 
changes in the conditional representations afforded by sensory information. This is 
because Bayesian surprise is the difference (Kullback-Leibler divergence) between the 
posterior (conditional) and prior densities on hidden causes or states. This difference 
reports the change in the conditional density after sampling new information. It is also 
called complexity in the Bayesian model comparison literature. Free-energy can be 
expressed as complexity minus accuracy (Friston 2009). This means that minimising 
(Shannon) surprise by updating conditional representations to increase accuracy 
(decrease prediction errors), necessarily entails an increase in complexity (Bayesian 
surprise). In short, increases in Bayesian surprise are necessarily associated with 
decreases in free-energy (they are the complexity cost of reducing prediction errors) but 
Bayesian surprise per se is not optimised in Bayes-optimal schemes.  
 
6.2 Biased competition and predictive coding 
 
It is becoming increasingly clear that estimates of the precision play an important role in 
sensory inference.  Whiteley and Sahani (2008) demonstrated very neatly that the brain 
possesses (and uses) a model of sensory uncertainty (i.e. precision) in decision-making, 
and that this model is available even under intermittent feedback, showing that is 
estimated internally rather than learnt.  Thinking of attention as optimising 
representations of uncertainty or precision resolves any potential conflict between biased 
competition and predictive coding schemes:  Spratling (2008) noted the potential 
difficulty in reconciling these two theories and proposed a variant of predictive coding, in 
which representations compete via negative feedback. Specifically, he showed that a 
particular implementation of the biased competition model, in which nodes compete via 
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inhibition that targets the inputs to a cortical region, is mathematically equivalent to linear 
predictive coding. This scheme relies on a rather complex neural architecture and employs 
nonlinear modifications to prevent cells from having a negative firing rate.  These 
modifications are interesting and relate to important theories based on divisive 
normalisation (Heeger 1993). This form of (divisive) predictive coding can explain a 
remarkable range of classical and extraclassical receptive field properties in V1 (see 
Spratling 2010).  
 
The formulation in this chapter reaffirms that there is no tension between biased 
competition and predictive coding: It demonstrates that the characteristic behaviours of 
biased competition emerge naturally under predictive coding. They key thing that 
reconciles these two theories is to realise that predictive coding can be generalised to 
cover both states and precisions and that (state-dependent) precision is itself optimised. 
This leads to nonlinear interactions among states implicit in the precision-weighting of 
prediction errors and provides a simple explanation for attentional gain effects. It will be 
interesting to relate the ensuing bias or weighting of sensory signals (prediction errors) 
by precision to the divisive schemes above (e.g., Heeger 1993; Spratling 2010).  
 
6.3 Baseline shifts and precision 
 
In this chapter, I have focussed on reaction time and event-related responses to targets. 
However, many electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies of attentional paradigms 
(e.g., Chelazzi et al. 1993; Chawla et al., 1999b; Kastner et al., 1999; Stokes et al., 2009) 
have demonstrated cue-related increases in the basal firing rate of cells, whose receptive 
field corresponds to the attended location. A non-invasive electrophysiological correlate of 
these baseline shifts is called the Contingent Negative Variation component (CNV), which 
follows a cue that furnishes information about subsequent (imperative) target stimuli 
(Walter et al., 1964; Rockstroh et al., 1982). Crucially, the cortical sources generating the 
CNV can include those responsible for processing the stimuli (Gómez et al., 2001). These 
baseline shifts may be accounted for, in the computational scheme, by the dynamics of 
expected hidden states, shown in the top left panels of Figures 3.2 and 3.3.  These 
accumulate evidence from cues and represent changes in context that persist over time. It 
is possible that the activity of these representational units could contribute to the CNV or 
baseline shift directly.  However, it is also possible that they could modulate baseline 
activity (caused by ambient sensory signals) in the prediction error units they modulate. 
This would be consistent with baseline shifts seen with fMRI in retinotopically mapped 
areas of directed attention (e.g., Macaluso et al, 2003), and the reduction in non-attended 
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areas (Smith et al, 2000). This suggests that baseline (endogenous) activity may be a 
quantitative proxy for the expected precision of sensory information in the corresponding 
sensory area (cf., Hesselmann et al, 2008). This hypothesis was tested recently: using 
fMRI, Hesselmann et al. (2010) linked perceptual estimates of precision with baseline 
increases in activity; showing that baseline activity before a (subliminal) stimulus was 
correlated with the accuracy of deciding if the stimulus was present (and not whether the 
decision was present or absent). This means that baseline activity may reflect the inferred 
precision of sensory signals. Specifically, they found that neuronal activity in sensory areas 
(extrastriate visual and early auditory cortex) biases perceptual decisions towards correct 
inference and not towards a specific percept. They conclude: “In accord with predictive 
coding models and the free-energy principle, this observation suggests that cortical 
activity in sensory brain areas reflects the precision of prediction errors and not just the 
sensory evidence or prediction errors per se.” 
 
The neurobiological (resp. computational) mechanisms that might underlie these effects 
tie several strands of evidence together rather neatly: As noted in the introduction the 
most plausible candidate for modulating activity-dependent (resp. state-dependent) 
synaptic gain (resp. precision) are fast synchronous interactions associated with attention 
(Börgers et al 2005; Womelsdorf & Fries 2006; Zeitler, Fries and Gielen, 2008; Fries et al 
2008). The associated increase in synchronous gain is necessarily accompanied by 
increased levels of population activity that are both supported by and support synchrony 
(Chawla et al 1999a; Salinas and Sejnowski, 2001). These are manifest as high frequency 
(gamma) activity and elevated fMRI signals seen in attentional paradigms (Gruber et al., 
1999; Sokolov et al., 1999; Steinmetz et al., 2000; Bichot et al., 2005; Pavlova, Birbaumer 
and Sokolov, 2006; Vidal et al., 2006; Fries et al., 2008). 
 
6.4 Attention, gain and learning 
 
In closing, a potentially interesting argument about the specificity of gain mechanisms and 
attention can now emerge. The idea pursued in this chapter is that attention corresponds 
to inference about uncertainty or precision and that this inference is encoded by dynamic 
changes in postsynaptic gain. However, nonlinear (gain) postsynaptic responses are 
ubiquitous in the brain; so what is special about the nonlinearities associated with 
attention? I suggest that attention is mediated by gain modulation of prediction error units 
(forward or bottom up information) in contradistinction to gain modulation of prediction 
units (backward, lateral or top-down information). The distinction may seem subtle but 
there is a fundamental difference between inferring the context-dependent contingencies 
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and causes of sensations (perception) and their precision (attention). For example, in a 
probabilistic learning task a cue that predicted reward in one particular context would be 
afforded higher top-down precision (on predictions) than one known to predict reward 
only in another context, whereas out of two cues predictive of reward, the one which 
predicted reward with a greater probability would cause higher bottom-up precision (on 
prediction errors) to be afforded to any subsequent events. In this sense, there is an 
implicit distinction between inferring what is relevant for a task (as in classical attention 
tasks like dichotic listening) and the uncertainty about what is relevant. I have side-
stepped this issue with the Posner task, because all cues are task relevant, and as such it is 
only the bottom-up precision on prediction errors which is modulated.  
 
There is a final distinction that may be mechanistically important: This chapter have 
focussed on activity-dependent optimisation of gain but have not considered the (slower) 
learning of how and when this optimisation should be deployed. For example, the latency 
of saccades to a target can be reduced if the target is more likely to appear on one side – 
and this relationship can be learned in as few as 150 trials (Carpenter and Williams, 1995; 
Anderson and Carpenter, 2006; Brodersen et al., 2008). This sort of learning corresponds 
to the optimisation of the precision parameters in Equation 3.2 and may involve 
modulatory neurotransmitters. This learning may be related to the psychopharmacology 
of attention and related theories about uncertainty (e.g., Yu & Dayan 2005).    
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have tried to establish the face validity of optimising the precision of 
sensory signals as an explanation for attention in perceptual inference.   We started with 
an established scheme for perception based upon optimising a free-energy bound on 
surprise or the log-evidence for a model of the world.  Minimising this bound, using 
gradient descent, furnishes recognition dynamics that are formally equivalent to evidence 
accumulation schemes. Under some simplifying assumptions, the free-energy reduces to 
prediction error and the scheme can be regarded as generalised predictive coding.  The 
key thing that I have tried to demonstrate is that all the quantities required for making an 
inference have to be optimised.  This includes the precisions that encode uncertainty or 
the amplitude of random fluctuations generating sensory information.  By casting 
attention as inferring precision, we can explain several perspectives on attentional 
processing that fit comfortably with their putative neurobiological mechanisms.  
Furthermore, by considering how states of the world influence uncertainty, one arrives at 
a plausible architecture, in which conditional expectations about states modulate their 
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own precision. This leads naturally to competition and other nonlinear phenomena during 
perception.  I have tried to illustrate these ideas in the context of a classical paradigm (the 
Posner paradigm) and relate the ensuing behaviour to biased competition evident in 
electrophysiological responses recorded from awake, behaving monkeys.  In chapter 4, I 
will use the theoretical framework in this chapter to model empirical electrophysiological 
data and pursue this hypothesis using formal model comparison.  
 
The work described in this chapter is published as: 
Feldman H, Friston KJ. (2010). Attention, uncertainty, and free-energy. Front. Hum. 
Neurosci. 4:215. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
The functional anatomy of 
attention: a DCM study 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In chapter 3, I suggest that attention can be understood as the selection of processing 
channels that conveyed precise or salient information within the framework of predictive 
coding (Feldman & Friston, 2010). The idea is that both the content of visual information 
and the confidence placed in that information have to be inferred during perception. In 
predictive coding, top-down predictions of the content are confirmed or disconfirmed by 
comparison with bottom-up sensory information (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005). 
However, this comparison rests on estimating the reliability or precision of sensory 
information – or more exactly the residuals or prediction error that cannot be explained. 
This precision may be itself context sensitive and has to be updated in exactly the same 
way as predictions of content, as described in chapter 1 (Brown & Friston, 2012). This 
leads to view of hierarchical perceptual synthesis in which particular processing channels 
are selected on the basis of cues that portend spatial locations or featural attributes that 
are likely to convey precise information. In neuronally plausible implementations of this 
hierarchical Bayesian inference – namely, generalised Bayesian filtering or predictive 
coding – expected precision is thought to be encoded by the postsynaptic sensitivity or 
gain of cells reporting prediction error (Friston & Kiebel, 2009). Given that prediction 
error is passed forward from sensory cortex to higher cortical areas by ascending or 
forward connections, the most likely candidates for reporting prediction error are the 
superficial pyramidal cells that are the source of ascending connections (Bastos et al., 
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2012). This means that one can understand attention as the top-down gain control of 
superficial pyramidal cells passing information that is yet to be explained (i.e., prediction 
error) deep into the visual hierarchy. 
 
This normative model and its neuronal implementation have been used to simulate and 
reproduce both the psychophysical and electrophysiological characteristics of the Posner 
paradigm, as described in chapter 3 (Feldman & Friston, 2010). In brief, predictive cues 
engage top-down predictions of increased precision in the left or right hemifield that 
facilitate the rapid processing of (inference about) valid visual targets. However, when an 
invalid target is presented in the wrong hemifield, the evidence accumulation implicit in 
predictive coding is slower, because gain or precision acts as a synaptic rate constant, 
meaning more presynaptic input is needed before firing threshold is reached. This leads to 
protracted reaction times and an invalidity cost. Simultaneously, the scheme infers that 
prior beliefs about the target have been violated and prediction errors drive higher levels 
to update both the deployment of attention (i.e., precision) and target predictions per se. 
This explains the classic electrophysiological correlates of the validity effects in the Posner 
paradigm – in which invalid targets elicit slightly attenuated P1, N1 and N2 early 
components and a more pronounced P3b late component (Mangun & Hillyard, 1991; 
Hugdahl & Nordby, 1994; Talsma et al., 2007). These two electrophysiological 
characteristics may reflect the initial insensitivity (low precision or gain) of early visual 
responses and a subsequent post hoc revision of top-down precision or gain control, when 
prediction error cannot be resolved by predictions based upon the (invalid) cue. 
 
In this chapter, I try to verify these explanations for electromagnetic responses to valid 
and invalid targets in the Posner paradigm using magnetoencephalography (MEG) and 
dynamic causal modelling of differences in effective connectivity. In particular, I hoped to 
establish that a sufficient explanation for responses evoked by valid and invalid targets 
would be provided by a difference in the gain or postsynaptic sensitivity of superficial 
parietal cells following a cue – and a subsequent top-down modulation of this gain from 
parietal and higher extrastriate sources. To do this, dynamic causal models based on 
canonical microcircuits that distinguish between superficial and deep pyramidal cells 
(Bastos et al., 2012) were used, which explicitly include a top-down modulation of 
superficial pyramidal cells.  
 
In what follows, I provide a brief description of the dynamic causal models used to address 
precision or gain control in predictive coding; describe the data and experimental design; 
and report the results of Bayesian model comparisons that quantify the evidence for 
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condition-specific differences in superficial pyramidal cell gain. The focus here is on cue-
dependent differences in gain prior to the onset of a visual target and subsequent top-
down modulation of that gain during target processing. In particular, I ask whether cue-
dependent differences in gain, top-down modulation or both were evident in evoked 
electromagnetic responses – and, whether any differences in gain were restricted to visual 
sources or extended to the parietal cortex. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Dynamic causal modelling of predictive coding 
 
In the predictive coding models of inference in the brain described in the introduction 
(Mumford 1992; Friston 2005; Bastos et al 2012), prediction error ascends to update 
representations at higher hierarchical levels. Crucially, the excitability of cells reporting 
prediction error corresponds (mathematically) to the precision of – or confidence in – the 
information they convey. This precision has been used to explain the psychophysical and 
electrophysiological correlates of attention and can be regarded as the basis of selective 
(predictive or attentional) gain – in which sensory processing channels that convey 
precise information are enabled. 
 
Neurobiological implementations of predictive coding use superficial pyramidal cells to 
report precision-weighted prediction error: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1)( ( ))i i i if       , where ( )i  
corresponds to representations (posterior expectations) of states of the world at level i in 
a cortical hierarchy and ( 1)( )if    corresponds to the top-down predictions of these 
expectations – based upon expectations in the level above. The precision of the ensuing 
prediction error is modulated by the precision ( )i to weight prediction errors in 
proportion to their (expected) reliability (c.f., known uncertainty). The encoding of 
precision – at each level of the hierarchy – can be associated with the strength of 
inhibitory recurrent connections. 
 
With Dynamic Causal Modelling (Garrido et al., 2008, Bastos et al., 2012),  this 
neurobiological implementation of predictive coding is mapped onto a neural mass model 
which is capable of simulating MEG data.  The depolarisation of the three excitatory cell 
populations in the model – superficial and deep pyramidal cells, as well as spiny stellate 
cells, forms the output of the model with the main contribution coming from superficial 
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pyramidal cells.  This activity is transformed by an MEG-specific lead-field which describes 
the translation from source activity to sensor perturbation. 
 
The four-population neural mass model used here has been described in chapter 2 (Brown 
et al., 2012).  In the neural mass models, ( )i , the negative log precision, corresponds to 
the strength of recurrent inhibitory connections on superficial pyramidal cells. This means 
that as precision increases, the strength of recurrent inhibition decreases. The strength of 
intrinsic (recurrent) self-inhibition (on superficial pyramidal cells) is therefore used as a 
proxy for log precision.  
 
One new feature is introduced in this implementation of the neural mass model.  To model 
top-down modulation of this self-inhibition the following form of (backward) modulatory 
connectivity is included: 
 
( ) ( )
0 0
32 ( ( ) )
i i
M V         
 
Here, 0  is self-inhibition when firing rates are at baseline levels 0 (0)  . Firing rates 
( ) [0,1]V   are a sigmoid function of depolarisation V  of afferent neuronal populations 
(deep pyramidal cells in other sources). The modulatory connection strength matrix  M
weights the influence of other sources; such that a high value suppresses self-inhibition 
and (effectively) increases the gain or precision of the superficial pyramidal cells that are 
targeted. In what follows, condition (valid or invalid) specific effects on   will be 
modelled to evaluate the evidence for cue-dependent changes in gain at the onset of target 
processing and test for condition specific changes in M  that mediate target-dependent 
changes in gain as target is processed. The hope was that  evidence will be found for 
differences in baseline gain and subsequent top-down modulation – and that these would 
be expressed predominantly in early visual sources.  
 
Specifically, I anticipated that intrinsic self-inhibition  would be lower (gain would be 
higher) in left hemisphere sources after (invalid) cueing of the right hemifield relative to 
(valid) cueing of the left hemifield, where the target appeared in the left hemifield in both 
conditions. In other words, I hoped to show differential responses to identical targets 
could be explained by differences in gain induced by valid and invalid cues. Furthermore, I 
anticipated differences in descending modulatory effects between valid and invalid trials 
that would be necessary to reverse the laterality of gain control following an invalid target. 
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2.2 Participants 
 
14 healthy right-handed subjects participated in the study (8 male; age 20-54). Ethical 
approval was obtained from the UCL Research Ethics Committee (no. 2715/001).  Written 
informed consent was obtained from all subjects. 
   
2.3 Experimental paradigm 
 
All stimuli were presented using Matlab 7.1 and Cogent. Stimuli were projected onto a 
screen 70 cm from the subjects.  During the task, subjects fixated on a central cross at all 
times.  At the start of each trial, the cross was replaced by an arrow pointing to the bottom 
left or bottom right corner of the screen, or a double-headed arrow pointing to both 
(neutral trials).  The cues subtended 1.6 degrees of visual angle.  After a cue-target interval 
of 50, 100, 200 or 400ms, a target appeared either where the arrow had indicated (valid) 
or at the other side (invalid).  The target was a white circle subtending 3.1 degrees of 
visual angle and presented in the lower left or lower right corners of the screen at 14.7 
degrees eccentricity.  Participants pressed a button with their right hand as soon as the 
target appeared.  66% of trials were valid, 17% were invalid and 17% uninformative 
(neutrally cued trials are not considered here).  Left and right cues and targets were 
balanced.  Catch trials, in which no target followed the cue, made up 10% of trials. 1800 
trials were collected over three sessions on two consecutive days. 
 
2.4 Behavioural data 
 
Reaction times were collected by Cogent and analysed with IBM SPSS 20.  A full factorial 
univariate ANOVA was performed with fixed factors ‘side’ ‘validity’ and ‘cue-target 
interval’ and random factor ‘subject’. 
 
2.5 Data collection and processing 
 
MEG data was obtained using a whole-head 275-channel axial gradiometer MEG system 
(CTF Systems).  The sampling rate was 600Hz and a low-pass filter of 150Hz was applied.  
Head position was monitored using three localisation coils, placed on the nasion and in 
front of each ear. An infrared eyetracker (Eyelink 1000) was used to monitor participants’ 
fixation as well as to detect blinks.  Stimuli were presented and behavioural data were 
collected with Cogent. 
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Data were analysed using SPM12b for EEG/MEG.  Data were down-sampled to 200Hz and 
bandpass-filtered between 2Hz and 32Hz.  Baseline-corrected epochs were extracted from 
the time series starting at 50ms before target onset and ending 400ms after target onset.  
Trials where the eyetracker detected a blink or saccade were excluded from analysis.    
Trials were then robustly averaged across cue-target intervals and participants to yield 
four conditions – left valid cue, right valid cue left invalid cue and right invalid cue.  
Averaging across participants can reduce the spatial precision of the MEG signal; however, 
as the hypotheses were not concerned with the spatial location of the signals, data were 
combined across all participants to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of the waveforms. 
 
2.6 Data feature and source specification 
 
The hypothesis was addressed using condition-specific grand average responses over all 
subjects. Intuitively, this is like treating each dataset as if it were from the same subject to 
produce an average ERP. To identify plausible sources a distributed source reconstruction 
was calculated (using four grand averages: valid right target, invalid right target, valid left 
target and invalid left target) based on multiple sparse priors (with default settings).  
The grand average data were bandpass filtered between 2 and 32 Hz and windowed from 
0 to 400 ms of peristimulus time. A lead field based upon the standard MRI template and a 
boundary element model as implemented in SPM12 (Mattout et al., 2005) was used. After 
source reconstruction, the power of evoked responses (over all frequencies and 
peristimulus time) was quantified to produce the maximum intensity projections in Figure 
4.1. As one would expect, left targets activate right early visual sources and vice versa. 
Note further, that early visual source responses to valid left targets are greater than the 
same targets under invalid cues. On the basis of these reconstructions, eight sources were 
identified corresponding (roughly) to key maxima of source activity. These sources 
included bilateral early visual sources (V2); bilateral sources near the occipitotemporal-
parietal junction (V5); bilateral dorsal (V3) extrastriate sources and bilateral superior 
parietal sources (PC).  The anatomical designation of these sources should not be taken 
too seriously - they are used largely an aide-memoire for sources at various levels in the 
visual hierarchy, so that the functional anatomy can be discussed. Clearly, the spatial 
precision of source localisation does not allow us to associate each source with a specific 
cytoarchitectonic area – and even if this could be, there is sufficient intersubject variability 
in cortical architectures to make this association, at best, heuristic.  
 
The distributed network constituting the DCM is shown in Figure 4.2.  The parietal sources 
sent backward connections to the extrastriate (V3 and V5) sources that then sent   
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Figure 4.1: Source specification for dynamic causal modelling.  A distributed source reconstruction 
was performed (Mattout et al., 2005) and the power of evoked responses was quantified over the 
time course of the trial and all frequencies to yield the maximum intensity projections shown.  Eight 
sources corresponding (roughly) to key maxima of source activity were identified: included 
bilateral early visual sources (V2); bilateral sources near the occipitotemporal-parietal junction 
(V5); bilateral dorsal (V3) extrastriate sources and bilateral superior parietal sources (PC). 
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backward connections to the V2 sources. These connections were reciprocated by 
extrinsic forward connections to produce a simple visual hierarchy with bilateral 
connections.  
 
2.7 Model space and Bayesian model comparison 
 
The DCM analyses used data from 0 to 400 ms of peristimulus time. To de-noise the data 
and improve computational efficiency, the first eight canonical modes of the scalp data, 
given the source locations, were fitted – these can be regarded as the principal 
components of the data that can be explained by source activity. The sources were 
modelled as small cortical patches of about 16 mm radius – centred on the source 
locations in Figure 4.1 – as described in (Daunizeau et al 2006). The vertices of these 
sources used the same lead fields as in the source reconstruction. 
 
Exogenous (visual target related) input was modelled as a Gaussian function with a prior 
peak at 120 ms (and a prior standard deviation of 16 ms). This input was delivered to V2 
on the appropriate side (left for right target trials and right for left target trials). The 
ensuing models were optimised to explain sensor responses by adjusting their (neuronal 
and lead field) parameters in the usual way – this is known as model inversion or fitting. 
The products of this inversion are posterior estimates of (differences in) intrinsic and 
extrinsic connectivity and the evidence or marginal likelihood for each model considered. 
 
The hypothesis centred on the gain of superficial pyramidal cells. I therefore estimated a 
full model in which all intrinsic gains and their extrinsic (backward) modulation could 
differ between valid and invalid trials. To ensure the same stimuli were used for assessing 
these differences two sets of analyses were conducted – one for targets presented to the 
left visual field and another for targets presented on the right. Each DCM estimated all 
intrinsic, extrinsic and modulatory connection strengths and any differences in intrinsic 
and modulatory connections due to invalid cuing. 
 
We performed an initial Bayesian model comparison to establish whether validity 
dependent differences in top-down connections were expressed in their driving effects, 
modulatory effects or both. To evaluate the ensuing models, we use Bayesian model 
comparison based upon (a variational free energy) approximation to log evidence (Penny 
et al 2004; Friston and Penny 2011). The differences in log evidence among the models 
(shown in Figure 4.3) suggest that we can be nearly 100% confident that validity 
dependent changes are mediated by top-down modulatory effects (with no changes in top- 
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Figure 4.2: DCM network. The location of the eight sources is shown in the panels on the left.  To 
construct the DCM, these sources were connected in the distributed network shown on the right.  
The parietal sources sent both driving and modulatory backward connections to the extrastriate 
(V3 and V5) sources that then sent backward connections to the V2 sources. These connections 
were reciprocated by extrinsic forward connections to produce a simple visual hierarchy with 
bilateral connections.  
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down driving effects). We therefore selected the model – in which all top-down 
modulatory connections could differ between conditions – for further examination. 
 
After inverting the full model, the evidence for reduced versions that constitute alternative 
hypothesises or models was then evaluated.  This model space was created by partitioning 
connectivity differences into three subsets and considering all eight combinations. These 
subsets were changes in intrinsic gain in the extrastriate sources (V2, V3 and V5); changes 
in parietal (PC) gain and changes in extrinsic modulatory connections. This partition was 
motivated by distinguishing between the effect of the cue on target-related responses – 
which should be apparent in changes in intrinsic gain in the visual areas – and the effect of 
the target per se – which should be apparent in changes in backward modulation of gain. 
To evaluate the ensuing models, Bayesian model comparison was used, based upon a 
(variational free energy) approximation to log evidence. Having identified the model with 
the greatest evidence, its posterior parameter estimates were examined. This allowed 
validity effects to be quantitatively characterised and interpreted in computational 
(predictive coding) terms. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Behavioural data 
 
The ANOVA demonstrated significant main effects of validity, subject and cue-target 
interval, with significant interactions between cue-target interval*validity, cue-target  
interval*subject, side*cue-target interval and validity*side*subject.  Reaction times to 
validly cued targets were significantly shorter than to invalidly cued targets (left: mean 
(SD) 333ms (42ms) vs. 355ms (44ms), p<0.001; right: mean (SD) 334ms (42ms) vs. 
354ms (44ms)), figure 4.4.   
 
The effects of attention (validity of cueing) on responses to targets presented in the left 
hemifield are shown – for the first two canonical modes – in Figure 4.5. Although these 
MEG responses are formally distinct from classic EEG results, they speak to similar effects 
on early and late responses: the blue lines correspond to valid trials and red lines to 
invalid trials. The response in the first mode shows the early response (just before 200 
ms) has a reduced latency and slightly higher amplitude – consistent with an attenuation 
of N2 response to invalid targets, as seen in classic EEG studies (Mangun& Hilliard, 1991). 
In terms of late responses, the second mode shows a protracted and elevated response  
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Figure 4.3: Results of provisional Bayesian model selection. The (free energy approximation) to log 
evidence was assessed for models with and without validity–dependent differences in top-down 
driving and modulatory connections. The log evidences (upper panel) show that the model with 
differences in modulatory connections has the greatest posterior probability (lower panel). The log 
evidences are shown relative to the evidence for a null model with no changes in either driving or 
modulatory backward connections.  
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Figure 4.4: Behavioural results. Reaction times to validly and invalidly cued targets at different cue-
target intervals for targets appearing on the left (left panel) and right (right panel), averaged across 
all participants. Reaction times were faster for validly than invalidly cued targets (p<0.0001).  
Reaction times decreased as cue-target interval increase (all p<0.05). 
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around 300 ms that is consistent with a P3b component, when the target location is not 
attended. 
 
The solid lines report the model predictions of observed responses (broken lines) in 
sensor space after inversion of the DCM. These illustrate the accuracy of model inversion, 
capturing both the early and late differences to a considerable level of detail. Examples of 
the underlying source activity that generates these predictions are shown in the lower 
panel. These traces represent the depolarisation of three excitatory populations within the 
left V2 source, contralateral to the visual input modelling the effects of target presentation. 
The dotted lines correspond to the spiny stellate and deep pyramidal populations, while 
the solid lines report the superficial pyramidal cells – that are the predominant 
contributors to sensor data. Note that this level of reconstructed neurophysiological detail 
rests on having a biologically plausible forward model. 
 
The differential responses to right targets were much less marked (results not shown). 
Furthermore, model inversion failed to converge for these conditions. Therefore, this 
analysis is restricted to the left target conditions. The failure to elicit clear validity effects 
with right targets may relate to the asymmetry of responses – and attentional gain control 
(see below). 
 
3.2 Bayesian model selection 
 
The comparison of different explanations for the validity effects above focused on 
differences in the gain of superficial pyramidal cells – either intrinsic to extrastriate or 
parietal sources, or differences in the modulation of gain, mediated by extrinsic top-down 
connections. The relative log evidences for all combinations of these condition-specific 
differences are shown in the upper left panel of Figure 4.6. The labelling of these models 
indicates the presence or absence of differences in extrastriate gain, parietal gain and gain 
modulation. It can be seen that the model with the greatest evidence includes differences 
in extrastriate gain and gain modulation – but not differences in parietal gain. The 
corresponding posterior probabilities of these models (assuming all were equally 
plausible a priori) are shown in the upper right panel. These suggest that differences in 
parietal gain cannot be definitively excluded; however, confidence exceeds 80% that 
parietal effects are not necessary to explain these data, provided validity effects on 
extrastriate gain and its top-down modulation are allowed for. 
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Figure 4.5: Empirical and predicted responses. Upper panel: the first two of eight spatial modes 
(principle components) of the data to which the DCMs were fitted.  Observed responses are dashed 
lines; solid lines show the responses fitted by the winning model (see below), demonstrating a 
good model fit.  Lower panel: reconstructed source activity in left V2. 
The lower panels show the same log evidences but in image format, to illustrate the 
relative evidence for gain effects. The image on the right is under extrinsic top-down gain 
modulation and suggests greater evidence than the corresponding results on the left, 
where modulatory effects are concluded. In both cases, the model with extrastriate– but  
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not parietal – gain differences has the greatest evidence. Having identified the best model, 
the changes in model parameters that explain the validity effect were then quantified. 
 
3.3 Attentional gain effects 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the differences in self-inhibition (top left panels) and backwards 
modulation of self-inhibition (top right panels) for the model with the highest posterior 
probability above. The upper panels show the differences as connectivity matrices 
indicating changes in connection strength. This means that differences in self-inhibition 
are located along the leading diagonal, while differences in backward connections are 
restricted to the upper diagonal elements. The middle panels show the same results but in 
terms of the posterior expectations for differences (in connections that changed) and their 
90% confidence intervals. 
 
As anticipated, the recurrent or self-inhibition of early visual sources showed a highly 
asymmetrical difference when attending to the right hemifield (during invalid trials), 
compared to attending to the left hemifield (during valid trials). When attending to the 
right hemifield the left V2 source shows a profound decrease in the self-inhibition of 
superficial pyramidal cells – consistent with a disinhibition or increase in gain. This is 
accompanied by a slight decrease in the gain or sensitivity of the left extrastriate V3 
source and an increase in the right V5 source. Note that these gain differences are in place 
before the target is presented and – presumably – are instantiated by the cue. The lower 
left and right panels in figure 4.7 show the dynamic change in superficial pyramidal cell 
gain during the trial. When the target arrives, it evokes responses throughout the visual 
hierarchy that modulate the gain of the lower sources. These effects are mediated by the 
backward modulatory connections. 
 
With the exception of backward connections from the right parietal source, all the 
differences in backward modulation between valid and invalid trials are positive, speaking 
to an increase in gain (or a top-down disinhibition of superficial pyramidal populations). 
However, it is difficult to predict the changes in gain that are produced by modulatory 
effects, because this disinhibition could itself be inhibited when top-down afference falls 
below baseline firing rates. Therefore, the changes in gain in early visual sources as a 
function of peristimulus time were evaluated for the two conditions. This is possible 
because of the biologically plausible forward or generative model that allows examination 
of changes in both neuronal states and connectivity – over peristimulus time – using the 
posterior parameter estimates.  
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Figure 4.6: Upper left panel: relative log evidence for models which fitted differences between 
conditions through changes in one of three sets of parameters: superficial pyramidal cell gain in 
visual areas (1 _ _), superficial pyramidal cell gain in parietal areas (_ 1 _) and strength of 
backwards modulatory connections (_ _ 1).  Upper right panel: The winning model had changes in 
superficial pyramidal cell gain in visual areas and in the strength of backwards modulatory 
connections, meaning that we can be more than 80% certain that backwards modulatory 
connections are not necessary explain the electrophysiological signatures of the validity effect.  
Lower panels show the same data as in the top left panel, but in image format. 
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Figure 4.7: Fitted parameter values. Differences in self-inhibition (upper left panels) and backwards 
modulation of self-inhibition (upper right panels) between valid and invalid trials for the model 
with the highest posterior probability above.  The lower panels show the gain of the superficial 
pyramidal cells over time in valid and invalid trials. 
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Figure 4.7 shows the log gain or precision of the early visual sources, following target 
presentation for valid (lower left panel) and invalid trials (lower right panel). As expected, 
there is a marked asymmetry in gain modulation during the prestimulus period that is 
revised or updated after the target is processed – through activity dependent modulatory 
mechanisms. Specifically, during valid trials the gain is greater in the appropriate (right) 
early visual source and then reaches a peak shortly before 200 ms. This peak is 
complemented by a suppression of gain in the unattended (left) visual source. This can be 
contrasted with the gain modulation during invalid trials. Here, the attended left source 
starts off with a slightly higher gain. Furthermore, the unattended source is suppressed 
more acutely with the arrival of the target. However, after about 120 ms its gain increases 
markedly, to peak just before 200 ms. This redeployment of precision (c.f., reorientation of 
attention) is the largest gain modulation in both sources and conditions. Interestingly, the 
gain of the left source also enjoys a slight increase but to a substantially lesser degree. In 
short, the top-down modulation of gain (through modulatory disinhibition of superficial 
pyramidal cells) appears to exert a dynamic gain control over peristimulus time and 
shows marked lateralisation, when attention is switched from one hemifield to another. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
In conclusion, I have used dynamic causal modelling to characterise putative changes in 
the gain of superficial pyramidal cell populations that might underlie attentional (validity) 
effects in the Posner paradigm. The focus on gain mechanisms was motivated by 
theoretical formulations of attention in terms of optimising perceptual inference using the 
expected precision of particular processing streams, as discussed in chapter 3 (Feldman & 
Friston, 2010). This formulation rests upon predictive coding schemes that the brain 
might use to infer the causes of sensory consequences it has to explain (Friston & Kiebel, 
2009). The model comparison and quantitative analysis of changes in parameter estimates 
are remarkably consistent with theoretical predictions. 
 
In brief, the modelling results suggest that, following a cue, sensory channels in the 
appropriate hemisphere are afforded more precision through the disinhibition of 
recurrent or self-inhibition of superficial pyramidal cells. These cells are thought to pass 
sensory information (prediction error) to higher levels to inform perception. When a 
target appears in an unattended location, the misplaced gain or sensitivity of lower areas 
is revised or updated by top-down modulatory influences from higher extrastriate and 
parietal sources. Phenomenologically, this increases the latency and reduces the 
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amplitude of early responses to invalid targets – because they are processed by channels 
that have an inappropriately low gain. The resulting prediction error induces an update 
response that reverses the misattribution of gain, producing differences in late or 
endogenous response components – such as the P3b.  The P3b is known to be sensitive to 
probabilistic surprise (Mars et al., 2008; Kolossa et al., 2012) as well as to risk 
(Schuermann et al., 2012).  These results suggest that the larger P300 in response to more 
unexpected events might be a result of  exaggerated precision at lower levels incited by 
the arrival of an unexpected stimulus. 
 
This application of dynamic causal modelling is slightly more focused than normal 
applications. A large model space was not explored; instead, I focused on particular 
synaptic mechanisms as sufficient explanations for condition-specific responses. It is more 
than likely that there are many models of these differential responses that would produce 
equally good or better explanations. However, I chose to focus on models that were 
explicitly informed or constrained by computational and biophysical considerations; 
namely, that the effects have to be mediated by a neurobiologically plausible gain control 
that is consistent with normative principles of perceptual inference. This allowed the 
validation of the theoretical proposals empirically, while providing a principled model 
space within which to test specific hypotheses about the underlying wetware.  
 
Evidence suggests that gain modulation in pyramidal cells is an important mechanism in 
visual attention.  Electrophysiological studies have demonstrated that attention can 
enhance the response of visual neurons (likely to be pyramidal cells) by a multiplicative 
factor (McAdams & Maunsell, 1999; Treue & Martinez-Trujillo, 1999).  fMRI studies 
demonstrate increased BOLD response for attended versus unattended stimuli (Kastner et 
al., 1998), even if these stimuli are predictable (Kok et al., 2012), and early visual ERPs, 
which are most strongly determined by pyramidal cell firing, are enhanced by attention 
(Rauss et al., 2011). 
 
Interestingly, although the relative simplicity of neuronal mass models used by dynamic 
causal modelling almost forces gain control to be modelled using inhibitory self-
connections, this particular mechanism makes a lot of sense in relation to current thinking 
about attention. Convergent evidence implicates local inhibitory processing, mediated by 
GABAergic neurotransmission, in attention.  Drugs working at GABA receptors, such as 
benzodiazepines, which are positive allosteric modulators of GABA-A receptors, increase 
the behavioural effect of cues so that reaction time differences to validly and invalidly 
cued targets become larger, while overall reaction times are slowed (Johnson et al., 1995).  
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Nicotine (an agonist at nicotinic acetylcholine receptors) also affects reaction times in the 
Posner paradigm, but it decreases the validity effect while increasing reaction times (Thiel 
et al., 2005; Meinke et al., 2006), and it is believed that the attentional effects of 
acetylcholine might be mediated at least partly though depression of inhibitory 
interneuron activity (Xiang et al., 1998; Buia and Tiesinga, 2006). These contrasting effects 
suggest that the inhibitory interneurons set the gain of their cortical area to determine 
reaction times.  Increasing their effects increases reaction times due to greater overall 
inhibition, exaggerating the difference between high- and low-gain cortical areas, and vice 
versa.  This is consistent with the ‘biased activation theory’ of selective attention 
(Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2010), which suggests that GABA interneurons mediate 
competition between stimuli which can be biased through top-down signals (the 
backwards modulatory connections in this DCM). 
 
In summary, the emerging picture is that attention may be mediated through local 
intrinsic or recurrent inhibitory mechanisms that form a key part of cortical gain control – 
and that have characteristic signatures in terms of frequency specific induced responses. 
This fits comfortably with the theoretical perspective provided by predictive coding – that 
provides a computational role for recurrent inhibition in encoding the gain or precision of 
prediction errors in hierarchical processing. The results presented in this chapter provide 
an initial link between these computational imperatives and plausible mechanisms at the 
level of synaptic processing and hierarchical neuronal circuits. 
 
The work described in this chapter is published as: 
Brown HR, Friston KJ. (2013). The functional anatomy of attention: a DCM study. Front. 
Hum. Neurosci. 2013 7:784. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Active inference, attention and 
motor preparation 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During the preparation and execution of goal-directed movements, processing is biased 
towards the perceptual attributes of the goal (e.g., Gherri and Eimer 2010; Perfetti et al. 
2010; Baldauf and Deubel 2010; Humphreys et al. 2010) and preparation or execution of 
an action improves perceptual processing in relevant sensory domains (Fagioli et al. 
2007). This suggests motor planning and attention are inherently linked, such that 
“perceptual codes and action plans share a common representational medium, which 
presumably involves the human premotor cortex” (Fagioli et al. 2007). This relates to the 
concept of motor attention that is specific to the effectors employed (Rushworth et al., 
2001) and decision making through attentional selection among motor plans (Goldberg 
and Segraves 1987). Moreover, the premotor theory of visual attention (Rizzolatti et al. 
1994) proposes that distinct maps are tuned to different effector representations and 
become active when a movement is prepared. In short, attention has a fundamental role in 
the selection and control of action; see Allport (1987) for a review.   
 
The link between action and attention and was first proposed by James (1890) and 
Woodworth (1899): however, the cognitive and neural mechanisms responsible for this 
association remain largely unknown (Dalrymple and Kingstone 2010). Greenwald 
(1970b) provided evidence that attention to a particular sensory modality speeded 
movements that are detected in that modality: In the oculomotor system, visual 
126 
 
discrimination performance is enhanced at the target location of a prepared saccade 
(Deubel & Schneider, 1996). Furthermore, stimulation of the superior colliculus can 
produce both eye movements (Robinson, 1972) and shifts of attention (Müller et al., 
2004).  Conversely, Craighero et al. (1999) showed that reaction times to visually 
presented objects are reduced when subjects grasp the objects being presented, 
illustrating the motor facilitation of sensory processing.   
 
This chapter explores the idea that motor attention uses exactly the same synaptic 
mechanisms as visual attention. This may sound strange because motor commands are 
usually considered to be outputs, whereas the visual channels selected by attention are 
inputs. However, active inference regards action as being driven by proprioceptive 
prediction errors in exactly the same way that perception is driven by exteroceptive 
prediction errors, as described in the introduction (Friston et al., 2010). If true, this means 
that attentional modulation may operate at low levels in the motor system in the same 
way that it operates in the early visual system. In this chapter, evidence for attentional 
modulation within the motor system was sought by reproducing a classical visual 
attention paradigm (Posner 1980) in the motor domain. Furthermore, by cueing attention 
to different attributes of movements I tried to locate the putative attentional modulation 
within the motor hierarchy. I hoped to show that attentional effects were expressed in low 
levels (in an intrinsic frame of reference) in much the same way that directed spatial 
attention operates in the early visual pathways. This chapter comprises four sections. The 
first rehearses the theoretical background that motivated a reaction time study described 
in the second section. The third section presents the results, which are discussed in 
relation to theoretical considerations in the final section. 
 
1.1 Active inference and motor attention 
 
In this section, motor preparation is considered as attention that is directed towards 
predicted proprioceptive sensations (Galazky et al. 2009), as opposed to the predicted 
exteroceptive consequences of action. This idea is motivated by the work described in 
chapter 3 (Feldman and Friston 2010). In this model, the effects of orienting cues on 
reaction times were explained by the Bayes-optimal encoding of precision in a hierarchical 
message-passing scheme (predictive coding). In this context, precision is the inverse 
variance or uncertainty associated with particular sensory channels, such that attention 
can be understood as weighting sensory signals in proportion to their precision (Feldman 
and Friston 2010; Friston 2010). In these predictive coding schemes, precision is encoded 
by the gain of units reporting bottom-up sensory information that has yet to be explained 
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by top-down predictions. This sensory information is called prediction error and is 
generally associated with the activity of superficial pyramidal cells: these cells are the 
source of forward or bottom-up projections in the brain (Rockland & Pandya, 1979; 
Mumford 1992; Friston 2010). In these schemes, attention therefore reduces to the 
optimisation of the postsynaptic gain of superficial pyramidal cells, of the sort associated 
with gamma-synchronisation (e.g. Womelsdorf et al. 2006) and monoaminergic or 
cholinergic modulation (e.g. Herrero et al. 2008); both of which have been implicated in 
attention. Here, I pursue the notion that attention is the optimum weighting of prediction 
error in the context of action preparation (Mars et al. 2007; Bestmann et al. 2008). In 
short, attention is considered to boost the gain of proprioceptive channels during motor 
preparation, in the same way that attention selects particular visual channels when 
subjects prepare for a visual target. In what follows, predictive coding and active inference 
are briefly reviewed in the context of this work; for a more complete exposition see the 
introduction and appendix: 
 
1.2 Predictive coding and active inference 
 
Predictive coding is based on the assumption that the brain makes inferences about the 
causes of its sensations. These inferences are driven by bottom-up or forward sensory 
information that is passed to higher brain areas in the form of prediction errors (Rao and 
Ballard 1999; Friston et al. 2008). Top-down or backward connections convey predictions 
that try to suppress prediction errors until predictions are optimised and prediction error 
is minimised. This suppression rests on opposing excitatory and inhibitory effects of top-
down predictions and bottom-up inputs on prediction error units (usually considered to 
be superficial pyramidal cells: Mumford, 1992). Active inference (Friston et al. 2010) 
generalises this scheme and proposes that exactly the same recursive message passing 
operates in the motor system.  The only difference is that prediction errors at the lowest 
level (in the cranial nerve nuclei and spinal cord) are also suppressed by movement, 
through classical reflex arcs. In this view, descending (cortico-spinal) signals are not 
motor commands per se but predictions of proprioceptive signals that the peripheral 
motor system fulfils (see Friston 2009, 2010 for details). As illustrated in Figure 5.1, a 
cued movement is not regarded as a simple stimulus-response mapping but is generated 
by a high level (sensorimotor) percept that predicts a particular pattern of proprioceptive 
and exteroceptive sensory signals. This percept arises to explain prediction errors caused 
by a cue in the exteroceptive domain, while motor reflexes suppress the ensuing 
prediction errors in the proprioceptive domain. This framework has been used to explain 
several features of the motor system and a series of behaviours, from visual tracking 
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(Friston et al 2009) to action observation (Friston et al 2010).  Active inference formalises 
much of what is proposed by the ideomotor theory of action (Lotze, 1852; James, 1890).  
The ideomotor account of motor control posits that moving causes a bidirectional 
association to be formed between a movement and its perceptual consequences.  Learning 
this association allows the perceptual consequences of a movement to be predicted, and 
anticipating the sensory consequences of a movement can be used to select an action.  At 
the level of the stretch receptors, the similarity is clear: signalling the predicted sensory 
consequences of an action (under active inference) causes the action to occur.  At higher 
hierarchical levels, movements can still be initiated in order to change the sensory input in 
another sensory system; indeed the free-energy principle demands the sampling of 
predicted information to minimise free energy or, more simply, surprise.  See Figure 5.1 
for a schematic illustration. 
 
1.3 Attention and active inference 
 
Attention enters this picture through context or state-dependent optimization of the 
precision of prediction errors. This sort of prediction is about the second-order statistics 
of sensory signals (i.e., their variability or reliability). In predictive coding, top-down first-
order predictions drive (or inhibit) neurons reporting prediction errors; while contextual, 
second-order predictions optimise their postsynaptic gain. It is this sort of top-down effect 
that is associated with attention. Neurobiologically, the distinction between first and 
second order predictions can be related to the distinction between the driving and 
modulatory effects mediated by AMPA and NMDA receptors. Optimising postsynaptic gain 
ensures that sensory information (prediction error) is weighted in proportion to its 
precision. This may sound complicated but is exactly the same procedure used every day 
in statistics, when weighting a difference in means (prediction error under the null 
hypothesis) by standard error (inverse precision) to form a t-statistic. Precision can thus 
be regarded as representing the reliability, ambiguity, or uncertainty about sensory 
signals. In summary, top-down predictions can have a direct (first-order) or a modulatory 
(second-order) effect on the responses of prediction error units that make the ensuing 
predictions as efficient as possible.  Reaction time (Goodman & Kelso, 1980), corticospinal 
excitability (Bestmann et al., 2008; Mars et al., 2007) and EEG data (Osman et al., 1995; 
Mars et al., 2008) all confirm that the motor system is highly sensitive to such second-
order effects.   
 
If ascending sensory signals are prediction errors and descending motor commands are 
predictions, then optimal predictions (and the resulting movements) should depend on  
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Figure 5.1: Active inference and predictive coding. Active inference is a generalisation of predictive 
coding that covers motor behaviours and itself is a special instance of the principle of free-energy 
minimisation. Free-energy is a statistical quantity that bounds the surprise (self-information) 
associated with sensory signals. This surprise is quantified in relation to a generative model of how 
those signals were caused. Predictive coding uses prediction error as a proxy for free-energy (cf, 
surprise) and rests on a hierarchical model, in which prediction errors are passed up the hierarchy 
(red arrows) to optimise high-level representations that provide top-down predictions (black 
arrows). In this schematic, prediction-error units are portrayed in red and units encoding the 
conditional expectations of the hidden causes of sensory input are shown in blue. During 
perception, the best explanation for sensory input emerges when the top-down predictions can 
explain as much of the prediction error (at each hierarchical level) as possible. Active inference 
takes this one step further and notes that certain sensory modalities can use prediction errors to 
drive motoneurons to eliminate prediction error directly (through classical motor reflex arcs). This 
is shown schematically on the lower left, using units in the dorsal and ventral horns of the spinal 
cord. Under active inference, a movement just fulfils the predictions afforded by percepts that 
predict both exteroceptive (e.g. visual) and interoceptive (e.g., stretch receptor) consequences. This 
high-level (sensorimotor) percept is activated by an exteroceptive (sensory) cue and the ensuing 
top-down predictions propagate to both sensory cortex (to suppress exteroceptive prediction 
error) and the motor system. However, in the motor system, the predictions engender a 
proprioceptive prediction error that is eliminated by movement. In this schematic, it is assumed 
that prediction errors are reported by superficial pyramidal cells (Mumford 1992), while 
conditional representations are encoded by (top-down) projecting deep pyramidal cells. Darker 
units highlight those activated by the presentation of a target-stimulus.  
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optimizing precision in exactly the same way as in sensory processing.  This suggests that, 
in the motor domain, cueing has a similar effect to that observed in the sensory domain: 
Rosenbaum (1980) first demonstrated an effect of movement cueing on reaction time in a  
way that is analogous to the accelerated detection of visual targets when they are 
preceded by valid cues in the Posner paradigm (Posner 1980).  However the movements 
cued in Rosenbaum (1980) were button presses, which required either visual or 
somatosensory attention to guide movement to the target.  Thus, these non-proprioceptive 
aspects of button presses conflate attentional effects in visual, somatosensory and 
proprioceptive domains. In other words, in previous work movements were planned in 
relation to an object in extra-personal space. Here, I used a simpler paradigm in which 
movements (wrist flexion and extension) could be performed using only proprioceptive 
information. This ensured that any attentional effects could be attributed to 
proprioception. This motor analogue of the Posner paradigm therefore allows 
interpretation of the results in relation to visual attention as modelled in chapter 3 
(Feldman and Friston, 2010); and to illustrate how active inference provides a framework 
in which to address questions about the functional anatomy of action preparation and 
attention. 
  
1.4 Cueing in an extrinsic or intrinsic frame of reference? 
 
In this chapter, ‘intrinsic’ will refer to a muscle-based, effector-dependent co-ordinate 
system and ‘extrinsic’ will refer to an external, effector-independent co-ordinate system. A 
key question in the functional anatomy of motor attention is where biasing effects are 
located in the cortical hierarchy: see Grafton and Hamilton (2007) for a review of motor 
hierarchies. In the sensory domain, attention is usually considered to operate at the lower 
levels of sensory hierarchies to select among competing sensory processing channels. This 
is seen in both psychological (e.g., the distinction between object and spatial visual 
attention: Treisman, 1998; Macaluso et al 2003) and electrophysiological treatments (e.g., 
biased competition models: Desimone and Duncan 1995). If the functional anatomy of the 
motor hierarchy recapitulates that of sensory hierarchies, then one might expect to see 
attentional modulation in lower levels, which will be associated with representations in an 
intrinsic frame of reference. 
 
Electrophysiological evidence demonstrates that between the ventral premotor cortex and 
M1 neurons change their response patterns from signalling movements in a visual 
(extrinsic) coordinate system that is independent of starting posture to a motor (intrinsic) 
coordinate system that depends on starting posture (Kakei et al. 1999, 2001, 2003).  Thus 
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in ventral premotor cortex, actions are largely encoded allocentrically, while in M1 they 
are predominantly encoded in terms of the joint angles and proprioceptive input required 
to reach the target (Soechting & Flanders 1992).  Shipp (2005) suggests that neurons 
representing movements in an intrinsic frame of reference send descending cortico-spinal 
predictions from M1. Kakei et al (2003) provide a detailed discussion of movement 
representations in terms of the coordinate transformations that begin with an “extrinsic 
coordinate frame representing the spatial location of a target and end with an intrinsic 
coordinate frame describing muscle activation patterns”. It should be noted however, that 
the segregation of intrinsic and extrinsic representations between motor and premotor 
cortex may not be complete or unique (Wu and Hatsopoulos 2007) 
 
These observations suggest two possible levels of the motor hierarchy at which 
attentional cueing effects could operate. Consider movements with two dimensions or 
attributes that are cued in an extrinsic frame of reference; for example, moving the left or 
right hand (where) inwards or outwards (what). If attention operates at high levels of the 
motor hierarchy, then one might expect cues to move the hand inward will facilitate 
inward movements, irrespective of which hand is used. This is because the representation 
of the movement can be primed in extrinsic coordinates, prior to transformation to 
intrinsic coordinates. Conversely, if attention operates at lower levels, encoding the 
muscle groups involved in inward movements of the left hand, then attentional priming 
will only be expressed when the left hand is moved inwards. In short, if attention operates 
on prediction errors in an intrinsic frame of reference, the effect of the what cue will 
depend upon the where cue.  
 
In summary, if sensorimotor constructs mediate attentional biases in an extrinsic frame of 
reference, cueing effects would be expected on both dimensions independently. 
Conversely, if these representations instantiate top-down biases at a lower (intrinsic) 
level of the motor system, then only a particular movement (in an intrinsic frame of 
reference) will be cued. Figure 5.2 tries to make the different predictions clear in terms of 
top-down enabling of postsynaptic gain (indicated with blue arrows). Crucially, the profile 
of speeded responses (under valid and invalid cueing) is different for extrinsic and 
intrinsic levels of attentional gain. In the intrinsic (motor cortex) model, there should be 
an interaction between the validity effects of cues over both movement dimensions. 
Conversely, under the extrinsic (premotor cortex) model, there should be no interaction 
but two main effects due to the validity of both what and where aspects of the cue.  It was 
this difference in the profile of validity effects on reaction times that this experiment was 
designed to reveal. 
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Figure 5.2: Different levels of attentional bias. This schematic illustrates the top-down enabling of 
postsynaptic gain (blue arrows) at different levels in the motor hierarchy. In the left panel, the 
predictions of an inward (flexion) movement of the left hand selectively bias the intrinsic 
prediction-error units that elicit inward movements of the left hand. This means that when a valid 
target-stimulus appears, these prediction errors will produce a more efficient and speeded 
movement (be eliciting stronger descending predictions). Conversely, if the attentional bias is 
mediated at the premotor (extrinsic) level, the prediction errors associated with both what and 
where aspects of the movement will facilitate speed responses over both movement dimensions; 
e.g., all left-hand movements and all inward movements. In this figure, darker units highlight 
prediction-error units with increased gain. The lower graphs show the predicted profile of reaction 
times (under valid and invalid cueing) for cueing at extrinsic (right) and intrinsic (left) levels. In 
the intrinsic (motor cortex) model, there should be an interaction between the validity effects of 
cues over both movement dimensions. In other words, the benefit using the expected hand will only 
be seen if the expected movement is required. Conversely, under the extrinsic (ventral premotor 
cortex) model, there should be no interaction but two main effects due to the validity of what and 
where aspects of the movement respectively.  
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Based on the results of Jentzsch et al. (2004) and the retinotopic frame of reference of 
attentional effects in the Posner paradigm (Woldorff et al. 1997), I hypothesise that 
attentional cueing operates in an intrinsic frame of reference. I therefore expected to see 
an interaction between the validity effects of cueing, with speeded responses when, and 
only when, both what and where dimensions were valid. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Subjects 
 
Eight healthy right-handed volunteers (2 female), aged 19 to 42, participated in this 
experiment. All subjects provided written and informed consent and the experiments 
were conducted in compliance with the standards established by the local ethical 
committee. 
 
2.2 Experimental procedure and EMG recordings 
 
Subjects were seated in a comfortable reclining chair. Their wrists were in a semi-supine 
position with the palms facing each other and supported by a splint that restricted wrist 
and hand movement to pure flexion and extension. The hand-splints were mounted on 
vertical spindles, which allowed rotation in the transverse plane. The hands were 
positioned such that the wrist joints sat directly above the axes of rotation. Additional 
support of the forearms further ensured that movements were constrained to the wrists, 
and reduced fatigue. Stimuli were viewed on a screen placed at eye level.  Each trial 
started with a (150ms) cue-stimulus, followed by a blank screen (see Figure 5.3).  700ms 
after the appearance of the cue, a target-stimulus appeared for 400ms.  A 50ms white-
noise mask was presented after the cue and target stimuli to prevent the appearance of 
visual after-effects. Participants were given 1000ms after the appearance of the target-
stimulus to make a response.  No feedback was given.  At the appearance of the target-
stimulus, participants were required to respond as quickly as possible with the movement 
indicated.  Four movements were possible – flexion or extension at the left or right wrist.  
The cue and target-stimuli had two dimensions – colour (blue, red) and spatial frequency 
(high, low).  For four of the participants, the colour of the stimulus cued the hand (e.g. blue 
= left, red = right) and the spatial frequency indicated the movement (e.g. high frequency 
= flexion, low frequency = extension).  For the remaining four, the stimulus-response 
mapping was reversed, so that colour indicated the movement to be made and spatial 
frequency the hand to be used.  The stimuli subtended approximately 35 degrees of visual  
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Figure 5.3: Experimental Design. Top panel: Schematic showing the time-line of three experimental 
trials, which comprised cue stimuli that could be congruent (valid) or incongruent (invalid) over 
each of their two dimensions (what: extension vs. flexion; where: left vs. right hand). Bottom panel: 
Example EMG trace acquired from a single muscle, plotted with the transform used for identifying 
movement onset.  The line shows the ad-hoc threshold used to derive reaction times automatically. 
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angle.  High-frequency stimuli were 2.5c/deg, low frequency were 0.25c/deg.  The colours 
had RGB values ([128 0 0] [255 100 100]) and ([0 0 128] [100 100 255]). 
 
Participants were required to relax their hands and lower arms until the appearance of the 
target-stimulus.  This paradigm independently cued which motor and (right or left) would 
implement one of two movements (wrist flexion or extension). Each cue contained two 
dimensions – one signalling the hand to be moved and one the movement.  For each 
dimension (colour, spatial frequency), cue-stimuli could be valid (80%) or invalid with 
regards to the target-stimulus (20%).  Since the validity of the cue in each dimension was 
independent, this gave 64% (0.8x0.8) of trials with a completely valid cue, 32% 
(0.8x0.2x2) of trials where either the hand or the movement required was invalidly cued 
and 4% (0.2x0.2) of trials where both the hand and movement were cued invalidly. The 
experiment comprised one training session and 25 experimental sessions. Each session 
contained 100 trials, which were balanced for the four types of cue and four movements.  
The large number of trials was needed to acquire sufficient data from trials with invalid 
cues in both dimensions.  The sessions were conducted over three separate days.  
 
Reaction times were evaluated using surface EMG.  Ag/AgCl electrodes were placed on the 
left and right brachioradialis/extensor carpi radialis longus and flexor carpi ulnaris 
muscles. Muscle activity was monitored throughout the experiment to ensure the effector 
muscles were relaxed before the appearance of the target stimulus.  Signals were recorded 
via a CED 1401 laboratory interface (Cambridge Electronic Design Ltd., Cambridge, UK) 
and stored on a personal computer (for later analysis) at a sample rate of 5 kHz (Signal 
2.0, Cambridge Electronic Design Ltd.). Data were bandpass-filtered between 3 Hz and 2.5 
kHz.   
 
2.3 Statistical analysis 
 
EMG data were smoothed with a Butterworth low-pass filter with a cutoff frequency of 
600Hz to increase signal-to-noise.  After full-wave rectification the data were log-
transformed to provide normally distributed time series for further analysis.  The mean of 
100 consecutive data points was compared with the mean of the preceding 5000 data 
points, using two-sample t-tests and a sliding window. Reaction times were defined 
operationally as the first time at which the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeded 50. 
This ad hoc threshold identified the highest number of correctly performed trials. 
Incorrect trials, where a muscle other than the agonist for the correct movement showed 
the shortest reaction time, were excluded.  
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A standard summary statistic method was used for statistical inference, using the log of 
the mean reaction times (to correct for positive skew) over each of the four conditions, for 
each subject.  Univariate 5-way ANOVA was performed in SPSS, with factors HAND CUE 
VALIDITY (valid vs. invalid), MOVEMENT CUE VALIDITY (valid vs. invalid), HAND (left vs. 
right), MOVEMENT (flexion vs. extension). Factors SUBJECT and STIMULUS-RESPONSE 
MAPPING were nested and were implemented in two separate ANOVA models. 
 
3. Results 
 
13% of trials (range over subjects 8% - 22%) were discarded.  Of these trials, in 2% no 
movement was made or no movement could be identified.  In the remaining 11%, an 
incorrect movement was made (error trials).  Error trial frequency varied significantly by 
cue type (p < 0.001, χ2 > 400, 1 d.f.), with errors less likely on validly cued trials.  The 
most common error (64% of errors) was making the incorrect movement with the correct 
hand. The least common error (10% of errors) was making the correct movement with the 
wrong hand.  Among invalidly cued trials, performing the movement specified by the cue 
stimulus rather than the target stimulus occurred significantly more often (p <0.05, χ2 > 
6.01, 1 d.f.).  Since the EMG measured the onset of movement rather than the endpoint, 
changing the response before the movement was completed resulted in an error trial.  This 
may explain the comparatively high error rate seen here, compared with more traditional 
button-press paradigms.    
 
The grand average reaction time was 334ms. There was no significant main effect of 
HAND, MOVEMENT or STIMULUS-RESPONSE MAPPING, so the ANOVA model including 
SUBJECT as a factor was used for further analysis.  There were significant main effects of 
HAND CUE VALIDITY (F(1,7) = 90.54, P < 0.001, η2 = 0.368), MOVEMENT CUE VALIDITY 
(F(1,7) = 171.12, P < 0.001, η2 = 0.155) and SUBJECT (F(1,7) = 9.29, P < 0.003, η2 = 0.293 ).  
There were two significant two-way interactions – MOVEMENT x MOVEMENT CUE (F(1,7) 
= 4.98 ,p = 0.048, η2 = 0.001), and, as anticipated, MOVEMENT CUE VALIDITY x HAND 
CUE VALIDITY (Fig. 4; F(1,7) = 233.34, P < 0.001, η2 = 0.108).  As expected, the fastest 
mean reaction time was seen when both cues were valid. Figure 5.4 highlights the nature 
of this interaction with reference to the profiles predicted by high (extrinsic) and low 
(intrinsic) levels of facilitation in the motor hierarchy. It is clear that this profile is 
consistent with attentional bias at the (motor cortex) level of representation, in an 
intrinsic frame of reference. Quantitatively, these results suggests that the validity effect is 
expressed primarily when both cue dimensions were jointly valid. 
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Figure 5.4: Reaction time effects for the four combinations of cue-validity. The top panels show the 
results predicted by the theoretical architectures of Figure 5.2. The green lines correspond to valid 
movement cues and the blues lines to invalid movement cues. The empirical results are shown in 
the lower panel using the same colours. The bars correspond to standard error over subjects. The 
form of the interaction observed is very close to that predicted under a model where attention 
biases prediction errors in an intrinsic frame of reference (Figure 5.2). 
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Paired t-tests among the four validity categories confirmed that only one pair failed to 
show a significant difference (after Bonferroni correction): movement cue valid, hand cue 
invalid and movement cue invalid, hand cue invalid (p > 0.2).  All other pairwise 
differences were highly significant (p < 0.001). 
 
4. Discussion 
 
This chapter pursues the idea that attention is an integral part of motor control and 
expresses itself through biasing the precision afforded to the proprioceptive and 
somatosensory consequences of an anticipated action (Galazky et al. 2009). This places 
previous proposals that link motor preparation and attention (cf, Rizzolatti 1994; 
Rushworth 2001; Humphreys 2010; Allport, 1987; Goldberg and Segraves 1987; see 
Tipper, 2004 for an overview) in the general framework of active inference and predictive 
coding. The important perspective provided by active inference is that movements fulfil 
predictions furnished by percepts with both exteroceptive (e.g. visual) and proprioceptive 
(e.g., stretch receptor) components. 
 
The work described in chapter 3 demonstrated that the reaction time benefits of cueing 
can be understood as statistically optimal responses, where the associated optimisation of 
precision can account for both psychophysical and electrophysiological phenomena fairly 
accurately (Feldman and Friston, 2010).  In this chapter, I asked whether similar reaction 
time benefits can be seen empirically in the motor domain. To this end, the paradigm 
developed by Rosenbaum (1980) was adapted, in which two different visual dimensions 
(colour and spatial frequency) cued the impending movement. As in Rosenbaum & 
Kornblum (1982), it was predicted and confirmed that cueing effects would occur only 
when both cue dimensions were valid.  These predictions were based on the possible 
outcomes of attentional bias at different levels in the cortical hierarchy, which I associate 
with representations in extrinsic (higher) and intrinsic (lower) frames of reference: In an 
extrinsic model, one would predict that cueing effects enact their influence independently 
and to a comparable degree. As outlined above, the interaction between the two validity 
factors argues for an intrinsic model, in which hand and movement are selectively enabled 
in a way that cannot be separated. In the present case, the observed interaction can be 
accounted for by a model where precision is increased in proprioceptive channels that 
represent the confluence of top-down predictions about the nature of a movement and 
where it will be implemented (see Figure 5.2). 
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In addition to the interaction above, there was a small reaction time benefit from a valid 
hand cue, even if the movement cue was invalid.  The magnitude of this effect was much 
smaller compared to the reaction time benefit seen for two valid cues (66ms vs. 237ms). 
This, and the lack of any benefit for a valid movement cue if the hand cue is invalid, means 
that a model in which precision operates at the intrinsic level is still the most likely.  The 
small validity effect of a valid hand cue might be explained in the framework of active 
inference; because the movements performed in this experiment were self-limited, the  
same muscles were recruited for both flexion and extension movements, to either initiate 
or terminate the movement.  Thus, if the precision of the stretch receptor channels in one 
forearm were boosted after cuing that side, a small benefit might accrue for the opposite 
movement.   
 
Rushworth et al. (1997b) also demonstrated a benefit for valid cuing using a similar 
paradigm.  Spatial cues were used, and the motor preparation time was calculated from 
the difference between two conditions: a simple cuing task in one movement dimension, 
and a control task where the movement made did not depend on the validity of the cue.  A 
small reaction time benefit was seen for valid cues.   
 
In Rosenbaum (1980), some aspects of the movement were left unspecified until the 
appearance of the target stimulus.  Unlike in this study, Rosenbaum saw separable effects 
of cuing just the arm, the direction and the extent of the upcoming movement.  However, 
there is a key difference between this paradigm and that of Rosenbaum (1980) that may 
account for the difference. The button-press responses used in Rosenbaum (1980) entail 
visuomotor and somatosensory-motor integration. This means that attentional cueing 
effects in the visual or somatosensory domains cannot be disambiguated from purely 
proprioceptive attention. This paradigm avoided conflating multiple attention processes 
by cueing movements that could be performed using only proprioceptive channels 
(simple, self-terminated flexion and extension movements). This means that one can 
attribute the cue validity effects to attentional modulation of proprioceptive signals, in 
accordance with active inference. Furthermore, Rosenbaum’s cues were semantic 
(letters), whereas this paradigm used low-level visual features which were arbitrarily 
mapped onto flexion and extension movements. The complexity of the semantic cues 
meant that most of the reaction time advantages seen in Rosenbaum (1980) could be 
accounted for by validity effects on processing visual targets and their semantic content 
and not on the movements per se. In short, the simplicity of the movements and cues used 
in this experiment suggests a motoric rather than sensory locus for attentional cueing. 
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A further study (Rosenbaum & Kornblum 1982), which resembled ours except that only 
two of four possible movements were possible in each trial, did not find that correctly 
cuing one response attribute benefitted reaction time.  They found the opposite – violating 
the hand and movement cues increased reaction times relative to violating just the 
movement cue. Their explanation for this was that both movements were simultaneously 
prepared, but choosing between two movements on the same hand takes longer because 
the movements are more ‘similar’. The larger number of possible movements in my 
experiment meant that simultaneously preparing all responses was unlikely (the flexion 
and extension movements used the same motor plant, while index and middle finger 
movements were used in Rosenbaum and Kornblum 1982).  By contrast, Miller (1982) 
found a contradictory effect – advance information of which hand to use gave a reaction 
time advantage, whereas advance information of which finger (on either hand) did not.  
 
How can these discrepancies be resolved? Cui and Deecke (1999) found anatomically 
congruent movements were performed faster than spatially congruent movements, 
suggesting that anatomically congruent movements are prepared together in the motor 
hierarchy, or, alternatively that the mapping from extrinsic to intrinsic coordinates is 
more efficient. Despite the anatomical distance between [pre]motor cortex in each 
hemisphere, activity in these areas may be influenced at an early stage during motor 
preparation. If left and right effectors are competing alternatives for subsequent actions 
(cf. Cisek and Kalaska, 2010), several (bilateral) representations can in principle occur in 
an intrinsic frame of reference at the same time. These results suggest that predictions 
about impending movements are integrated to boost processing in effector-based 
(intrinsic) coordinates. 
 
Goodman & Kelso (1980) suggested that stimulus-response mapping time is shorter for 
cued movements.  If this were the case, one would expect cues correct in one response 
dimension to provide some reaction time benefit for the other.  The locus of such an effect 
would likely be before the motor stage; i.e., early in the stimulus-response interval. 
However, evidence from EEG studies  suggests that the effects of cueing occur relatively 
late, again suggesting an effect in intrinsic coordinates: for example, the lateralised 
readiness potential (LRP), an EEG potential evoked when one hand is cued, has been 
suggested to be the halfway point between premotor and motor processing (Osman et al, 
1995). This is supported by the finding that it occurs nearer to the movement during trials 
with informative cues than those without, although the stimulus-LRP latency does not 
change (Jentzsch et al, 2004).  Finally, it can be noted that a locus of the motor attentional 
effect in intrinsic coordinates provides an interesting parallel with results from the Posner 
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paradigm. The reaction time benefit associated with cues in most visual paradigms seems 
to occur in retinotopic (intrinsic) rather than allocentric (extrinsic) frames of reference 
(Posner & Cohen 1984; Golomb et al., 2008).   
 
 
 
4.1 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the idea that motor preparation is an attentional phenomenon 
that is directed towards proprioceptive sensations (i.e., predicted sensory feedback of the 
anticipated motor response). This perspective suggests that attention should not be 
limited to perceptual processing in the exteroceptive (e.g. visual) domain but should also 
bias interoceptive inference during movement. These predictions were verified by 
adapting a classical attention (Posner) paradigm for a motor setting. Furthermore, the 
hierarchical level this attentional bias operates at was established by cueing the 
movement and effector independently. These behavioural results demonstrate an 
interaction between the validity of movement and effector cues. This suggests that the bias 
for the selected action is mediated at a low level in the motor hierarchy, in an intrinsic 
frame of reference. More generally, the ideas outlined above provide a heuristic 
framework in which to address questions about the link between motor preparation and 
attention, and their mechanistic underpinnings. 
 
The work described in this chapter was published as: 
Brown H, Friston K, Bestmann S. (2011). Active inference, attention, and motor 
preparation. Front. Psychol. 2:218. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
Active inference, sensory 
attenuation and illusions 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Children discover early in life that although they can tickle others, and be tickled by 
others, it is almost impossible to tickle oneself. The commonplace nature of this 
observation hides its profundity – two physically identical sensory stimuli can be 
perceived differently, depending on high-level concepts such as agency or wilfulness. This 
sort of effect has now been quantified in a number of tasks and has been investigated in 
numerous neuroimaging studies.  However, after more than a decade of research, a simple 
explanation is still outstanding. In this chapter, I try to provide a principled account of how 
beliefs about agency depend upon the active sampling of sensory information (active 
inference) and how this leads naturally to phenomena like sensory attenuation, the force 
matching illusion and attribution of agency.  
 
1.1 Sensory attenuation and agency 
 
The difference between self-generated and externally-generated tickle has been the focus 
of many studies (Weiskrantz et al., 1971; Claxton 1975; Blakemore et al., 1999).  Self-
produced tickle is consistently rated less ‘ticklish’ than externally produced tickle and its 
ticklishness can be increased by closing the eyes (Claxton, 1975).  Tickle is not the only 
attribute of sensation affected – self-generated touch stimuli are also perceived as less 
pleasant and intense (Blakemoreet al., 1999). Indeed, sensory attenuation is not limited to 
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somatosensation; attenuation of self-generated visual (Hughes et al., 2011; Cardoso-Leite 
et al., 2010) and auditory sensations have been reported (Martikainen et al., 2005; Weiss 
et al., 2011a, 2011b; Desantis et al., 2012). 
 
A measure of sensory attenuation is provided by the force-match task (Shergill et al., 2003, 
2005).  During this task, instead of reporting sensations explicitly, subjects match a 
reference force, either by pressing directly on themselves, or by using a robot to 
reproduce the perceived pressure.  Higher levels of matched force are produced when the 
force is self-generated, consistent with self-reports of sensory attenuation. 
 
Sensory attenuation is also evident in neuronal responses. Subcortically, both cerebellar 
(Blakemore et al., 1998, 1999, 2001) and thalamic (Blakemore et al., 1998) activity is 
reduced for self-produced vs. externally produced sensations.  Early sensory responses 
are also modulated in auditory paradigms, where these differences can appear as early as 
27 ms after stimulus onset (Baess et al., 2008, 2009; Aliu et al., 2009; Martikainen et al., 
2005).  Repetitive stimulation of M1 (which has a depressive effect on activity) reduces 
the magnitude of sensory attenuation in the force-match task, as well as in a grip-
production task (Therrien et al., 2001; Voss et al., 2007), whereas single-pulse TMS of M1 
just before movement onset (which delays the movement) has no effect on the level of 
sensory attenuation (Voss et al., 2006).  This suggests that M1 is involved in determining 
the level of sensory attenuation but not in mediating it. In visual studies, the only ERP 
change noted thus far is a late (~150 ms) modulation of frontoparietal potentials (Shaefer 
& Marcus, 1973; Hughes et al. 2011). Concepts, such as meaning, perception of agency and 
social factors can influence sensory attenuation.  Curio et al. (2000) demonstrated the 
absence of the late (300 ms) ‘oddball’ potentials (usually elicited in response to rare 
stimuli which have ‘meaning’ or task-relevance) in response to self-generated stimuli, 
suggesting that they are categorised as distinct from externally generated stimuli at a 
conceptual level.  Sato (2008) observed sensory attenuation both when participants 
performed a movement resulting in a tone, and when they observed experimenters 
performing the same movement. Similarly, Weiss et al., (2011) noted greater sensory 
attenuation when participants triggered the experimenter to produce externally 
generated tones by tapping them, and vice versa for self-generated tones.   
 
The relationship between sensory attenuation and the experience of agency is complex.  
An experience of agency over movements that generate sensation seems to be necessary 
for sensory attenuation (Desantis et al., 2012; Gentsch & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011): sensory 
attenuation does not occur if movement and sensation are correlated but the relationship 
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is not perceived as causal.  Some authors have suggested that the experience of sensory 
attenuation is important in labelling movements as self-generated (Blakemore et al., 
2002). In support of this idea, Baess et al. (2011) found that sensory attenuation was more 
pronounced in blocks with mixed self- and externally-produced sensations.  In this setting, 
the attribution of agency is more difficult than during a sequence of sensations that are 
purely self- or purely externally-generated.   
 
Sensory attenuation is an interesting phenomenon partly because sensory attenuation is 
reduced in schizophrenia (Blakemore et al., 2000; Shergill et al., 2005), or those at high 
risk of developing psychosis (Wilquin & Delevoye-Turrel, 2012). In normal subjects, 
sensory attenuation is (negatively) correlated with the level of delusional beliefs (Teufel 
et al., 2010).  Less sensory attenuation means that the percepts of schizophrenics are more 
veridical than controls and – in the force match task – they perform more accurately 
(Shergill et al., 2005).  This means that differences between schizophrenics and controls 
are difficult to attribute to non-specific effects of long-term disease, psychoactive 
medication or social deprivation, and that investigating this effect might provide clues 
about the pathogenesis of schizophrenia.  A key symptom of schizophrenia is aberrant 
perception of agency (Frith, 2005), particularly the delusion that one’s actions are being 
controlled by others, suggesting the mechanisms that impair sensory attenuation in 
schizophrenia are intimately related to the perception of agency.   
 
1.2 Formal theories of sensory attenuation 
 
Previous explanations for the force-match paradigm – that can be applied to sensory 
attenuation more generally – have come from engineering approaches to motor control 
(Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). In the model proposed by Frith, Blakemore & Wolpert 
(2000), the decision to move initiates a motor command, which is transformed by a 
forward model into a prediction of the sensations created by that movement.  The real 
sensations produced by the movement are compared to the predictions of the forward 
model to produce a ‘control theory’ prediction error, which is used to update predictions 
and refine the forward model.  During self-generated movement, an accurate forward 
model means there is little prediction error.  Under this model, it is suggested that small 
prediction errors during self-generated movement leads to a percept of a less intense 
force, relative to the true force. 
 
This model is incomplete in a number of aspects.  Firstly, it is unclear why the intensity of 
a percept is related to the size of prediction error: prediction errors are used to update 
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predictions but they do not constitute predictions or percepts per se. Within predictive 
coding formulations of perception (Rao & Ballard, 1999; Friston 2005), prediction errors 
play a crucial role in perception but, again, they are not the percept itself; the percept is a 
synthesis of prior beliefs and sensory evidence that is conveyed by prediction errors. 
 
Second, this explanation overlooks the multidimensional nature of sensory attributes.  In 
the optimal control explanation, any mismatch between the forward model and sensory 
input is mapped to a single variable that determines perceived intensity.  It is true that 
parametrically varying the time delay between movement and sensation – or rotating 
sensory feedback with respect to movement – will alter the force-match illusion 
(Blakemore et al., 1999).  However, the optimal control formulation does not explain how 
this is caused by the amplitude of prediction error, pooled over all sensory channels. 
Furthermore, the amplitude of prediction error does not seem to be important in 
determining the level of sensory attenuation: for example, Baess et al. (2008) show that 
the predictability of a self-generated sensation does not affect sensory attenuation. 
Crucially, a self-generated movement that should result in sensation – but does not – can 
still cause sensory attenuation, despite the implicit production of prediction errors (Bays 
et al., 2005). 
 
Third, there is a set of results that control theory approach cannot account for.  During 
self-generated movement, sensory attenuation is often noted in response to externally 
generated stimuli (Voss et al., 2008; Rushton et al., 1981; Milne et al., 1988; Chapman et 
al., 1987). These stimuli are applied by the experimenter so they cannot be predicted by 
the forward model and therefore cannot be attenuated.  Additionally, sensory attenuation 
has been found for stimuli that occur (up to 400 ms) before the onset of movement (Voss 
et al., 2008; Bays et al., 2005), when they cannot be predicted from self-generated 
movement. This attenuation seems to be due to changes in sensitivity (d-prime) to 
external stimuli rather than a change in the response criterion (Juravle and Spence, 2011; 
Van Hulle et al., 2012).  The attenuation of these stimuli – which cannot be predicted from 
motor commands – suggests that the phenomenon of sensory attenuation is broader than 
suggested by optimal control formulations. 
 
In this chapter, I put forward an alternative explanation for sensory attenuation based on 
active inference. Active inference is based on Bayes optimal accounts of behaviour and 
provides a principled explanation of how sensory attenuation may arise in a Bayes optimal 
(normative) sense.  This is in contrast to previous explanations, which have explained 
sensory attenuation as a quirk or anomaly of motor control.  Instead, I suggest that 
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sensory attenuation is a necessary consequence of reducing the precision of sensory 
evidence during movement to allow the expression of proprioceptive predictions that 
incite movement. This explanation is potentially important because a failure of sensory 
attenuation may result in false inference about the causes (agency) of self-made acts – a 
failure that is characteristic of the positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Furthermore, the 
neuronal mechanisms behind sensory attenuation (and compensatory changes in the 
precision of beliefs at non-sensory levels) rest on neuromodulatory mechanisms that have 
been implicated in psychosis. 
 
In the following, active inference and its neurobiological implementation are briefly 
recapitulated. This is discussed more extensively in the introduction. This implementation 
is used in later simulations to demonstrate why sensory attenuation is necessary for 
movement.  I then simulate the force match illusion using exactly the same scheme. The 
chapter concludes by simulating a loss of sensory attenuation and a compensatory 
increase in non-sensory precision, as might be found in schizophrenia. Crucially, this 
simulated pathology exposes actors to false beliefs or delusions; interestingly, with a 
necessarily antagonistic content. These simulations do not model all the aspects of sensory 
attenuation discussed above (e.g. Sato et al., 2008); however, it is hoped that the principles 
of active inference – in particular, the optimisation of precision at different levels of a 
predictive coding hierarchy – may generalise to other settings. 
 
2. Neurobiological implementation of active inference 
 
These simulations use differential equations that minimise the free energy of sensory 
input using the generalised gradient descent derived in Appendix 1 (Friston, Stephan, Li, & 
Daunizeau, 2010). 
 
       (6.1) 
 
These coupled differential equations describe perception and action respectively and just 
say that neuronal activity encoding conditional expectations ( , , , )    =  and action 
a  change to reduce free energy, where free energy ( , )F s   is a function of sensory inputs 
( , , , )s s s s   and conditional expectations encoded by neuronal activity. The first 
differential equation has the same form as Bayesian (e.g., Kalman-Bucy) filters used in 
time series analysis.  The second differential equation says that action also minimises free 
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energy. The differential equations above are coupled because sensory input depends upon 
action, which depends upon perception through the conditional expectations. This circular 
dependency leads to a sampling of sensory input that is both predicted and predictable, 
thereby minimising free energy and prediction errors. 
 
To perform neuronal simulations under this scheme, it is only necessary to integrate or 
solve Equation (6.1) to simulate the neuronal dynamics that encode conditional 
expectations and the ensuing action. Conditional expectations depend upon the brain’s 
generative model of the world, which is assumed to have the following hierarchical form 
discussed in the introduction. 
 
In the present context, the key thing about this predictive coding scheme used is that the 
precisions at each level in the hierarchy depend on the expected hidden causes and states 
in the level above. It is this dependency that has been proposed to mediate attention or 
selection in hierarchical inference, as described in chapters 3 and 5 (Feldman & Friston, 
2010; Brown et al., 2011; Friston et al., 2012). The mathematics of this scheme (set out in 
equation 0.3) tells us that the state-dependent precisions modulate the responses of the 
error-units to their presynaptic inputs. This modulation depends on the conditional 
expectations about the states and suggests something intuitive – attention is mediated by 
activity-dependent modulation of the synaptic gain of principal cells that convey sensory 
information (prediction error) from one cortical level to the next. This translates into a 
top-down control of synaptic gain in principal (superficial pyramidal) cells elaborating 
prediction errors and fits comfortably with the modulatory effects of top-down 
connections in cortical hierarchies that have been associated with attention and action 
selection.  
 
2.1 Action 
 
In active inference, conditional expectations elicit behaviour by sending top-down 
predictions down the hierarchy that are unpacked into proprioceptive predictions at the 
level of the cranial nerve nuclei and spinal-cord. These engage classical reflex arcs to 
suppress proprioceptive prediction errors and produce the predicted motor trajectory 
 
?̇? = −
𝜕
𝜕𝑎
𝐹 = −
𝜕?̃?
𝜕𝑎
. 𝜉𝑣
(1)
        (4) 
 
The reduction of action to classical reflexes follows because the only way that action can 
minimise free energy is to change sensory (proprioceptive) prediction errors by changing 
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sensory signals; cf., the equilibrium point formulation of motor control (Feldman & Levin, 
1995). In short, active inference can be regarded as equipping a generalised predictive 
coding scheme with classical reflex arcs: see (Friston, Daunizeau, Kilner, & Kiebel, 2010; 
Friston, Daunizeau, & Kiebel, 2009) for details. The actual movements produced clearly 
depend upon top-down predictions that can have a rich and complex structure, as we will 
see next. 
 
3. Simulations of sensory attenuation 
 
This section provides a series of simulations – using the active inference scheme of the 
previous section – to illustrate the basic phenomena of sensory attenuation. In what 
follows, I describe a minimal model of sensations that can be generated internally or 
externally. This model is used to illustrate the permissive and necessary role of sensory 
attenuation in the production of self-made acts. The perceptual consequences of sensory 
attenuation are then addressed, in terms of detecting externally and internally generated 
events – that has been the focus of much work in psychology and psychophysics reviewed 
in the introduction. Using the same model, the force-matching illusion is then reproduced 
by yoking externally applied forces to the perceived level of self-generated forces. Finally, I 
demonstrate the disappearance of the illusion and the emergence of false inferences about 
(antagonistic) external forces, when sensory attenuation (attenuation of sensory 
precision) is removed. 
 
3.1 The generative process and model 
 
Figure 6.1 describes the generative process and model in terms of equations (that have the 
same hierarchical form as Equation 0.2) and a schematic showing how the hidden states 
and causes are interpreted. This model is as simple as it could be, while retaining the key 
ingredients that are required to demonstrate inference about or attribution of agency. The 
equations on the left describe the real world (whose states and causes are in boldface), 
while the equations on the right constitute the subject’s generative model. In the real 
world, there is one hidden state ix  modelling self-generated force or pressure that is 
registered by both proprioceptive 
p
s
 
and somatosensory ss  input. This hidden force 
increases with action and decays with a time constant of four time bins (where each time 
bin corresponds to about one hundred milliseconds). Externally generated forces are 
modelled with ev  and add to the internally generated forces to provide somatosensory 
input. 
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Figure 6.1: Generative model. This figure shows the generative process and model used in these 
simulations.  The generative process (left) models real-world states and causes, while the 
generative model (right) is used by the subject to make inferences about causes of its sensations.  In 
the real world, the hidden state xi models self-generated forces that are sensed by both 
somatosensory 𝑠𝑠  and proprioceptive 𝑠𝑝  input channels.  External forces are modelled with the 
hidden cause ve  and are sensed only by the somatosensory input channel.  Action causes the self-
generated force to increase and is modified by a sigmoid squashing function 𝜎 (a hyperbolic 
tangent function).  The hidden state decays slowly over four time bins. In the generative model, 
causes of sensory data are divided into internal causes  𝑣𝑖  and external causes 𝑣𝑒 . The hidden cause 
excites dynamics in hidden states 𝑥𝑖  and 𝑥𝑒 , which decay slowly over time as above.  Internal force 
is perceived by both proprioceptive and somatosensory receptors, while external force is perceived 
only by somatosensory receptors.  Crucially, the precision of the sensory prediction error    is 
influenced by the level of internal force, again modulated by a squashing function, and controlled by 
a parameter 𝛾 which governs the level of attenuation of precision. The pink circles highlight this 
state dependent precision, which effectively controls the influence of sensory prediction errors 
during active inference. 
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The key thing about this model is that somatosensory sensations are caused ambiguously, 
by either internally or externally generated forces. The only way that the underlying cause 
of the sensations can be resolved is by reference to proprioceptive input – which, here, we 
use to refer to as the subset or pattern of inputs generated only internally. This is a very 
simple model, where the somatosensory input is being used metaphorically to stand in for 
the sensory consequences of events that could either be caused by self or others, while 
proprioceptive input represents those sensory signals that can only be caused by self-
made acts. Active inference now compels the subject to infer the causes of its sensations. 
 
The generative model used for this inference is shown on the right. In this model, 
internally and externally generated forces ( , )
i e
x x  are modelled symmetrically, where 
changes in both are attributed to internal and external hidden causes ( , )i ev v , with the 
same restorative dynamics associated with action above. The hidden causes trigger the 
dynamics associated with the hidden states, much like a push which sets a swing in 
motion. This means that proprioceptive and somatosensory inputs are explained in terms 
of hidden causes, where proprioceptive sensations are caused by internally generated 
forces and somatosensory consequences report a mixture of internal and external forces. 
Crucially, the precision of the sensory prediction errors depends upon the magnitude of 
the internally generated force (and its hidden cause). This dependency is controlled by a 
parameter   that mediates the attenuation of sensory precision: as internally generated 
forces rise, sensory precision falls, thereby attenuating the amplitude of (precision 
weighted) sensory prediction errors. These context or state-dependent changes in 
precision enable the agent to attend to sensory input, or not – depending upon the relative 
precision of prediction errors at the sensory and higher levels. This context sensitive 
sensory precision is shown in Figure 6.1 as  . 
 
Notice that, from the point of view of the subject, there is no real difference between 
hidden causes of internal and external forces – other than that the internal forces affect 
both proprioceptive and somatosensory inputs, while external forces only produce 
somatosensory sensations. Although action can fulfil proprioceptive predictions, the 
subject does not need to know this. In other words, it is not aware of its reflexes; it simply 
attributes particular sensations to particular hidden causes, which is labelled as self-
generated.  
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3.2 Precision and the psychophysics of sensory attenuation 
 
In the simulations which follow, I try to reconcile the literature on stimulus detection and 
ratings of intensity by associating the reported intensity of a stimulus with its 90% lower 
posterior confidence bound. This means that the detectability and subjective intensity are 
functions of both the conditional expectation and confidence or precision – such that 
stimulus intensity is reported to be greater when the confidence that it exceeds some 
threshold is larger. This is an important assumption because it implicates the subject’s 
confidence in the estimation of intensity and therefore speaks to a role for precision in 
subjective reports of sensory attenuation. Invoking a (signal detection or decision 
theoretic) notion of a threshold rests on the fact that sensory attenuation is only observed 
for stimulus attributes that can be above a threshold; for example, loudness, pressure, 
unpleasantness and so on. Stimulus attributes that do not have an intensity threshold 
could not be treated in this fashion and – I would suggest – could not show sensory 
attenuation. For example, although one can attenuate the loudness of an auditory tone, 
one cannot attenuate its frequency (which can only change by going up or down). Put 
simply, sensory attenuation can only be expressed in sensory modalities that have the 
attribute of intensity. 
 
The relationship between physical stimulus intensity and perceived stimulus intensity is 
not linear.  In many domains, the relationship is approximated by a power law: that is, 
perceived intensity is proportional to physical intensity raised to the power of an 
exponent (Stevens, 1967).  In the case of somatosensory pressure, this exponent is less 
than one (Xiong et al., 2012), meaning that – at higher levels of pressure – the same 
increase in physical pressure produces a smaller increase in perceived pressure.  A clue as 
to why this might be is found in Weber’s law (Weber, 1846), which states that the just-
noticeable difference between figure luminance and background luminance increases as 
background luminance increases.  Higher background light levels increase the amplitude 
of random fluctuations in the stimulus, making discrimination more difficult.  It could be 
that this ‘diminishing returns’ effect seen in pressure perception results from higher levels 
of noise attenuating the perception of the stimulus. 
 
As noted above, attentional processing can also be cast in terms of state-dependent 
precision.  In chapter 3 (Feldman & Friston, 2010), I suggest that attention is the process 
of optimising precision in neural hierarchies, such that attended locations or objects are 
afforded high precision.  This process is exactly opposite to the process of sensory 
attenuation described above: during sensory attenuation, attention is withdrawn from the  
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Figure 6.2: Functional anatomy. Speculative mapping of Equation (3) onto neuroanatomy.  
Somatosensory and proprioceptive prediction errors are generated by the thalamus, while 
conditional expectations and prediction errors about hidden states (circles) (the forces) are placed 
in sensorimotor cortex.  The expectations and prediction errors about the hidden causes of forces 
(triangles) have been placed in the prefrontal cortex. In active inference, proprioceptive predictions 
descend to the spinal-cord and elicit output from alpha motor neurons (playing the role of 
proprioceptive prediction error units) via a classical reflex arc. Red connections originate from 
prediction error units (  cells) and can be regarded as intrinsic connections or ascending 
(forward) extrinsic connections from superficial principal cells. Conversely, the black connections 
represent intrinsic connections and descending (backward) efferents from (deep) principal cells 
encoding conditional expectations (   cells). The cyan connections denote descending 
neuromodulatory effects that mediate sensory attenuation. The crucial point to take from this 
schematic is that conditional expectations of sensory states (encoded in the pyramidal cell 
x
 ) can 
either be fulfilled by descending proprioceptive predictions (that recruit classical reflex arcs), or 
they can be corrected by ascending sensory prediction errors. In order for descending motor 
efferents to prevail, the precision of the sensory prediction errors must be attenuated. 
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consequences of movement so that movement can occur.  Directing attention to a stimulus 
can increase its perceived intensity: in the visual domain, this has been demonstrated in 
the cases of contrast (Liu et al., 2012; Carrasco et al., 2002; Treue et al., 2004), colour 
saturation (Fuller et al., 2006), speed (Turatto et al., 2006), flicker rate (Montagna & 
Carrasco, 2006) and spatial frequency (Gobell & Carrasco, 2005; Abrams et al., 2010).  
Given that judgements of stimulus intensity are necessarily subjective, the corollary – that 
withdrawing attention should decrease intensity – is entirely sensible. There is little 
empirical work directly addressing the effect of stimulus uncertainty (sensory precision) 
on perceived intensity.  However, it has been demonstrated that in the auditory domain, 
loudness is attenuated by the addition of a noise mask (Richards, 1968; Lochner and 
Burger, 1961; Stevens, 1966, 1967).   
 
3.3 Functional anatomy 
 
If this model is placed in the predictive coding scheme described in the introduction, one 
obtains a simple architecture that is shown schematically in Figure 6.2. The precise 
anatomy illustrated in the figure should not be taken too seriously but illustrates how a 
generative model can be transcribed into a plausible neuronal architecture for predictive 
coding and active inference. In this particular example, sensory prediction errors are 
assigned to the thalamus, while corresponding expectations and prediction errors about 
hidden states (forces) are associated with the sensorimotor cortex. The expectations and 
prediction errors about the hidden causes of forces have been placed – somewhat 
agnostically – in the prefrontal cortex. Notice how proprioceptive predictions descend to 
the spinal cord to elicit output from alpha motor neurons (playing the role of 
proprioceptive prediction error units) to elicit movements through a classical reflex arc. 
Red connections originate from prediction error units and can be regarded as intrinsic 
connections or ascending (forward) extrinsic connections from superficial principal cells. 
Conversely, the black connections represent intrinsic connections and descending 
(backward) efferents from (deep) principal cells mediating conditional predictions. The 
cyan connections denote descending neuromodulatory effects that mediate attenuation of 
sensory precision. The ensuing hierarchy conforms to the functional form of the predictive 
coding scheme in Equation 0.3. In this architecture, predictions based on expected states 
of the world ?̃?𝑣, can either be fulfilled by reflex arcs or they can be corrected by ascending 
sensory prediction errors. Which of these alternatives occur depends on the relative 
precisions along each pathway – that are set by the descending modulatory connection to 
sensory prediction errors. In the following sections I use this model to demonstrate some 
key points: 
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Figure 6.3: Sensory attenuation and action. Simulation results illustrating the permissive effect of 
sensory attenuation in movement.  The model was supplied with a prior belief about the hidden 
cause of internally generated movement, while sensory attention was high (𝛾 = 6). This prior 
expectation was a simple Gaussian function of time (blue line in the lower left panel) and 
engenders beliefs about forces (upper right panel), which produce proprioceptive predictions 
(upper left panel). Action is enslaved to fulfil these predictions (lower right panel). Note the 
confidence interval around the external cause temporarily inflates during action (lower left panel), 
reflecting the attenuation of sensory precision.   
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3.4 The permissive role of sensory attenuation in action 
 
In the first simulations, I illustrate the necessary role of state-dependent changes in 
sensory precision (sensory attention) in permitting self-generated behaviour. To produce 
internally generated movements, I supplied the subject with prior beliefs that the internal 
hidden cause increased transiently to a value of one, with high sensory attenuation 6  . 
Figure 6.3 shows the results of this simulation. The lower left panel shows the internal 
hidden cause (blue line) with relatively tight 90% confidence intervals (grey areas), 
reflecting the relatively high log-precision on this hidden cause of six. Log-precisions are a 
convenient way of quantifying confidence or certainty about prediction errors and 
correspond to the logarithm of the associated precision or confidence. Prior beliefs about 
this hidden cause excite posterior beliefs about internally generated forces, while at the 
same time attenuating the precision of sensory prediction errors. This is reflected by the 
rise in the conditional expectation of the internal force (blue line in the upper right panel) 
and the transient increase in the confidence interval about this expectation, due to the 
attenuation of sensory precision. The resulting proprioceptive predictions are fulfilled by 
action, and they are sensed very accurately (shown in the upper left panel). Note that 
proprioceptive prediction (blue line) corresponds to somatosensory prediction (green 
line) and that both are close to the real values (broken black line). This simulation shows 
normal self-generated movement under permissive sensory attenuation. 
 
Compare these results with the equivalent simulation when sensory attenuation was 
reduced from six to two (Figure 6.4). Here, the sensory attenuation leaves the sensory 
precision higher than the precision of the prior beliefs about internal hidden causes. This 
means that bottom-up sensory prediction errors predominate over top-down projections 
and the expected internal hidden force is profoundly suppressed – and inferred with a 
high degree of confidence. Because there are no predictions about proprioceptive changes, 
there is a consequent hypokinesia and failure of movement.  
 
These simulations demonstrate the inherent trade-off between sensation and action that 
is necessary in free-energy minimisation models of the brain. There are two possible ways 
of minimising free-energy within these schemes – to change internal models of the world 
to represent current sensory input, or to predict future sensory input which will be 
achieved by moving. The simulations here demonstrate how these strategies are mediated 
by allocation of precision. High precision on prediction error prioritises sensation and the 
updating of internal models of the world, at the expense of movement, while high 
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precision on predictions of movement prioritises the fulfilling of those predictions through 
action, at the expense of sensation. 
 
There is an interesting link between this simulation and a body of clinical, behavioural and 
experimental evidence regarding the impairment of movement by self-focussed attention; 
i.e., attending to the actual process of moving. Attention towards movement has been 
recognised as a major factor in the phenomenon of “choking” under pressure in 
professional sportspeople; where they are sometimes rendered unable to produce over-
learned movements in a performance situation (Beilock & Carr, 2001). Less extreme 
versions of this phenomenon are part of normal experience: most of us can probably recall 
an incident when our movement has been impaired when we focus on it too much. This 
phenomenon has been described as “re-investment” in movement, and has been shown to  
impair performance and motor learning in a number of behavioural simulations (Maxwell 
et al., 2006; Chell et al., 2003; Zhu et al., 2011; Malhotra et al., 2012). Experimentally, 
asking healthy subjects to attend the production of an over-learned sequence of key 
presses impairs performance and elicits activation in prefrontal and anterior cingulate 
cortex, which is not activated during natural (unattended) sequence production (Jueptner 
et al., 1997). The suggestion, in light of this model, is that attending to the sensory 
consequences of movement increases the precision of sensory evidence, so that 
descending predictions of the intended proprioceptive state are foreshadowed by precise 
sensory prediction error – and movement is precluded. In other words, movement is 
imperceptible, for both the subject and any observer. 
 
Figure 6.5 (solid line) shows the results of simulations repeated over a range of sensory 
attenuations, where   was decreased from 6 to -4 and the internally generated force was 
recorded. As the prior precision increases in relation to sensory precision, prior beliefs are 
gradually able to incite more confident movement, with movement being around half its 
maximum amplitude when prior and sensory precision are in balance (𝛾 = 2, vertical 
line). In short, this simple demonstration shows that sensory attenuation is necessary if 
prior beliefs are to supervene over sensory evidence, during self-generated behaviour. 
However, there is a price to be paid for the sensory attenuation, which is considered next: 
 
3.5 Sensory attenuation and perception 
 
Clearly, reducing the precision of sensory prediction errors reduces the posterior 
confidence in beliefs about their causes. Figure 6.3 shows an inflation of the posterior 
uncertainty (90% grey confidence intervals) due to sensory attenuation. The consequence  
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Figure 6.4: A simulation of akinesia. This figure uses the same format as previous figure but reports 
the results of simulations when sensory attenuation is much lower (𝛾 = 2).  In this case, bottom-up 
prediction errors retain a higher precision than descending predictions during movement. 
Conditional expectations that are updated by ascending prediction errors (upper right panel) 
overwhelm prediction errors based upon top-down predictions, and consequently infer that there 
is no change in the state of the world. This means that proprioceptive prediction errors are not 
produced (upper left panel) and action is profoundly suppressed (lower right panel).   
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Figure 6.5: Movement and precision. True internally generated force xi and perceived internally 
generated force (lower 90% confidence interval of  𝑥𝑖) simulated over a range of sensory 
attenuations, where {6, 4}   . Confident movement gradually emerges as the prior precision 
increases in relation to sensory precision, with movement being around half its maximum 
amplitude when prior and sensory precisions are balanced (𝛾 = 2, vertical line). Force on the y axis 
is measured in arbitrary units. 
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Figure 6.6: Simulation of the Force Match task.  In the first part of this simulation (left hand panels), 
an internal force is generated (from a prior belief about the hidden cause  𝑣𝑖), followed by the 
presentation of an external force.  The estimates of the hidden states (upper right panel) are 
similar, but the confidence interval around the force for the internally generated state is much 
broader.  If perceptual inference is associated with the lower 90% confidence bound of the estimate 
of the hidden state, it will be lower when the force is self-generated (double-headed arrow, upper 
right panel). This is demonstrated in the right-hand panels. This is a simulation the force match 
paradigm where the external force is matched to the lower bound of the 90% confidence interval of 
the internal force.  This means that internally generated force is now greater than the externally 
applied force (double-headed arrow, upper left panel).   
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of this transient uncertainty – due to a temporary suspension of attention to sensory input 
– provides a simple explanation for sensory attenuation in terms of psychophysical 
detection. This can be demonstrated fairly easily by presenting the forces generated by the 
subject exogenously and comparing the posterior beliefs about internal and external 
hidden states (forces). The left panels of figure 6.6 show the results of this simulation, in 
which there has been a veridical inference about the succession of internal and external 
hidden causes (blue and green lines in the lower left panels), with a reasonable degree of 
confidence. Furthermore, the predictions about internally and externally generated 
sensations are accurate and subtended by veridical conditional expectations. However, the 
confidence interval around the estimate of the internal hidden state is much greater than 
for the external hidden state. This means that if we asked the subject to reports 
somatosensory sensations at 90% confidence, the externally generated sensations would 
be detected much more readily than the internally generated sensations. This is the 
essence of sensory attenuation in psychophysical studies and – in this simulation – rests 
upon the inflation of the confidence interval associated with internally generated 
consequences. In other words, one would expect a reduction in d-prime for events that 
were self generated, relative to exactly the same events that were generated externally – 
as demonstrated experimentally (Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010).  As this reduction in 
precision is applied to the entire sensory channel for the duration of the movement, a 
reduction in d-prime will also been seen for external stimuli produced during voluntary 
movement.  This result has also been demonstrated experimentally (Juravle and Spence, 
2011; Van Hulle et al., 2012).  This attenuation is shown by the double headed arrow in 
Figure 6.6. Exactly the same interpretation can be applied to the force matching paradigm: 
 
3.6 Sensory attenuation and the force matching illusion 
 
The right-hand panels of figure 6.6 show exactly the same results as in the left hand 
panels; however here, I have yoked the exogenous force to the self generated force 
perceived at 90% confidence, (as opposed to the true force exerted by the subject). In 
other words, the external force corresponds to the force that would be reported by the 
subject to match the perceived force at 90% confidence. Crucially, the internally generated 
force is now much greater than the matched external force. This is the key finding in the 
force matching illusion and is entirely consistent with the sensory attenuation literature 
mentioned above. In this setting, the loss of confidence in posterior estimates of hidden 
states that are self generated translates into an illusory decrease in the intensity of percept 
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and hence an increase in the force applied, relative to the equivalent force in the absence 
of sensory attenuation. 
 
To simulate the force-match paradigm, these simulations were repeated under different 
levels of self-generated forces by modulating the prior beliefs about the internal hidden 
cause (from a half to twice the normal amplitude). The results are shown in Figure 6.7 
(blue line) by plotting the self-generated force against the yoked or matched external force 
with a corresponding 90% confidence interval. These results are remarkably similar to 
those obtained empirically (Shergill et al., 2003, 2005) and reveal sensory attenuation 
through an illusory increase in the self generated force, relative to matched forces over a 
wide range of forces. In the final simulations, I ask what would happen if subjects 
compensated for a failure in sensory attenuation by increasing the precision of their prior 
beliefs. 
 
3.7 False inference and precision 
 
To simulate pathology of sensory attenuation, sensory attenuation was reduced and – to 
compensate –precision of prediction errors at higher levels in the hierarchy was increased 
(by reducing sensory attenuation and increasing the log-precision of prediction errors on 
hidden states and causes by four log units). In the absence of sensory attenuation 
movement can only be elicited when there is a compensatory increase in the precision of 
proprioceptive predictions. In other words, beliefs about an intended movement have to 
be held with undue conviction (precision) to render them immune from contradictory 
sensory evidence that has not been attenuated.  
 
These changes to precision mean that sensory attenuation is abolished, as indicated by the 
red line in Figure 6.7 (left panel). This reports the results of repeating the above force 
matching simulations over a range of internally generated forces but with a compensated 
loss in sensory attenuation. The resulting behaviour is very reminiscent of empirical 
results found in schizophrenia (right panel – Shergill et al 2003; 2005). One might ask why 
optimal subjects do not simply adopt this strategy and use very precise prior beliefs about 
hidden causes? 
 
The answer is evident in Figure 6.8, which shows the results of a simulation with low 
sensory attenuation and augmented precisions at non-sensory levels of the generative 
model. Here, there is an almost perfect and precise inference about internally and 
externally generated sensations. However, there is a failure of inference about their 
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hidden causes. This can be seen on the lower left, where the subject has falsely inferred an 
antagonistic external hidden cause that mirrors the internal hidden causes: i.e., it believes 
that when it presses its finger on its hand, something also pushes its hand against its 
finger. Note that this false inference does not occur during normal sensory attenuation 
(see previous figures), where the true external hidden cause always lies within the 90% 
confidence intervals. The reason for this false inference or delusion is relatively simple: 
action is driven by proprioceptive prediction errors that always report less force than that 
predicted (if they did not, the reflex would not be engaged). However, when sensory 
precision increases, somatosensory prediction errors become very precise and need to be 
explained – and can only be explained by falsely inferring an opposing exogenous force. In 
more general terms, to reconcile a mismatch between the predicted consequences of 
action and the state of the world that precedes action, external forces are falsely invoked. 
This only occurs when both the predictions and their consequences are deemed to be very 
precise. This false inference could be interpreted as a delusion in the same sense that the 
sensory attenuation is an illusion. Having said this, it should be noted that – from the point 
of view of the subject – its inferences are Bayes-optimal. It is only our attribution of the 
inference as false that gives it an illusory or delusionary aspect. In the context of these 
simulations, the only difference between an illusion and a delusion is the level of the 
supposed failure of inference. Here, false inference at the perceptual level of hidden states 
is associated with illusions and false inference at the conceptual level of hidden causes 
with delusions. 
 
3.8 Precision and psychopathology 
 
Associating false inference at a conceptual level with delusions has some face validity in 
relation to empirical studies of the force matching illusion. This illusion is attenuated in 
normal subjects that score highly on ratings of delusional beliefs. Furthermore, subjects 
with schizophrenia – who are prone to positive symptoms like delusions – are less 
susceptible to the force matching illusion. In other words, there may be a trade-off 
between illusions at a perceptual level and delusions at a conceptual level that is mediated 
by a (failure of) sensory attenuation. A mechanistic contribution of the treatment in this 
chapter is to link sensory attenuation with putative neurobiological mechanisms that 
involve neuromodulatory changes in the gain of principal cells reporting prediction error. 
One important candidate for this modulation is the dopaminergic system, a classical 
ascending neuromodulatory transmitter system (Howes & Kapur, 2009).  
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Figure 6.7: Sensory attenuation in schizophrenia. Left panel: results of the force-match simulation 
repeated under different levels of self-generated force.  For normal levels of sensory attenuation 
(blue circles), internally produced force is higher than externally generated force at all levels of 
force, consistent with published data. Force matching typical of schizophrenia (red circles) was 
simulated by reducing sensory attenuation and increasing the precision of prediction errors at 
higher levels of the hierarchy. This resulted in a more veridical perception of internally generated 
force (small circles). Right panel: empirical results using the same format adapted (with 
permission) from (Shergill et al., 2003, 2005).  
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Loosely speaking, these simulation results are entirely consistent with two known 
pathologies in schizophrenia: the loss of sensory attenuation and a hyper-dopaminergic 
drive to the striatum in acute psychosis. I demonstrated earlier that an uncompensated 
loss of sensory attenuation results in an inability to move (Figure 6.4). This state is very 
reminiscent of the psychomotor poverty (catatonic) symptoms of schizophrenia (and 
other psychotic disorders) such as immobility, mutism, catalepsy and waxy flexibility. 
With waxy flexibility, patients may maintain a fixed posture for a long time, even though 
their limbs can be moved easily by an observer. Increased dopaminergic transmission in 
the striatum could increase the gain – i.e. precision – of prior beliefs about the causes of 
internally generated behaviour and may reflect a compensation for the loss of sensory 
attenuation (as in ther simulations above). A hyper-dopaminergic drive in schizophrenia 
could then lead to false inferences about external forces attributed to exogenous causes 
(such as in delusions of somatic passivity) or others in the acute psychotic state. Although 
it is overstretching the argument, it is tempting to equate the antagonistic aspect of falsely 
inferred hidden causes to the paranoid content of delusions that are typically seen in 
schizophrenia. 
 
These simulations have several important similarities with some recent simulations of 
schizophrenic motor symptoms (Yamashita & Tani, 2012). In this work, the authors used a 
hierarchical predictive coding network to control a humanoid robot, and observed the 
effects of network lesions on both neural processing and behaviour. They showed that 
increasing the noise (i.e. decreasing the precision) in connections from higher to lower 
hierarchical areas could lead to catatonic motor symptoms, such as disorganised, 
stereotyped or loss of movements. Exactly the same effects are seen in similar models 
when reducing the precision of empirical priors in simulations of motor behaviour (Figure 
13 in Friston et al., 2010a). 
 
Finally, one might also speculate that the hypo-dopaminergic states seen in Parkinson's 
disease would produce similar symptoms, for slightly different reasons; here, sensory 
attenuation might be intact, but hypokinesia may reflect prior beliefs about self-generated 
movement that are held with insufficient precision and are overwhelmed by sensory 
evidence that the patient is not moving. 
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Figure 6.8: Pathology of sensory attenuation.  To simulate the force-matching results seen in 
schizophrenia, sensory attenuation was reduced and precision at non-sensory levels of the 
hierarchy increased to allow movement.  This results in a precise and accurate perception of 
internally and externally generated sensations (upper left panel).  However, the causes of sensory 
data are not accurately inferred: an illusory cause (circled response in the lower left panel) is 
perceived during internally generated movement that is antagonistic to the movement.  This is 
because the proprioceptive prediction errors driving action are rendered overly precise, meaning 
higher levels of the hierarchy must be harnessed to explain them, resulting in a ‘delusion’.   
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4. Discussion 
 
The ideas presented in this chapter suggest that attribution of agency – in an ambiguous 
situation – can be resolved by attenuating the precision of sensory evidence during 
movement: in other words, attending away from the sensations caused by self-made acts. 
When implemented in the context of active inference, this context–dependent attenuation 
provides a Bayes-optimal explanation for sensory attenuation in terms of perceptual 
psychophysics. Furthermore, it explains the force-matching illusion and reproduces 
quantitative results. Finally, if attenuation is withdrawn, the force-matching illusion 
disappears and false (delusional) inferences about agency emerge. This is important, given 
the negative correlation between sensory attenuation and predisposition to delusional 
beliefs in normal subjects and the resistance to the force matching illusion in 
schizophrenia. Active inference therefore links the neuromodulatory optimisation of 
precision to sensory attenuation and illusory phenomena during the attribution of agency 
in normal subjects. It also provides a functional account of deficits in syndromes 
characterised by false inference and impaired movement that are associated with 
abnormal neuromodulation. 
 
This interplay between precision, attention, hierarchical inference and neuromodulation 
may also have important implications for functional movement disorders. It has 
previously been suggested that functional motor symptoms can be thought of as a 
pathological attention to predictions about movement that is mediated by abnormally high 
levels of precision in the motor hierarchy (Edwards at al., 2012). The results of these 
simulations make the strong prediction that patients with functional movement disorders 
should resemble people with schizophrenia and show no force matching illusion, which 
does seem to be the case (Parees et al., in preparation). 
 
The work described here was published as: 
Brown H, Adams RA, Parees I, Edwards M, Friston K. (2013). Active inference, sensory 
attenuation and illusions. Cogn. Process. 14:411-27. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis demonstrates how the free-energy principle can be used to link levels of 
explanation in the brain. Marr (1982) suggested that complex systems in the brain should 
be understood on three levels of analysis – computational, algorithmic and physical 
implementation. The free energy principle is almost unique in offering linked explanations 
of complex behaviour at each of these levels. At the computational level, the free energy 
principle suggests that organisms attempt to reduce their entropy, or long-term average of 
surprise, by minimising their free energy. This suggests that hierarchical Bayesian 
modelling and predictive coding would be efficient strategies to use at the algorithmic 
level. In chapters 1, 3, 5 and 6 I demonstrate how models which minimise free energy 
using hierarchical Bayesian models and predictive coding, used either formally or 
informally, can model human behaviour, explaining how counterintuitive perceptual 
phenomena can be adaptive. Implementation of predictive coding in the cortex, 
constrained by cortical anatomy, suggests certain computational roles for forward and 
backwards connections and their cells of origin (Bastos, 2012). A test of these theories is 
provided in chapters 2 and 4. 
Chapter 1 revisits the proposal that visual illusions are Bayes-optimal from the 
perspective of the free-energy principle. Using the Cornsweet illusion, I illustrate that this 
percept represents the most likely explanation for ambiguous sensory input, based on 
simple and plausible prior expectations about the spatial deployment of illuminance and 
reflectance. I also show that the contrast-dependence of the Cornsweet and Mach bands 
illusions emerges naturally within this simulation when precision, or signal-to-noise ratio, 
is used as a proxy for contrast. These simulations show how Bayesian modelling can be 
used to explain visual illusions based on simple and universal principles rather than 
complex and specific heuristics. 
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Chapter 2 tests a prediction of the model described in chapter 1 – that increasing contrast 
is encoded algorithmically as increasing precision  on sensory input and prediction error. 
On the physical implementation level, this suggests that increasing contrast should 
increase the gain in superficial pyramidal cells, and this hypothesis was confirmed by 
dynamic causal modelling of EEG data. This validates the free-energy principle and 
predictive coding models of cortical function, as well as showing how principled 
computational modelling and dynamic causal modelling might be used to assay physical 
parameters in the brain such as cortical gain. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates how a dynamic, nonlinear implementation of predictive coding 
can be used to give a principled explanation of directed attention phenomena. It also 
bridges the gap between behavioural and electrophysiological data by demonstrating how 
predictive coding schemes can give rise to biased completion-like behaviour. All the 
quantities required for making an inference have to be optimised – that is, both the 
conditional expectations and the precision with which the brain holds those expectations 
must be derived.  These precisions encode the uncertainty or the amplitude of random 
fluctuations generating sensory information. By considering how states of the world 
influence uncertainty, it is clear that conditional expectations about states modulate their 
own precision. This leads naturally to competition and other nonlinear phenomena during 
perception. 
The MEG study in chapter 4 demonstrates that the cortical responses seen during cued 
attention tasks can be modelled using just backwards modulation of intrinsic gain, giving 
face validity to the model. These computational parameters in the model correspond to 
the local intrinsic or recurrent inhibitory mechanisms that mediate cortical gain control. 
The results presented in this chapter provide an initial link between the computational 
imperatives of predictive coding, and plausible neuronal mechanisms at the level of 
synapses and cortical columns. 
Chapter 5 extends these models to the motor system and describes how attention 
processes might operate in a motor cuing paradigm, by recasting motor preparation as 
attention directed towards proprioceptive sensations. This perspective suggests that 
attention should only optimise the precision of exteroceptive (e.g. visual) perceptual 
signals, but should also bias interoceptive inference during movement. The results 
presented in this chapter suggest that the bias for the selected action is mediated at a low 
level in the motor hierarchy, in an intrinsic (muscle-based) frame of reference.  
 
171 
 
Chapter 6 extends the formulation of attention as precision, and the reimagining of 
illusions under Bayes-optimal perception, to provide an account of sensory attenuation. 
The simulations also explore how movement, sensory attenuation and the attribution of 
agency might be dynamically linked concepts rather than having a clear order in which 
they are inferred by the brain. As well as providing a simulation of the force-match 
illusion, this model highlights the tension between reducing surprise by moving to alter 
the environment (action) or by changing models of the world to accommodate present 
sensations (perception). We extend these ideas to the clinical domain to discuss 
Parkinson’s disease and schizophrenia as abnormalities of precision modulation. 
 
In conclusion, the work presented in this thesis demonstrates that the free-energy 
principle is a powerful and flexible approach to explain brain function in a principled, 
evolutionarily plausible way. I demonstrate that reducing free energy by inferring the 
values of causes and parameters in hierarchical dynamic models using predictive coding is 
a plausible algorithmic task for the brain to be performing. I also show how these 
computations might be implemented in the brain, and how this can be tested empirically.  
I show how computational deficits in precision modulation might be an appropriate level 
of explanation for diseases such as schizophrenia. My future work will focus on testing the 
hypotheses about cortical function that follow from predictive coding schemes, specifically 
with respect to frequency responses in magnetoencephalography recordings. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Recognition from basic principles 
 
The objective, given a model (brain), m, is to minimise the average uncertainty (entropy) 
about some generalised sensory states,  s s s s S       it experiences (  means 
concatenation). Generalised states comprise the state itself, its velocity, acceleration, jerk, 
etc. This average uncertainty is 
 
( | ) ( | ) ln ( | )H S m p s m p s m ds         A.1 
 
Under ergodic assumptions, this is proportional to the long-term average of surprise, also 
known as negative log-evidence ln ( ( ) | )p s t m  
 
0
( | ) ln ( ( ) | )
T
H S m dt p s t m         A.2 
 
Minimising sensory entropy therefore corresponds to maximising the accumulated log-
evidence for a model of the world. Although sensory entropy cannot be minimised 
directly, we can create an upper bound ( , ) ( )S s q H S . This bound is induced with a 
recognition density ( ) : ( )q t q   on the causes (i.e., environmental states and parameters) 
of sensory signals. We will see later that these causes comprise time-varying states 
( )u t   and slowly varying parameters ( )t  . The recognition density is sometimes 
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called a proposal density and becomes the conditional density over causes, when it 
minimises the bound. The bound itself is the path-integral of free-energy ( )F t , which is 
created simply by adding a non-negative function of the recognition density to surprise: 
 
( )
( ) ln ( ( ) | )
ln ( ) ln ( | , )
S F
F
KL
KL q
dt t
t p s t m D
D q p s m 

  
 

       A.3 
 
This function is a Kullback-Leibler divergence KLD  and is greater than zero, with equality 
when ( ) ( | , )q p s m   is the true conditional density.  This means that minimising free-
energy, by changing ( )q  , makes the recognition density an approximate conditional 
density on sensory causes. This is Bayes-optimal recognition. The free-energy can be 
evaluated easily because it is a function of the recognition density and a generative model 
( )L t  entailed by m  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ln ( ( ), | )
( ) ln ( )
F L H
L
H
q
q
t t t
t p s t m
t q t

 
 
 
        A.4 
 
The free-energy has been expressed here in terms of ( )H t , the negentropy of ( )q t  and an 
energy ( )L t  expected under ( )q t . The energy ( )L t  reports the surprise about sensations 
and their causes under a generative model. If we assume that recognition density 
( ) ( , )N Cq    is Gaussian (known as the Laplace assumption), we can express free-
energy in terms of the mean and covariance of the recognition density 
 
1 1
2 2 2
( ) ( ) ln | | ln 2F L CL C ntr e           A.5 
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Where dim( )n  and subscripts denote derivatives. We can now minimise free-energy 
with respect to the conditional precision (inverse covariance). The free-energy is 
minimised when 1 0 0
C C
P C L F S 

       and allows us to eliminate C  from 
Equation A.5 
 
1
2 2
( ) ln | | ln 2F L L n           A.6 
 
Crucially, this means the free-energy is only a function of the conditional mean or 
expectation. The expectations that minimise free-energy are the solutions to the following 
differential equations. For the generalised states ( )u t   
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
D F
F
F
F
u u
u
u u
u
u u
u
u u
u
 
 
 
 


 

 
  
  
         A.7 
 
Where D  is a derivative matrix operator with identity matrices above the leading 
diagonal, such that Du u u    . Here and throughout, we assume all gradients are 
evaluated at the mean; here ( )uu  . The stationary solution of Equation A.7 minimises 
free-energy and its path integral: ( ) ( ) 0 0 0D F Su u
u u
        . This ensures that 
when free-energy is minimised the mean of the motion is the motion of the mean; that is 
( ) ( )
0F D
u u
u
    .  
 
For slowly varying parameters ( )t   this motion disappears and we can use the 
following scheme  
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
F
 
 

 
 

   
         A.8 
 
Here, the solution ( ) 0   minimises free-energy, under constraint that the motion of the 
expected parameters is small: ( ) ( ) 0 0 0F S           . The last equality 
0S   just means that variations in the parameters do change the path integral of free-
energy (cf, keeping to the floor of a valley to minimise the average height of ones path). 
 
Equations A.7 and A.8 prescribe recognition dynamics for the expected states and 
parameters of the world respectively.  The dynamics for states can be thought of as a 
gradient descent in a frame of reference that moves with the expected motion of the world 
(cf, surfing a wave). Conversely, the dynamics for the parameters can be thought of as a 
gradient descent that resists transient fluctuations with a damping term ( ( ) ), which 
instantiates our prior belief that the fluctuations in the parameters are small. We use 
N  , where N  is the number of sensory samples. 
 
In summary, we have derived recognition dynamics for expected states (in generalised 
coordinates of motion) and parameters, which cause sensory samples. The solutions to 
these equations minimise free-energy and therefore minimise a bound on surprise or 
(negative) log-evidence. Optimization of the expected states and parameters corresponds 
to perceptual inference and learning respectively. The precise form of the recognition 
depends on the energy ( ) ln ( ( ), | )L t p s t m   associated with a particular generative 
model. In what follows, we examine dynamic models of the world. 
 
Appendix 2: Hierarchical Dynamic Models 
 
We next introduce a very general model based on the hierarchal dynamic model discussed 
in Friston (2008). We will assume that any sensory data can be modelled with a special 
case of this model 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( , , ) : ~ (0, ( , , ))
( , , ) : ~ (0, ( , , ))
N
N
v v v v
x x x x
s f x v z z x v
x f x v z z x v
 
 
  
  
     A.9 
 
The nonlinear functions ( ) : ,uf u v x  represent a sensory mapping and equations of 
motion respectively and are parameterised by   .  The variables v u  are referred to 
as hidden causes, while hidden states x u  meditate the influence of the causes on 
sensory data and endow the system with memory.  We assume the random fluctuations 
( )u
z  are analytic, such that the covariance of ( )uz  is well defined. Unlike our previous 
treatments (Friston 2008), this model allows for state-dependent changes in the 
amplitude of random fluctuations. It is this generalisation that furnishes a model of 
attention and introduces the key distinction between the effect of states on first and 
second-order sensory dynamics. These effects are meditated by the vector and matrix 
functions ( ) ( )u dim uf   and ( ) ( ) ( )u dim u dim u   respectively, which are parameterised by 
first and second-order parameters { , }   . 
 
Under local linearity assumptions, the generalised motion of the sensory response and 
hidden states can be expressed compactly as 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
D
v v
x x
s f z
x f z
 
 
         A.10 
 
Where the generalised predictions are 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
u u
u u u
x vu
u u u
x v
f f
f f x f v
f
f f x f v
 
 
    
  
    
 
 
       A.11 
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Equation A.10 means that Gaussian assumptions about the random fluctuations specify a 
generative model in terms of a likelihood and empirical priors on the motion of hidden 
states 
 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
| , , , ( , )
| , , , ( , )
N
N
v v
x x
p s x v m f
p Dx x v m f


 
 
       A.12 
 
These probability densities are encoded by their covariances ( )u  or precisions 
( ) ( )
: ( , , )
u u
x v     with precision parameters    that control the amplitude and 
smoothness of the random fluctuations. Generally, the covariances factorise; 
( ) ( ) ( )u u u
V    into a covariance proper and a matrix of correlations ( )uV  among 
generalised fluctuations that encodes their smoothness.  
 
Given this generative model we can now write down the energy as a function of the 
conditional means, which has a simple quadratic form (ignoring constants) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1
2 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ln | |
ln | |
ln | |
L L L L
L
L
L
D
v x
v v T v v v
x x T x x x
T
v v
x x x
s f
f

    
  
 
 
 

 
  
  
   
   
   
 
 
 
       A.13 
 
Here, the auxiliary variables ( ) : , ,j j v x   are prediction errors for sensory data, the 
motion of hidden states and parameters respectively. The predictions for the states are 
( )
( ) : ,
u
f u v x   and the predictions for the parameters are the prior expectations 
( ) . 
Equation A.13 assumes flat priors on the states and that priors ( ) ( )( | ) ( , )Np m      
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on the parameters are Gaussian. We next consider hierarchical forms of this model. These 
are just special cases of Equation A.9, in which we make certain conditional 
independencies explicit. Although they may look more complicated, they are simpler than 
the general form above. They are useful because they provide an empirical Bayesian 
perspective on inference and learning that may be exploited by the brain. Hierarchical 
dynamic models have the following form 
 
( ) (1) (1) (1, )
(1) ( ) (1) (1) (1, )
( 1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
( 1) ( ) ( , )
( , , )
( , , )
( , , )
( , , )
v v
x x
i v i i i v
i x i i i x
h v h v
s f x v z
x f x v z
v f x v z
x f x v z
v z







 
 
 
 
 
       A.14 
 
Again, ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ): ( , , ) : ,i u u i if f x v u v x   are continuous nonlinear functions and ( ) ( )v t  is 
a prior mean on the hidden causes at the highest level. The random terms 
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
~ (0, ( , , ))N
i u i i i u
z x v   are conditionally independent and enter each level of the 
hierarchy.  They play the role of observation error or noise at the first level and induce 
random fluctuations in the states at higher levels.  The causes (1) (2) .v v v    link 
levels, whereas the hidden states (1) (2) .x x x    link dynamics over time.  In 
hierarchical form, the output of one level acts as an input to the next.  This input can enter 
nonlinearly to produce quite complicated generalised convolutions with deep 
(hierarchical) structure. This structure appears in the energy as empirical priors 
( , )
: ,L
i u
u x v  where, ignoring constants 
 
180 
 
( , ) ( , ) ( )
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )1 1
2 2
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )1 1
2 2
( , ) ( 1) ( , )
( , ) ( ) ( , )
ln | |
ln | |
L L L L
L
L
i v i x
i i
i v i v T i v i v i v
i x i x T i x i x i x
i v i i v
i x i i x
v f
Dx f

 
 



  
   
   
 
 
 
       A.15 
 
Note that the data enter the prediction errors at the lowest level; (1, ) (1, )v vs f   . At 
intermediate levels the prediction errors mediate empirical priors on the causes. 
 
In summary, these models are as general as one could imagine; they comprise hidden 
causes and states, whose dynamics can be coupled with arbitrary (analytic) nonlinear 
functions.  Furthermore, these states can be subject to random fluctuations with state-
dependent changes in amplitude and arbitrary (analytic) autocorrelation functions. A key 
aspect is their hierarchical form, which induces empirical priors on the causes.  In the next 
section, we look at the recognition dynamics entailed by this form of generative model, 
with a particular focus on how recognition might be implemented in the brain.  
 
Appendix 3: Perception and attention 
 
If we now write down the recognition dynamics (Equation A.7) using precision-weighted 
prediction errors ( , ) ( , ) ( , )i u i u i u    from Equation A.15, one can see the hierarchical 
message passing this scheme entails (ignoring the derivatives of the energy curvature): 
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Please note that this is a different form of Equation 0.3. Here, we have assumed the 
amplitude of random fluctuations is parameterised in terms of log-precisions, where   
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i u i u i u
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The vector function ( , ) ( , ): ( , , ) : ,i u i ux v u v x     returns state-dependent log-precisions 
and ( , )i uR  is the inverse smoothness matrix ( , )i uV .  In what follows we will quantify the 
amplitude (variance) of random fluctuations in terms of log-precisions, such that the 
associated variance is ( , )exp( )i u . With this particular form for the precisions, the terms 
( , )i u
w
  and ( , ) ( , )( )i u i u
w w
tr    are constant for states ,w v x  that affect the log-precisions 
linearly and zero if they have no effect. 
 
Appendix 4: Integrating the recognition dynamics (generalised 
filtering) 
 
Generalised filtering (Friston 2010b) involves integrating the ordinary differential 
Equations A.7 and A.8 to optimise the conditional means. We can simplify the numerics for 
hierarchical dynamic models by first collapsing over the hierarchy, then over generalised 
motion and finally over hidden causes and states:  
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This gives a simple form for the (Gibbs) energy that comprises a log-likelihood and prior 
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with the following integration scheme 
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This system can be solved (integrated) using a local linearisation (Ozaki 1992) with 
updates 1(exp( ) ) ( )y t I t y       over time steps t , where ( )t  the filter’s Jacobian. 
Note that we have omitted terms that mediate changes in the motion of state estimates 
due to changes in parameter estimates. This is because changes in parameter estimates 
are negligible at the time scale of changes in states.  The requisite gradients (evaluated at 
the conditional expectation) are, with a slight abuse of notion when dealing with 
derivatives with respect to vectors 
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The corresponding curvatures are (neglecting second-order terms involving states and 
parameters and second-order derivatives of the conditional entropy) 
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Finally, the conditional precision and its derivatives are given by the curvature of the 
(Gibbs) energy 
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Note that we have simplified the numerics here by neglecting conditional dependencies 
between the precisions and the states or parameters. These equations may look 
complicated but can be evaluated automatically using numerical derivatives. All the 
simulations in this paper used just one routine - spm_LAP.m.  Demonstrations of this 
scheme are available as part of the SPM software (http://www.fil.ion.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm; 
DEM_demo.m) and reproduce the examples in the figures. 
 
Appendix 5: State-dependent noise and Weber’s Law 
 
Sensory signals are invariably registered as non-negative quantities (e.g., firing rates of 
photoreceptors). If we assume the sensory signals lns   are an approximate log-
transform of some non-negative variables    sampled from a Poisson distribution 
with rate  , we have from Equation 9 (and using a first-order Taylor expansion): 
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This means that as the expected amplitude of the sensory input increases, ( ) lnvf  , so 
does its precision ( ) ( )exp( )v vf   . 
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